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This thesis addresses the role of non-lethal weapons (NLWs) within missions 
conducted by special operations and general purpose forces in peacetime contingency 
operations referred to as "special wars." It takes a paradigmatic approach from the emerging 
debate concerning the revolution in military affairs (RMA). The specific concepts employed 
constitute the paradigm of control warfare. We hypothesize that, the more tenets of control 
warfare are applied to a mission or operation, the more effective will be any application of 
non-lethal weapons, and the greater the likelihood of success. 
The thesis defines NLWs, then focuses on the comparative analysis of two different 
mini-case studies of follow-on operations from the war in Panama in 1989-1990. Missions 
in the case studies are first analyzed with respect to the control warfare paradigm. Then, a 
second analysis, using quality function deployment (QFD) techniques, is used to examine the 
specific applicability of types of NLWs to operational tasks within these missions. The 
criteria used for this analysis are measures of effectiveness (MOEs) expanded along the 
dimensions addressed in the theoretical discussion. The finding is that employing the 
concepts associated with control warfare has a direct relationship to how well suited non- 
lethal weapons may be to application in burgeoning "special" types of wars that we shall 
likely face in the future. 
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This thesis asks how may we best address the role of non-lethal weapons (NLWs) 
within the missions conducted by special operations and general purpose forces in peacetime 
contingency operations (PCOs), or what might also be referred to as "special wars." It takes 
a paradigmatic approach to the problem by examining the theory and concepts associated 
with the emerging body of work that address the revolution in military affairs (RMA). The 
specific concepts employed in the analysis are drawn from the paradigm of control warfare. 
Analysis using this perspective may provide a more synergistic view of how we fight these 
special wars versus a traditional analysis using attrition or maneuver warfare paradigms. 
The thesis reviews the definitional and doctrinal arguments concerning NLWs. After 
developing a typology for NLWs, it focuses on the class of PCOs at the high end of the 
spectrum of conflict short of war. This widening niche, that we also refer to as "special 
wars," constitutes neither conventional war nor stand alone military operations other than war 
(MOOTW), but the complex integration of both military force and political instruments to 
accomplish strategic goals through a campaign(s) by joint forces under the control of a joint 
forces commander (JFC) or theater CINC to meet specified national objectives. 
The paradigm of control warfare, expanded upon under the theoretical RMA 
discussion, is used to develop a model for viewing the principles involved in these 
operations. Using the model, this thesis focuses on the comparative analysis of two different 
mini-case studies of follow-on operations within Operation JUST CAUSE in the war in 
Panama in 1989-1990. They are analyzed with respect to the control warfare paradigm to 
examine the validity of the hypothesis that the degree of mission success is governed by how 
well the tenets of the theory of control warfare are applied to a mission or operation. As a 
result, it is hypothesized that by following these tenets in future operations similar to these 
reviewed, the more effective would be any application of non-lethal weapons, either as an 
adjunct to lethal weapons or standing alone, depending on the specific goal of the overall 
operation. 
IX 
A second analysis follows each mini-case study, using quality function deployment 
(QFD) techniques to examine the specific applicability of types of NLWs to operational tasks 
within these missions. The criteria used for this analysis are measures of effectiveness 
(MOEs) expanded along the dimensions addressed in the theoretical discussion. The 
external constraints on the use of specific NLWs - the legal and ethical, sociopolitical, 
informational, environmental, and economic constraints - are weighted and internalized into 
the decision problem by the use of QFD matrix analysis. The criteria used in this second 
perspective both provide confirmation of the first paradigmatic analysis, and as the baseline 
for further interdisciplinary quantitative research. 
The findings of this study are that the concepts of information dominance and the 
other tenets associated with control warfare have a direct relationship to how well suited non- 
lethal weapons may be to application in these burgeoning "special wars" that we shall likely 
be facing in the future. It also follows that NLWs should not be considered piecemeal, 
without consideration of the other instruments of power and application of non-lethal tools, 
sensors, and precision guided standoff munitions that will also populate this information- 
based type of knowledge warfare. This work is a preliminary effort, and as such it also 
suggests the need for further research into the broader questions of how to view NLWs 
quantitatively. Other directions for inquiry include how NLWs should be viewed with 
respect to arms control discussions, countermeasures, and special use cases, such as in the 
support of emerging counterproliferation missions as driven by the Defense 
Counterproliferation Initiative. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
/ will also direct the Office of the Secretary of Defense to accelerate efforts to field 
non-chemical, non-lethal alternatives to RCAsfor use in situations where combatants and 
noncombatants are intermingled... 
(President William J. Clinton, 23 June 1994) 
A. BACKGROUND AND PURPOSE 
As recently as a few years ago, just saying the words, special operations and "non- 
lethal weapons," in the same sentence would have drawn raised eyebrows from most military 
officers. Nevertheless, this thesis intends to explore the mission utility and role for "non- 
lethal weapons" in special operations missions conducted in "special wars." Briefly defined, 
non-lethal weapons may be referred to as those that disable personnel, weapons, supplies, 
or equipment in such a way that death or severe permanent disability to personnel are 
unlikely.1 In one form or other they have been used throughout history, as we will review 
later in this section.  In a recent draft DoD policy for non-lethal weapons the following 
definition was proposed: 
Non-lethal weapons are discriminate weapons that are explicitly designed and employed so 
as to incapacitate personnel or material, while minimizing fatalities and undesired damage 
to property and the environment. Unlike weapons that permanently destroy targets through 
blast, fragmentation, or penetration, non-lethal weapons have relatively reversible effects on 
targets and/or are able to discriminate between targets and non-targets in the weapon's area 
of impact.2 
This thesis addresses the question, how may we best assess the role of non-lethal 
weapons within the missions and sub-missions conducted by the United States Special 
Operations Command (USSOCOM) special operations forces (SOF) as they prosecute 
missions as part of the integrated force in complex peacetime contingency operations in the 
1
 The definition as used by Major Joseph W. Cook III, Major David P. Fiely, and Captain Maura 
T. McGowan in, "Non-lethal Weapons and Special Operations: Technologies, Legalities, and Potential 
Policies," an unpublished study conducted for HQ USAF/XOXI, 27 Jun 94, p. 3. 
2
 Draft DoD Directive, SUBJECT: "Policy for Non-Lethal Weapons" (Draft, 21 July 1994), 
currently out for comment. Draft signed out by Dr. Christopher Lamb, Director, Policy Planning in the 
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict OASD(SO/LIC) 
(Policy Planning). 
1 
post-Cold War era.3 This thesis will concentrate on using a mission-based perspective to 
examine the requirements and constraints for non-lethal weapon (NLW)4 applications in SOF 
missions. As such, this mission-based analysis includes a careful examination of the way 
special operators fight. Many of these emerging missions may also be assigned to general 
purpose forces (GPF). In this respect, this analysis would apply more to the special nature 
of these missions than to the explicit designation of units. 
SOF are required to operate in situations which demand an adaptive, proportional, 
and precise approach to the defeat of an adversary. In response to this requirement, U.S. 
SOF have worked jointly to develop training and tactics, planning and rehearsal, and 
operational techniques and support systems to prosecute their various missions. SOF have 
developed a variety of mobility and maneuver options on land, sea, and air to complement 
conventional means: from motorcycles and light vehicles to fast boats and submerged SEAL 
Delivery Vehicles (SDVs) to high altitude high opening (HAHO), high altitude low opening 
(HALO) and very low altitude static line parachute jumps, to light, medium, and heavy-lift 
helicopters, gunships and specialized transport aircraft. Similarly, SOF command, control, 
communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I) systems have undergone an extensive and 
intensive development effort to offer redundant and flexible options for the optimal use of 
these forces in conflict. Advances in more precise and deadly weapons have also been 
fielded in recent years for SOF and GPF fire support. 
But, this quick review uncovers the limited availability of suitable options or choices 
between the use of deadly force and the use of no force for SOF. The lack of NLW options 
for defense or offense constrains the flexibility of these forces to respond appropriately in 
environments governed by restrictive rules of engagement (ROE) or limited policy 
" General Purpose Forces (GPF) are also facing these challenges. To the extent that they task, 
organize and operate under a the same paradigm as SOF, this research would apply to the prosecution of 
their missions. However, the purpose here is to focus primarily on SOF. 
As will be seen in the review given in this thesis, not only is it hard to find agreement on the 
definition for non-lethal weapons, it is even harder to find agreement on using similar terminology. Even 
the spelling of the same terms strikes debate as some authors hyphenate non-lethal and others do not. We 
will use the same convention as currently pending DoD policy direction, by hyphenating the word or using 
the acronym NLW to refer to these weapons. When quoting other sources, we will honor their convention. 
objectives. Increasingly, the U.S. finds itself engaged in Military Operations other than War 
(MOOTW) to support national policy objectives in the post-Cold War world. Proper 
consideration of the present and future need for non-lethal capabilities for SOF prompts a 
review of the framework for missions conducted in the most complex combinations of 
MOOTW and limited conventional warfighting scenarios. 
Using this perspective, this thesis introduces a better way of understanding the proper 
integration of possible NLWs into SOF missions by first reflecting on the doctrinal paradigm 
under which these forces would operate. These future operations do not seem best described 
by using the existing paradigms for warfare of attrition and maneuver.5 A better description 
may be as suggested by the emerging paradigm of "control warfare" which links information 
dominance to the concept of the enemy as a system6 to understand how to defeat even a 
strong opponent with minimum cost and loss of life. 
The next step is to test this emerging paradigm by examining demanding cases. For 
this thesis, this requirement will be satisfied by examining SOF missions performed in 
peacetime contingency operations (PCOs)7 that may be sustained, complex, and extensive. 
These PCOs deal with very limited conventional regional threats, unconventional regional 
threats, and trans-regional threats that define the environment short of war for which 
OASD(SO/LIC) is developing a policy framework. They fit into the gray area or "special 
war" category located at the high end in the continuum between MOOTW and conventional 
war. Defined as "special wars" in this thesis because they are not conventional war, 
5
 Army Field Manual 100-5 (June 1993), Air Force Manual 1-1 (March 1992), Naval Doctrine 
Publication (NDP) 1, Mar 1994. 
6
 The concepts of information dominance and the enemy as a system spoken of here are based on 
the thought paper by John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, "Cyberwar is Coming!," Comparative Strategy, 12, 
1993, 141-165 and Arquilla, "The Strategic Implications of Information Dominance," Strategic Review, 
Summer 1994, 25-30. Additional reference for the modeling of the enemy as a system goes to Col John A. 
Warden III, "The Enemy as a System," Concepts in Airpowerfor the Campaign Planner, Air Command 
and Staff College, 1993. 
7
 Peacetime Contingency Operations are defined in Army Field Manual 100-20/Air Force 
Pamphlet 3-20, Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict (Dec 1990), as Politically sensitive military 
operations normally characterized by the short-term, rapid projection or employment of forces in conditions 
short of war. The usage here emphasizes the high end of the continuum short of war. 
MOOTW, or discrete special operations, but, rather a unified campaign or series of 
campaigns waged in an integrated fashion by a unified commander or joint forces 
commander (JFC).8  The "special war" that is used as the basis for this study is the first one 
waged under the new command relationships developed as a result of the Goldwater-Nichols 
Act of 1986 - the conflict in Panama in 1989-1990.   It was comprised of two major 
sequential integrated operations that phased from one into the other:   Operation JUST 
CAUSE, as the force projection and crisis response phase, and Operation PROMOTE 
LIBERTY, the post-crisis civil initiatives phase. The hypothesis to be tested is applied to 
special operations forces operating in environments that create tension between the military 
desire to come in with guns blazing in a maximum use of force and the political necessity 
to employ the minimum amount of force. The hypothesis is that the more the concept of 
control warfare was applied to our conduct within these mission areas, the more effective 
would have been the use of NLWs in leading to mission success. This would be true whether 
they were to be used as an adjunct to lethal weapons or used independently, depending on 
military necessity or the specific objective desired. 
This thesis recognizes the potential constraints on the use of NLWs, as well as their 
advantages. Because of the newness of the technology surrounding some of these weapons, 
a subjective weighting of their net potential based on these constraints will be factored in the 
projected quantitative assessment.   Even though emerging mission areas that SOF are 
currently facing are already creating a demand for NLWs, finding a "magic" bullet that works 
effectively while avoiding lethal doses may prove difficult.  As the Commander in Chief 
(CINC) of USSOCOM has noted: 
We can design a projectile that will not hurt a grown man but that will kill a child, or 
someone who is old, infirm or sick. I am very interested but I have not found the Holy Grail 
yet." 
For a thought provoking discussion of integrated operations, see CPT(P) Michael M. Kershaw, 
The Integration of Special Operations and General Purpose Forces (Monterey, CA: Master's Thesis, Naval 
Postgraduate School, Dec 1994). 
R. Pengelley, interview with General Wayne A. Downing, Defense News, 11-17 April 1994, p. 
30. 
This thesis does not propose NLWs as a panacea. However, the detailed argument 
developed, based on the actual mission case studies, should shed light on the larger value of 
an integrated approach to the use of innovative and adaptive means to accomplish the end 
goals of an operation. New ways of operating or organizing to do battle, using the tenets 
developed when applying the paradigm of control warfare, should illustrate the synergistic 
effects on all elements as they come together in battle. 
1.   Brief Historical Overview 
Throughout history, humans have increased their ability to destroy in warfare, at 
times by small increments at other times aided by quantum leaps in technological 
development or paradigm shifts. Since the adoption of the use of the pike and the Greek 
development of the catapult in Sicily10 between 400-300 B.C., the evolution of lethal 
weapons has progressed in leaps and bounds. As Dupuy describes the progression, arms 
have evolved from the swords and bows of the Age of Muscle to the cannons and muskets 
of the Age of Gunpowder beginning in the early 1500s. Along with industrialization came 
rifled magazine loading long arms and belt-fed machine guns, and tanks, rockets, fighters, 
bombers, battleships, aircraft carriers, submarines, and nuclear weapons. In the post- 
industrial era, precision guided munitions (PGMs) and "intelligent machines" have sprouted 
up." Industrialization led to an attritional paradigm and large conscript armies. Modern 
rifles, machine guns, and artillery combined to produce the wholesale carnage of World War 
I. The paradigm of maneuver was spurred on by the development of the internal combustion 
engine and mechanization. German blitzkrieg doctrine in World War II provides the defining 
example." The developments in gas turbine propulsion technologies have vastly increased 
the range and dominance of air warfare in maneuver over the battlefield and supported the 
concepts of air superiority and aerospace control to allow flexible force application. 
10
 Martin van Creveld, The Transformation of War (New York: Macmillan, 1991), p. 83. 
11
 Trevor N. Dupuy, The Evolution of Weapons and Warfare (Indianapolis: Bobbs, 1980), pp. 
286-289. 
12
 John Arquilla, "The Strategic Implications of Information Dominance," Strategic Review, 
Summer 1994, p. 26. 
Looking to the future, the fusion of revolutionary work in sensors, computers, and 
"hyper-technology weapons" will lead to even greater and more precise lethality for troops, 
armored vehicles, vessels and aircraft. The Army tested some of these nascent technologies 
at the National Training Center (NTC), Ft. Irwin, California, during their "Digital Soldier" 
advanced war-fighting experiment April 10-23, 1994. However, the results of digitization 
were mixed against experienced "Red Force" opposing forces (OPFOR). The results 
suggested that the hypothesis that digitization will enhance the power of the force is valid but 
that no amount of high technology will ever take the place of basic soldiering skills, 
leadership, imagination, and organization. Exercises like this are just the beginning for 
exploring these new technologies.13 A National Research Council report, Star 21, Strategic 
Technologies for the Army of the 21st Century, predicts advances that will serve to make the 
battlefield "unprecedentedly dangerous." It also alludes to the same technologies being 
useful in improving the odds of survival through the use of stealth, low-probability-of- 
intercept sensors, and electronic countermeasures.14 
In contrast, the development of NLWs has been less structured, and until recently, 
less emphasized than lethal weapons. Notable historical examples of the use of NLWs 
include obscuring smoke in the Peloponnesian Wars to mask troop actions.15 Other examples 
of the use of sounds include the screams of attacking Celts, the bagpipes of Scottish 
Highlanders, the drumming of spears against shields by Zulu warriors, and the Rebel yell. 
These examples from previous centuries illustrate the use of sound in a nonlethal application 
to strike fear into the hearts of an enemy and affect the outcome of battle. During the U.S. 
Civil War, following the Battle of Chattanooga, there was an unusual engagement on the 
night of 28-29 October 1863 near Chattanooga, between the forces of the Confederate 
General Longstreet and those of the Federal General Hooker. "The Federals were assisted by 
11 
" David Silverberg, "The Battle of Debnam Pass," Armed Forces Journal International, June 
1994, pp. 32-33, sidebar. 
14 NRC report, Star 21, as reported by William Matthews, Air Force Times, November 21, 1994. 
Referenced by David C. Morrison, "War Without Death?," National Journal, 7 November 
1992: 2589. 
their mules, which took fright and stampeded towards the enemy, who broke and fled, 
imagining a cavalry charge was upon them."16 It is interesting to note that this effective 
although accidental use of "non-lethal mules" was never subsequently adopted. 
As a goal, Sun Tzu wrote as his third tenet of offensive strategy: "To subdue the 
enemy without fighting is the acme of skill."17 However in reference to this pursuit, the use 
of nonlethal weaponry has been relegated to secondary military roles: mostly limited to 
deterring the enemy, weakening combat effectiveness, using deception to induce capitulation 
to a lesser force without engaging in combat, improving security and self protection, or 
enabling the more efficient use of lethal weapons. In this manner the tools of the trade in the 
fields of intelligence, psychological operations and electronic warfare have matured. For the 
most part, nonlethal weapons directed specifically at individual personnel were primarily 
used by states in quelling civil disorder. Examples that come to mind include rubber bullets, 
water cannons, tear gas, and long batons used against rioters. Indeed, in this century, non- 
lethal weapons used in place of lethal weapons have been more a creature of internal policy 
than a warfighting tool. 
As we will elaborate in Chapter II, this situation is undergoing rapid change as a 
result of the shifting post-Cold War environment and a governmental policy of minimum use 
of force and limited collateral damage. Additional factors drawing interest to NLWs include: 
a downsized military, accelerating technological development, a societal paradigm shift to 
an information age, and the related discussion of an emerging Revolution in Military Affairs 
(RMA). This new environment, governmental policies, and the other relevant factors have 
combined to generate high-level policymaker, academic, and military interest in a broad 
spectrum of NLWs. 
16
 The above examples are drawn in part from an extensive listing in an Air Command and Staff 
College study conducted by Major Terry L. Carpenter, Major Biltim Chingono, Major Jeffry A. Dull, Major 
Michael S. Kalna, Major Jim H. Keffer, Major Jonathan W. Klaaren and Major Ronald S, Mitchell, 
Nonlethal Technology and Airpower: A Winning Combination for Strategic Paralysis(ACSC: June 1994). 
The Civil War example was cited from a quote in J. F. C. Fuller, A Military History of the Western World 
(New York: Da Capo Press, Inc., n.d.). 
17
 Samuel B. Griffith, ed. and trans., Sun Tzu: The Art of Warfare (London: Oxford University 
Press, 1963), p. 77. 
7 
2. Relevance 
Technological developments in the last few decades have produced a plethora of 
emerging and maturing options for nonlethal warfare.     One rising debate among 
technologists, policymakers, military officers and academics has centered on the need to 
develop a new paradigm for nonlethal warfare to frame future policy toward development, 
acquisition, and integration of these weapons into our arsenal.   Some of the paradigm 
proposals offered take a "top-down" technological or moralistic approach to the question.18 
A conversation with a Department of Defense official19 who would sit on the recently 
proposed Non-Lethal Weapons Steering Committee, confirms that DoD is grappling with the 
basic definition of nonlethal weapons and plans to issue an annual Non-Lethal Weapons 
Master Plan.   Regardless of the challenges, there is a strong push to develop nonlethal 
weapons. Deputy Secretary of Defense, Dr. John Deutch notes: 
The trend is toward more accurate weapons, that limits the task with small error - nonlethal 
weapons are a natural evolution... It is very important to shut down a country with minimum 
force.20 
In the post-Cold War world the U.S. is facing further dangers to its national security 
caused by the increased disorder and turbulence in regional relations and the diffusion of 
technology in the international arena. The dangers include the proliferation of weapons of 
mass destruction, regional wars of resurgent nationalism or religious revivalism, state 
sponsored terrorism, and other threats to international peace (or to emerging democracies). 
To react properly to these threats, as well as to other MOOTW, will increasingly require the 
selective use of U.S. special operations forces either alone or in concert with general purpose 
forces(GPF). In integrated operations, the reformed U.S. Atlantic Command's (USACOM) 
See Janet Morris, "Nonlethality: A US Global Strategy Council Concept Paper" (Washington, 
D.C.: United States Global Strategy Council, 1990) or "Nonlethality: Development of a National Policy and 
Employing Nonlethal Means in a New Strategic Era" (Washington, D.C.: US GSC, 1991). 
1
  Discussion with Mr. Don N. Henry, Staff Specialist - Tactical Systems in OSD(AQ), at National 
Institute of Justice (NIJ) symposium, "21st Century Law Enforcement," 21 May 94. 
20 Remarks made by Dr. Deutch, while he was then Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition) in a 
speech to the Council on Foreign Relations on 5 November 1993. 
Adaptive Joint Force Packages (AJFP) suggest one possible composition or force mix.21 In 
these operations, however, these forces will be bounded and constrained at the strategic, 
operational, and tactical level by political sensibilities and limited policy objectives, domestic 
and military concerns for loss of life, media coverage, and situations with mixed combatants 
and civilians. All these constraints point toward the need for limiting the loss of life on all 
sides. The aforementioned high-level interest in policy circles in the subject of nonlethal 
weapons suggests the relevance of studies that work to determine the role of nonlethal 
weapons in special operations. 
B. SCOPE 
This thesis is primarily focused on the mission-specific line of inquiry for NLWs. 
Since any substantial reliance on such weapons will necessitate a serious reassessment of 
doctrine as well as rethinking overall military planning and strategy at the tactical, 
operational, and strategic levels, we do not anticipate the need to concentrate on a lengthy 
or detailed discussion of all the possible weapons technology options. Many excellent open 
source studies have developed reasonably comprehensive listings of the different possible 
technologies.22 We will compile the technologies and present a baseline listing in Appendix 
A. We will concentrate mainly on ordering these technologies and concepts by cross-listing 
them in a functional typology that categorizes their value based on targets and tasks. These 
categories can be scaled to apply at the tactical, operational, or strategic levels of conflict. 
Using measures of effectiveness (MOEs) developed from a review of the emerging paradigm 
of control warfare, case studies will be examined to see where previous missions might have 
benefited by the use of NLWs from these categories. 
21
 ADM Paul David Miller, "A New Mission for Atlantic Command," Joint Forces Quarterly, 
Summer 1993, 80. Adaptive Joint Force Packaging (AJFP): A Critical Analysis (Monterey, CA: Master's 
Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Dec 1993), pp. 64-75. 
22
 The list of studies detailing specific technologies includes the already cited works by Cook, 
1994; and Mitchell, 1994 (Appendix). Other excellent sources include: an article by Paul R. Evancoe, 
"Non-Lethal Technologies Enhance Warrior's Punch," National Defense, December 1993, pp. 26-29; a 
briefing by John Alexander of the Special Technologies Group, Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) 
to USSOCOM, "Nonlethal Weapons Concepts," 31 March 1994; and a publicly released DoD briefing, 
"DoD Activities in Non Lethal Weapons" (94-S-4521), cleared October 19, 1994. 
One of the problems with researching these weapons has been the differing security 
classifications of the same or similar systems by different services or agencies. In respect to 
this conundrum, we will be circumspect when discussing anything that could possibly be 
considered sensitive or classified. This philosophy also will be used when addressing special 
operations roles and missions in Panama. We intend to rely on open source references and 
unclassified interviews. One last problem involves the plethora of news reports, magazine 
and journal articles, studies, and draft policies being currently generated on this subject. For 
this reason the information cut-off date for this thesis is 21 November 1994. The risk, of 
course, is that some of the data provided herein may be overtaken by events. However, the 
theoretical application should remain valid. 
C. ORGANIZATION 
This thesis begins with an overview of the detailed definitions of PCOs and non- 
lethal weapons necessary to understand the later discussion of their detailed elements. PCOs 
comprise different and sometimes overlapping missions for special operations forces, 
conventional forces, Department of State (DOS) and other government agencies (OGAs). 
Integration of the military assets and interagency cooperation with OGAs, non-government 
organizations (NGOs) and other foreign governments or host nations (HN) may combine to 
develop a complex, coalition command and control relationship for PCO "special wars." The 
nature of the different missions and environments faced in the distinct phases of these PCOs 
produces different perspectives for evaluating the functional categories in the typology of 
NLWs that we will discuss in the second half of this chapter. As mentioned earlier, a listing 
of the types and technologies of NLWs, either now becoming available or proposed, will be 
available in Appendix A. A review of recent non-lethal initiatives, an expanded definition 
and categorization of NLWs, and the brief mention of a concept for differentiating non-lethal 
tools from others will all fall under the title of a discussion of non-lethality in the second 
section of the chapter. The advantages and constraints to non-lethal warfare and the subject 
of countermeasures and arms control for specific weapons will be introduced. 
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Chapter HI reviews the attrition, maneuver, and control warfare paradigms, and 
develop an operational model for the emerging paradigm of control warfare. This 
operational model will be used in a systems approach to discover guidelines for viewing the 
"traditional" principles and tenets of warfare using the lens provided by the theory of control 
warfare. With knowledge of the enemy as the driving force in this discussion, a perceptual 
shorthand for viewing the enemy at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels will be 
offered. 
In Chapter IV, this model or theorized perspective will then be applied to the general 
arrangement and disposition of SOF forces in Panama for the initial main battles of the 
"special war," Operation JUST CAUSE. This general discussion is then narrowed and 
focused later in the chapter, when detailed reviews are given of two mini-case studies from 
follow-on missions in Operation JUST CAUSE: 1) the western campaign in Chiriquf 
province and the surrender of the Military Zone 5 commander, Lt. Col. Luis del Cid in 
David, and 2) the urban control efforts in Panama City (and Colon) immediately after the 
initial coup de main. This thesis describes the way different missions within this operation 
were planned, managed and fought at the tactical, operational, or strategic levels. The 
relative success or failure to accomplish the stated goals of these missions is compared to 
how well the tenets of control warfare theory can be applied. These case studies provide a 
demanding test for the tenets of the theory of control warfare, because these operations 
encapsulate in fine detail some of the innovative and adaptive ways special operations forces 
are now commanded and fought and the constraints on missions within these large peacetime 
contingency operations. 
Chapter V analyzes the different missions, when the task was to paralyze or otherwise 
disable versus kill the adversary or target. The analysis is represented by matrices that are 
developed that compare the desired goal of the mission and the proposed Measures of 
Effectiveness (MOEs) that the mission's goals would suggest, plotted versus a projection of 
the probable level of effectiveness of the different categories of nonlethal weapons. This is 
accomplished for all the different categories of weapons in the typology of nonlethal 
weapons that this thesis proposed and developed in Chapter JJ (unless otherwise noted). The 
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different technologies that cross-reference within the categories listed are then examined. 
Scenarios are developed from within the case studies and from other anecdotal examples to 
show how nonlethal weapons may aid special operations forces in future engagements and 
the MOEs developed in the thesis will be suggested to judge their use. 
The conclusion, Chapter VI, reviews and summarizes the analysis of Chapter V and 
offers recommendations. Also examined is the necessity for developing countermeasures 
and for examining arms control implications for the possible proliferation of the more 
destabilizing and destructive variants of possible NLW systems. This open ended work 
concludes by ordering the proposed MOEs for use in an interdisciplinary development of an 
object-oriented software program to provide prioritized guidance for judging the employment 
of NLWs. This procedure could assist the following research and development efforts and 
policy development: 1) Input for seminal work being done by the Advanced Research 
Projects Agency (ARPA), 2) Measures to consider for simulations and "Digital Soldier" like 
field tests during the early injection of technical expertise in the limited procurement phase 
by using Advanced Concept Technology Development (ACTD) programs (as DoD Science 
and Technology (S&T) advises in the process), 3) "Bubble up" policy influence for OSD, 
the Non-Lethal Weapons Steering Committee, OASD(SO/LIC), the Services, and 
USSOCOM from a review of the analysis of these case studies, or 4) Operational testing of 
NLWs and possible concurrent or later use in decision aids for the operational commander. 
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II. DEFINITIONS 
A. "SPECIAL WARS" 
After carefully reviewing recent doctrinal guidance and the military and academic 
literature that suggests a transformation in the way we view war and Military Operations 
other than War (MOOTW),23 we now offer a more precise definition of "special wars," as 
used in the following discussions. "Special wars" could be described as either lesser regional 
conflicts (LRCs)24 or what we have referred to in Chapter I as peacetime contingency 
operations (PCOs). For example, PCOs like Operation JUST CAUSE/PROMOTE 
LIBERTY and (the narrowly averted forced-entry option of) Operation RESTORE 
DEMOCRACY in Haiti, cannot be considered conventional war (CW) scenarios, and yet do 
surpass the levels of classification for any one discrete category within the MOOTW 
environment. The range of forces and missions also surpasses any one description for SOF 
in Joint Pub 3-05, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations. These operations may include 
forced entry and combat operations as part of Joint Task Force (JTF) organizations that 
conduct operations and task organize below the corps level. 
These PCOs may encompass the integration of elements of GPF, SOF, DOS, OGA 
(USAID, USIS, DEA et al), NGOs, HN, and local private volunteer organizations (PVOs). 
The challenges these PCOs present are dynamic. By conducting a coordinated medium-term 
sustained campaign that consists of time-phased and simultaneous operations that span the 
missions described for multiple types of MOOTW, or even a short CW, they populate the 
widening fuzzy grey line that defines the difference between CW and MOOTW scenarios 
23
 Joint Pub 1, Joint Warfare of the US Armed Forces, 11 November 1991; Joint Pub 3-05, 28 
October 1992, Joint Pub 3-07(Draft), 18 July 1994; Army Field Manual 100-20/Air Force Pamphlet 3-20, 
5 December 1990, Alvin and Heidi Toffler, War and Anti-War: Survival at the Dawn of the 21st Century 
(Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1993); van Creveld, 1991, The Transformation of War, Strategic Studies 
Institute (SSI) RMA monographs (6), 6, 10 June and 15, 20, 22, 25 July 1994; Arquilla and Ronfeldt, 
1993; and Arquilla, 1994. 
24
 The generic term used in the 1 September 1993, Bottom-Up Review (BUR) brief by Secretary 
of Defense, Les Aspin. 
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(see Fig 2.1).25 Existing either as what one may consider the lowest rung of CW or the high 
end of the continuum for MOOTW, they represent what an OASD(SO/LIC) policy paper 
considers as situations for the employment of measures short of war (MSW). These 
measures should be considered for selective engagement against unconventional regional 
threats or trans-regional threats.26 These PCOs should also be considered as alternative 
preventive responses to counter developing lesser conventional regional threats - to "nip 
them in the bud" before a later large-scale conventional Major Regional Conflict (MRC) 
response might become necessary. This selected engagement scheme seems in agreement 
with our new National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement?1 
The dilemma is that even with an increased probability for more conflict situations 
like these PCOs in the post-Cold War environment and the development of Joint 
Publications to address the issue,28 there exists a doctrinal gap for describing them as 
integrated operations.29 This suggests the need for their further study. Martin van Creveld 
points out that a lesser view of non-trinitarian war or low-intensity conflict (LIC) in the 
recent past, has prevented a proper strategic appreciation for LIC. He has argued that it has 
not been taken seriously until too late.30 Coupled with this, is the fact that they encompass 
a microcosm of most all the elements of MOOTW and the political, legal, social, cultural, 
25 Figure 1.1 adapted from Figure 1-1, Joint Pub 3-07(D), 18 July 94, p. 1-7. 
26
 OASD(SO/LIC) (4 Mar 1992, Working Paper Draft) Concept Paper on the environment short of 
war, pp. 4-9, 18-21. 
27 National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement, 21 July 1994. 
90 
Joint Pub 3-07, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War (18 July 1994 DRAFT) 
describes environments, and Joint Pub 3-05, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations (28 October 1992), 
describes the planning and organization of special operations forces and their missions. The definitional 
break between conventional war and special operations seems conducive to the neglect for the most 
complicated scenarios. 
29 Please refer to Michael M. Kershaw, The Integration of Special Operations and General 
Purpose Forces. 
"   Martin van Creveld, The Transformation of War (New York: Macmillan, 1991), p. 57. 
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Figure 2.1 - Modified Range, After Joint Pub 3-07(D) 
and informational entanglements that to differing degrees constrain the conduct of the 
different phases within the overall operation. This suggests their value and use as a source 
for fine-grained demanding cases for evaluating the emerging paradigm of control warfare, 
and also as crucibles for evaluation of the possible employment of NLWs in the PCO at the 
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tactical, operational, and strategic level. The principles of MOOTW that are presented in 
Joint Pub 3-07: Objective, Unity of Effort, Security, Restraint, Perseverance, and 
Legitimacy,31 and the unified principles of war that control warfare theory suggests (reviewed 
in Chapter III), combine with the "normal " principles of war to illustrate the complex 
command challenges these operations may engender, beyond the relatively straightforward 
constraints on the employment of forces in a conventional war or MRC. 
Now that we have established where these "special wars" fit in the spectrum of 
conflict, we will next discuss some of the roles for the different SOF and GPF elements that 
may participate in them. These PCOs generally have three major phases. The first is the 
forced entry, usually accomplished either through an air head, port facilities, airborne or 
amphibious landing. The next phase is the sustainment phase, characterized by the 
stabilizing of the operation by military augmentation with follow-on forces and the various 
political and military operations designed to over-match and defeat the adversary. The final 
phase is the continued stability operations, like foreign internal defense (FID) and nation 
assistance to aid the transition of the host nation to a stable or normal independent state of 
affairs. 
In the forced entry phase, SOF may be required to perform Direct Action (DA), 
Unconventional Warfare (UW), Special Reconnaissance (SR), and Counterterrorism (CT) 
missions. Even before the large-scale raid or strike that "kicks the door open," SOF may be 
involved at a lower level in the above missions, with the inclusion of psychological 
operations (PSYOPS), human intelligence (HUMINT), and counterinsurgency (CI) missions 
supporting the entry into battle. SOF and GPF may also conduct coalition warfare missions 
to facilitate interoperability between U.S. and allied forces. GPF forces may conduct air 
strikes, naval bombardment, or cruise missile attacks in this opening phase. 
In the sustainment phase, GPF may replace-in-force or quickly augment the SOF 
elements that opened the operation. The force mix of the JTF may be as described by the 
31
 Joint Pub 3-07, pp. II-1 -11-10. 
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USACOM definition for AJFPs: "a capabilities centered grouping of forces and headquarters 
organized and trained to meet specific peacetime, crisis or wartime requirements of the 
supported combatant commander."32 The various SOF and GPF missions must be 
coordinated to further the intent of the combatant commander. In these PCO scenarios, the 
use of adaptive SOF packages or task forces must be able to quickly meet the objectives of 
missions requiring minimum collateral damage and economy of force. As will be seen in the 
case studies, when the command philosophy incorporates flexibility and provides for 
decentralized execution, these operations can have outstanding results. 
In the final phase, the continued stability operations become essential as we transition 
from a warlike situation of "us versus them" to a more policeman like situation of "us helping 
them." The ROE and modus operandi of the Special Forces (SF) teams and Civil Affairs 
(CA) groups that stay behind when the bulk of the troops leave has to adapt to a positive 
presence influence. These critical missions, like the civil-military operations run by OGAs 
and the efforts of NGO, other foreign governments (OFG) or UN peacekeeping forces must 
all be coordinated to ensure the long term success of a PCO. 
Hopefully, this review of what a PCO generically encompasses will be helpful during 
the later discussions of non-lethal warfare, the control warfare paradigm, and the specific 
case studies. When speculating on future possible scenarios, this "special war" model will 
be useful to examine the roles, missions and functions of a representative force and the 
countermeasures and constraints the enemy and the environment presents for each phase. 
This discussion has been cursory at best and we suggest that an early marker be put down 
now for further research on "special wars." 
32
 ADM Paul David Miller, USN, "US Atlantic Command: Focusing on the Future," Military 
Review, September 1994, p. 7. 
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B. NON-LETHALITY 
This section will expand on the earlier definition of NLWs given in the introduction 
to the thesis. One other term will also be defined, non-lethal tools, in order to clarify the 
distinction between a NLW and combat support tools. It is hoped that this approach will 
serve as the basis for a presentation of a functional typology that we will also develop. This 
contains target or task based functional categories into which all the technologies and types 
of NLWs concepts listed in Appendix A may be cross-referenced. 
Also introduced in this chapter is the lively debate on the perceived constraints on the 
use of NLWs. The resulting weight of these arguments will be used in Chapter V to examine 
the legal, political, social, and informational aspects of these constraints. In Chapter V, 
anecdotal examples will be drawn from within Operations JUST CAUSE and PROMOTE 
LIBERTY, as well as from a selected review of non-lethal use of force in peacetime internal 
responses to political violence by the U.S. and by other governments. Also some military 
responses within conflict or war will be used to round out the discussion. Later, during the 
analysis in Chapter V, these constraints will be quantified and used to weigh the utility of 
NLWs that seem the most promising when viewed in the context of missions conducted 
under a control warfare paradigm. From this an overall assessment will be summarized and 
presented in the conclusion. 
1. Recent Non-Lethal Initiatives 
As discussed in Chapter I, NLWs have been used throughout history. In fact, the first 
prehistoric altercation between two of our ancestors that was decided with a debilitating, but 
recoverable blow from a club or fist instead of a death blow to a combatant probably serves 
as the lead example. However, recent interest in this subject in the last few years has 
increased dramatically. For some current background we will review general developments 
in the U.S. Then we will give a brief synopsis of DoD specific initiatives. 
A paper published almost twenty-five years ago by Joseph F. Coates of the Institute 
for Defense Analyses (IDA), Nonlethal Combat in Cities Overseas, provides a preview of 
the unconventional warfare and MOOTW type missions and operations that are fueling 
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current debate on NLWs and the importance of limiting collateral damage. His ground 
breaking study also examined a majority of the high-tech and even some of the neglected 
low-tech potential concepts or mechanisms for non-lethal use in firepower missions.33 The 
U.S. Army study of incapacitating agents has been ongoing since the 1920s and was 
particularly concentrated during the 1950s and 1960s.34 
The military combatant readers of this thesis are probably familiar with the following 
personal example - an Army training film shown during annual nuclear, biological, and 
chemical (NBC) refresher training that reviewed the effects of a debilitating agent on a 
volunteer soldier. The subject first runs through an obstacle course successfully and delivers 
a message. He is then exposed to the agent (probably the now discontinued agent BZ), he 
then half-heartedly attempts to complete the course before he is distracted and wanders off. 
Upon questioning, he seems very confused and seems to have no recollection of any message 
that he was to deliver. This example illustrates the effectiveness of some of these early 
weapons. The film definitely served to convince troops to become proficient in quickly 
donning their protective mask. What it does not reveal is the utility, suitability, or long term 
effects of such agents. 
In the late 1980s, scientists at the nuclear labs and at DARPA began to concentrate 
on developing concepts for weapons that came to be called "non-lethal." Although various 
DoD agencies and the services have studied and researched non-lethal concepts and 
technologies, there has been no serious DoD policy review until February 1991.35 Beginning 
33
 Joseph F. Coates, "Nonlethal and Nondestructive Combat in Cities Overseas" (Arlington VA: 
Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA), Science and Technology Division, Paper P-569, May 1970), pp. 1-2, 
9, 27. The methodology Coates uses in his analysis to quantify missions, non-lethal applications, effects, 
possible options, and constraints were unusually comprehensive -he examined 19 different non-lethal 
concepts. 
34
 As cited in letter from Ken Collins, U.S. Army Edgewood Research, Development and 
Engineering Center,"Response to 'Nonlethal Military Force' Draft Paper," 2 May 1994, p. 2. to authors Col 
John L. Barry, USAF; LTC Michael W. Everett, USA; and Lt Col Allen G. Peck, USAF, in "Nonlethal 
Military Means: New Leverage for a New Era" (Cambridge, MA: Harvard, National Security Program 
Discussion Paper Series, Draft - 13 May 1994), p. 16. 
35 Barry, et al, 1994, describes and references some of the initiatives, pp. 16-19. 
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in 1990, letters from Ray Cline, chairman of the Global Strategy Council (and formerly DDI 
at CIA) to the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the Under Secretary for Policy urged 
that DoD aggressively pursue NLWs. Mr. Cheney, the Secretary of Defense, became 
interested in the subject and in the Spring of 1990 commissioned a Nonlethal Strategy Group 
to formulate an approach to the issue. OASD(SO/LIC) participated in this group.36 In 
1991, the group released their report. Their major findings about NLWs were that they could 
be the following: operationally attractive, legally and morally defensible, force multipliers 
when used with traditional means (consistent with military principles of economy of force 
and mass), technically feasible, and affordable. During this same time frame a substantial 
amount of publicity was generated by proponents at the U.S. Global Strategy Council and 
at the national labs.37 Also in 1991, Congress sent a list of questions to DoD asking about 
the Pentagon's intentions regarding NLWs, and OSD sent non-committal responses back. 
A proposal was developed by OSD officials to create a high profile Non-Lethal 
Technology Initiative, and to have JCS prepare an acquisition strategy, including 
promulgation documents, policy statements, and a public initiative. The proposal was turned 
down by the USD(P), Paul Wolfowitz, in September 1991 and apparently never reached the 
Secretary of Defense, Mr. Cheney. The reason officially given was that the existing approach 
was adequate.38 Because of disagreements concerning technology issues, the autonomy and 
prominence that should be afforded the initiative, as well as political infighting, the group 
Charles F. Swett, Assistant for Strategic Assessment, OASD(SO/LIC), Policy Planning, Official 
Paper, "Strategic Assessment: Non-Lethal Weapons" (unpublished, n.d.) given to the author during 
interview, 27 Oct 1994. 
'   Janet Morris, 1990 and 1991, Chris Morris, "Nonlethality: Development of a National Policy 
and Employing Nonlethal Means is a New Strategic Era" (U.S. GSC, Washington, D.C., 1991). John 
Alexander, Special Technologies Group, Los Alamos National Laboratory, is a major proponent of an anti- 
material approach, which he terms, Non-Lethal Defense (personal interview, 18 May 1994). 
"   Ibid. p. 2. Also, apparently USD(AQ), Donald Yockey nonconcured with the group's 
recommendations. His office disputed the need for a separate acquisition strategy and he felt that the 
acquisition community (including DARPA) was adequately exploring the potential value of non-lethal 
technologies. "New concepts must continue to compete on their own merits," wrote Yockey, "Non-lethal 
Warfare Study (Disabling Systems)," Memorandum for the USD(P), 20 September 1991. 
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was disbanded. With the departure of those appointed during the Bush Administration, 
however, there was a renewed effort to launch a "Nonlethality Strategy Initiative" overseeing 
development, policy, strategy and doctrine related to NLWs.39 But since then, no office in 
Policy has picked up the lead, although the recent draft non-lethal policy directive out for 
comment from Dr. Christopher Lamb, the Director, Policy Planning, proposes that 
OASD(SO/LIC) co-chair a renewed effort with OUD(A&T).40 According to Frank Kendall, 
director of tactical warfare programs, in an address to the Comdef '94 conference on 24 May 
1994, the Pentagon plans to fund a modest initiative in the FY 1996 budget request. He also 
said that DoD hopes to develop a comprehensive policy by the end of the year that will 
address the legal, ethical, political, environmental, and other issues associated with the use 
of various nonlethal weapons.41 The modest funding request for some non-lethal initiatives 
was confirmed in an interview with John K. Reingruber, OASD(SO/LIC), on 28 October 
1994. 
In 1993-94, there were at least six major conferences.42 The last one was an 
unprecedented joint DoD and Department of Justice (DOJ) conference, co-sponsored by the 
American Defense Preparedness Association (ADPA) and the National Institute of Justice 
(NIJ) entitled, "Law Enforcement Technology For the 21st Century," was held 20-22 June 
1994 in Washington, D.C.  This was the first major conference to discuss non-lethal and 
39
 Ibid p. 3., and Weinschenk, A., "Boosters again are pushing for 'Office of Non-Lethality,'" 
Defense Week, 16, Feb 1993, p. 2. 
40
 "Policy for Non-Lethal Weapons" (21 July 1994, Draft), pp. 3-4. 
41
 Glenn W. Goodman, Jr., "Upping the Nonlethal Ante," Armed Forces Journal International, 
July 1994, p. 13. 
42
 Barry, 1994, pp. 16-17, and (note 24) gives a good review and summarizes the six conferences 
listed here: June 1993 - Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA, sponsor, MIT Defense and 
Arms Control Studies Program; August 1993 - FBI Academy, Quantico, VA, co-sponsored by the Joint 
Service Small Arms Program (JSSAP) and the Army's Armament, Research, Development and Engineering 
Center (ARDEC); October 1993 - Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Washington, D.C, 
sponsored by same; November 1993 at Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory, Laurel, MD, 
sponsored by LANL and ADPA; April 1994, The Eighty-Fifth American Assembly contained a panel on 
NLWs technology and a background paper by Richard L. Garwin of IBM; and the joint DoD and DOJ 
conference mentioned above. 
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other technology transfer issues from DoD and ARPA to Justice. It was a direct result of a 
MOU signed by Mr. Deutch and Ms. Reno in April. Other research activities by think tanks 
and the services added to the increased attention to NLWs.43 For example, RAND is under 
contract by the Army and Air Force to study applications. Additionally, Booz-Allen & 
Hamilton hosted a non-lethal wargame for the Advanced Concepts and Plans Directorate of 
the ARL on 17-19 November 1993. 
The Services have taken different specific tacks as to the development of NLWs. The 
Army appears to be the Service with the strongest interest in NLWs. ARDEC at Picatinny 
has taken the lead for the Army in the study and development of Low Collateral Damage 
Munitions. The U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) mentions non- 
lethal weapons or disabling operations concepts in two pamphlets.44 According to Mr. 
Charles Swett's strategic assessment, at the policy level, the Air Force staffed the non-lethal 
issue in the Fall of 1992, and has adopted the position that it will start a program for non- 
lethal weapons if it is directed to do so by OSD, but will not take the initiative on its own. 
Also at the policy level, the Navy appears to have ignored the question entirely.45 
USSOCOM acting in its service-like role of equipping SOF, has mentioned non- 
lethal weapons in the current draft of the SOCOM Technology Investment Plan. Considered 
a general roadmap rather than a hard set of requirements, it includes the following passages: 
' Ibid., p. 17 and (notes 22, 27). Richard Kokoski, Chapter 11. "Non-lethal weapons: a case study 
of new technology developments," in SIPRI Yearbook 7994(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), pp. 
370-372. 
U.S. Army, AirLand Operations: A concept for the Evolution ofAirLand Battle for the Strategic 
Army of the 1990s and Beyond, TRADOC PAM 525-5, 4 August 1991, and U.S. Army, Operations 
Concept for Disabling Measures, TRADOC PAM 525-XX, 1 August 1992 discuss the non-lethal niche 
between diplomacy and conventional warfare and an operations concept for disabling measures, 
respectively. 
' Swett, Nov 1993, pp. 2-3. Articles in Aviation Week and Space Technology, describing non- 
nuclear electromagnetic pulse (EMP) warheads for USAF ALCMs, and the carbon-fiber warheads on Navy 
Tomahawk cruise missiles used against power plants in Iraq would tend to indicate more operational 
interest than expressed at the policy staff level. David A. Fulghum, "ALCMs Given Nonlethal Role," 
AW&ST, 22 Feb 1993, pp.20-22, and "EMP Weapons Lead Race for Non-Lethal Technology," AW&ST, 
vl38, n21,24may 1993, p. 61. 
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SOF requires the capability to selectively damage and/or immobilize personnel and/or critical 
equipment/systems. To render key personnel ineffective for a selectable period of time, 
without their having memory of the events that transpired and to incapacitate the enemy's 
capability to manufacture, transport, emplace or employ war materiel. These 
systems/weapons will fill the vacuum between diplomacy and lethal force in regional 
conflicts.. . 
SOF requires the capability to engage selected targets with Non-Lethal, Soft-Kill, Anti- 
Material, Low-Collateral Damage or System Disabling Measures. This variable effects 
system will provide the option, based on the mission and sensitivity, to destroy and/or 
immobilize personnel and/or critical equipment/systems.46 
These statements were composed by the SOF R&D community with inputs from the 
operational community. They have not been formally validated, and the word "requires" in 
the first paragraph should be understood in an informal sense. Also, interest is evidenced by 
some recent Small Business Innovative Research (SBIR) solicitations and funded 
proposals.47 
2. Non-Lethal Weapons (NLWs) 
The U.S. Army has referred to Low Collateral Damage Munitions (LCDMs) in work 
done by ARDEC and has also referred to "disabling measures" as well as nonlethal 
technologies in TRADOC pamphlets. Dr. John B. Alexander of Los Alamos National 
Laboratory describes a primarily anti-materiel concept option that he calls, non-lethal 
defense.48 The National Institute of Justice refers to a "Less-Than-Lethal" initiative to 
emphasize the intent not to kill and the safety of the use of such weapons, but does not to 
deny the possibility of their use being lethal. Some authors in the Army, the ARPA, and the 
Defense Nuclear Agency talk about "soft kill" or "mission kill" when referring to NLWs. 
Some in DoD policy circles prefer the description "disabling" while some feel it has a 
46 USSOCOM, Technology Investment Plan (draft), 17 August 1993. 
47
 Advertised by the Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC) for the Army, ARPA, and 
SOCOM, the following examples are of solicitations (and funded contracts) for non-lethal weapons 
research. Army: A92-004, (funded ID#: 92ARD-051, 92ARD-050, and 92ARD-042); ARPA: A94-093; and 
SOCOM: 94-006.   These SBIR programs may be accessed and viewed on the internet through DTICs 
server. Not all of the solicitations necessarily result in funded proposals. 
48
 John B. Alexander, "Non-Lethal Weapons as Force Options for the Army," LANL, LA-UR 94- 
861, 28 March 1994. 
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pejorative connotation. Other DoD officials prefer to speak of "controlling" individuals and 
"disabling" materiel. By looking at the second paragraph of the USSOCOM Technology 
Investment Plan quoted in the preceding subsection the reader will see that SOCOM tries to 
communicate most of the different ways to describe NLWs. The U.S. Global Strategy 
Council speaks of "nonlethality" as a new paradigm. While in this thesis, nonlethality is only 
used as a means of describing the overarching subject of NLWs and their relation to other 
methods or tools. 
The following expanded functional definitions for the categories of NLWs will be 
based upon the current DoD definition listed in the introduction of this work. After 
reviewing these categories, we will briefly discuss a possible definition for non-lethal tools 
to help clear up the debate over the fuzzy distinctions within elements of psychological 
warfare, electronic warfare, and information warfare as to what qualifies as a NLW. 
Please refer to the proposed DoD NLWs definition on page one, as we apply its 
elements to define the functional categories. Also, refer to the following wiring diagram in 
Figure 2.2, which graphically depicts the typology of the categories of NLWs that we will 
describe. This typology will be used for the subsequent analysis in Chapter V. The 
definition states that the intent of the weapon should be to incapacitate personnel or materiel. 




Personnel Materiel Information Sect urity 
Figure 2.2- NLW Typology 
a. Personnel 
This functional category includes the nondestructive, invasive or non-invasive 
measures of suasion, coercion, compellence, or force that are applied against personnel. The 
dimensions of this usage include the physical (time and space) and morale aspects of the 
effects on personnel. The paralyzing, isolating, or disabling aspects of the weapon should 
be temporary in nature. The word nondestructive as used in this definition means that the 
intent of the temporary effects should be completely reversible with no lasting ill effects. 
The means of a particular NLW to accomplish this task will be evaluated in Chapter V by 
using the goal of a particular mission (Chapter IV) and the perceptual model that is 
developed in Chapter III from the control war paradigm. 
b. Materiel 
This functional category includes the relatively reversible non-destructive or 
precisely-limited destructive (discriminate - with almost zero collateral damage) use of force 
against materiel. The materiel affected could include weapons, supplies, or equipment. The 
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dimensions of this usage of this force also include the physical (time and space) and morale 
aspects as they relate to the ability of personnel to utilize these assets. The same 
effectiveness evaluation method listed above for personnel directed NLWs also applies for 
materiel directed NLWs. 
c. Information 
This functional category includes the relatively reversible non-destructive or 
precisely-limited destructive (discriminate - with almost zero collateral damage) use of force 
against information sources or systems. The attack on information could be conducted either 
against the media, the software, the transmission medium, or the receiving capability for it. 
To discriminate this category from the larger subject of information warfare or C2W, we will 
limit the discussion to NLW usage in the framework of tactical and operational missions in 
the case studies. We realize that there is an overlap and blurring in the distinction of these 
subjects. Nevertheless, besides the brief mention later in this section of non-lethal tools as 
opposed to weapons, we consider this debate beyond the scope of the thesis. 
d. Security 
This functional category concerns a task rather than a target. Because of the 
importance of the physical security of our own personnel, facilities, and vehicles in reducing 
or eliminating friendly casualties, we feel it is necessary to examine the emergence of 
specific specialized types of NLWs that have a purely self defense role to play in the 
successful completion of missions in MOOTW and PCO missions. This category is 
therefore examined separately from the general offensive and defensive mission use of 
personnel and materiel targeted NLWs. Obviously sensors and intelligence play a role in this 
function of self-defense, but are they to be considered NLWs? The following discussion of 
non-lethal tools should help clear up the rationale for the differentiation of the categories. 
3. Non-Lethal Tools 
The nature of the definition for NLWs suggests an active means for incapacitating 
personnel or materiel. The question arises of just what precisely are NLWs in the context 
of the already developed fields of PSYOPs and Electronic Warfare and the emerging field 
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of Information Warfare. A few examples will be reviewed here to help clarify this issue and 
provide a differentiating line between tools and weapons. 
PSYOPs are planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to 
foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately 
the behavior of foreign government, organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose of 
a PSYOP is to induce or reinforce attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator's 
objective. But do the tools of PSYOPs necessarily qualify as non-lethal weapons? 
The answer depends on whether the PSYOP has an active role to play in the 
incapacitation of an enemy in battle. For example, the dropping of leaflets or broadcast of 
radio transmissions may influence the morale and will to resist of a combatant. But these 
tools, effective as they may be in an integrated approach to the defeat of an enemy, cannot 
be shown to be immediate active contributors to his incapacitation. On the other hand, the 
"sky shouting" tactics of the British in their counterinsurgency battles in the 1950s in Malaya 
when directly targeted at individuals or groups were directly responsible for the surrender of 
guerrillas.49 Also similar "sky shouting" loudspeaker tactics were used by U.S. special forces 
flying in C-47 aircraft in Korea to warn dispersed enemy troops to surrender under threat of 
napalm attack. Marching orders were given and sometimes directly followed that lead the 
enemy to small allied patrols on the ground to be processed as prisoners of war.50 Clearly, 
PSYOPs are conducted primarily with non-lethal tools, but the last two examples do indicate 
the use of PSYOPs measures directly as non-lethal weapons in an active contribution to the 
defeat of the enemy. 
Electronic Warfare measures similarly face the same dilemma as PSYOPs measures 
in this definitional problem.   When considering electronic attack and the direct use of 
49
 Bruce Hoffman, British Air Power in Peripheral Conflict, 1919-1976 (Santa Monica, CA: The 
RAND Corp., R-3749-AF, October 1989), pp. 54-56. 
50
 Colonel Michael E. Haas, USAF, Air Commando! (Hurlburt Field, FL: AFSOC History Office, 
1994), p. 15. 
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electromagnetic weapons to degrade, neutralize, or destroy the enemy combat capability51, 
one would have to conclude that this is an example of NLWs usage. However, electronic 
warfare support measures and electronic protection are usually related to passive detection 
measures or hardening. One example of a cross-over may be the development of aircraft 
countermeasures like isotropic radiators (Appendix A) that actually destroy the seeker head 
of an attacking missile and therefore go beyond the passive or spoofing nature of traditional 
countermeasures. 
Similarly, in a discussion of information warfare, many of the measures or techniques 
that may be related to this subject encompass support tools like media campaigns, which 
must be considered non-lethal tools. However, in C2W, for example the use of a computer 
virus that attacks the enemy's information systems, incapacitates his command and control 
net, and results in the subsequent surrender of his dispersed forces, should be considered a 
NLW. This discussion should clarify that not all measures used in these aforementioned 
fields should be considered as NLWs. Additionally, the discussion of them as non-lethal 
tools should reduce confusion as to what we may conveniently call the combat support 
measures they offer under the broader heading of non-lethality. 
4. Advantages of Non-Lethal Weapons 
The debate over NLWs has produced some consensus as to the possible advantages 
for their use. In the PCO and MOOTW environment explored in this thesis, NLWs could 
represent an intermediate strategic means to coerce cooperation or compel the end of aberrant 
behavior. Used as an adjunct to an internationally sanctioned effort, they could serve as a 
gap filler to complement diplomacy and economic measures without resort to lethal force.52 
In fact these measures may be more precisely "tunable" to make sure they apply pressure to 
the leadership without unduly burdening the general population. It can be argued that NLWs 
meet the jus in hello requirement of Walzer's "just war theory," providing decision makers 
51
 CJCS MOP 30, 8 March 1993, Command and Control Warfare, p. A-l, Appendix A 
Terminology for Electronic Warfare. 
52
 Barry, 1994, pp. 33-34. 
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with options to comply with the proportionality-of-means test and the requirement to limit 
noncombatant casualties.53 Additionally non-lethal measures could possibly offer several 
other advantages over lethal force. They may be more legally and morally defensible. They 
may offer less political risk with more benefits. Operationally, they may offer more 
appropriate military effectiveness, flexibility, and better protection for our troops. In tactical 
situations, they may be force multipliers when used in conjunction with traditional means. 
And finally, they may be technically feasible, supportable, and affordable. 
5. Constraints on Use 
One of the first constraints on the use of NLWs is the actual in field use proof that 
they are not lethal and that they do not produce undesirable side effects. Besides the 
necessary constraints of political and military utility, the legal, ethical, social, informational, 
environmental, and economic constraints to the use of a particular NLW must be addressed. 
Because we are considering their use in PCO or MOOTW missions across a wide spectrum 
of conflict, the issue of the laws of war becomes enmeshed with international law and local 
statutes that may complicate the use of NLWs. Different social or cultural norms also impact 
the use of non-lethals, local populace and the international media perceptions may affect the 
suitability of NLWs. The issue of environmental effects, obviously a selling point for non- 
lethals may also be a detriment. Some of the long term effects of the possible chemical or 
biological NLWs may not be known until after the weapons have been fielded and used. 
Likewise little is known of the effects of repeated use of high power microwaves (HPM) near 
humans (except for accidental dosages) or animals. Similarly, in addition to their possible 
immediate blinding effects, repeated exposure to lasers or laser-type energy may have long 
term effects on vision that do not show up for years. 
53
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29 
C. SUMMARY 
We believe that it was worth reviewing the detailed definitions for the preceeding two 
concepts on the front end of this thesis. This appreciation for PCO "special wars" and non- 
lethality should serve us well as we jump into the following larger theoretical discussion and 
case study analysis that incorporates their use. The acronym PCO will not be found in any 
DoD publication, although contingency and and contingency planning are both discussed in 
Joint Pub 1-02.54 The attempt to provide a functional typology for non-lethality has been 
constrained by the diverse fields and tools that get lumped into this category. Others that we 
cited in the definition have contributed to the first three categories that were used to get our 
arms around the subject. The last category of security, as a task-based versus target-based 
category, was added into the discussion for this thesis because of the priority for minimum 
friendly casualties in these PCO type scenarios. Finally, the concept of non-lethal tools was 
used to bridge the grey area between what may be considered a weapon in a particular 
situational use. 
Joint Pub 1 -02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 23 March 
1994. The definition for contingency includes the issue of emergency response of military forces to 
uncertain events and the need for plans, rapid response, and special procedure to ensure readiness. 
Necessarily, the time for the U.S. to develop a tailored force will be constrained by the need to "come as 
you are." 
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III. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
A. SHIFTING PARADIGMS 
Most will agree that we live in a time of immense transitions. Technological, societal, 
informational, economic, and geopolitical forces are combining in an accelerative and 
synergistic manner to alter the way people perceive global events and interactions." This 
environment provides the backdrop for the concomitant discussion of a paradigm shift in the 
way we theoretically view and conduct warfighting operations in the emerging Information 
Age.56 An understanding of how we wage war is crucial to the analysis of the conduct of 
operations, missions, and sub-missions and the use of tactics, techniques, weapons, and tools 
within the larger strategic context of a given campaign or PCO. As such, the following 
paradigmatic approach satisfies the need to see where we have been and where we might be 
going in the conduct of warfare. After reviewing attritional and maneuver paradigms and 
then examining in more detail the control warfare paradigm as presented by Arquilla (and 
under the umbrella of recent RMA debates), we will develop an operational model and a 
modified list of principles of control warfare. We will later use these in Chapter V to 
analyze and order the requirements, tasks, and specific non-lethal technologies that may 
prove useful for mission accomplishment in future scenarios similar to our case studies. 
1. Review of Attritional and Maneuver Paradigms 
As mentioned in Chapter I, the protracted attritional battles by massive armies in 
World War I represented the culmination of the industrial revolution's effect on warfare 
among the large developed nation-states. Prior to industrialization, siege warfare gave way 
to the Napoleonic strategy of striking at the vital point with maximum force as the dominant 
military paradigm. Clausewitz, as an admirer of Napoleon, wrote that," the best strategy is 
55
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56
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always to be very strong, first in general and then at the decisive point."57 With the onset of 
the support structures of production line assembly, railroads, and telegraphs; and the use of 
machine guns, artillery, and magazine-fed rifles, forces employed sustained lethal effects at 
a magnitude greater than any time in the past. As such, these changes resulted in the 
unification of a whole country's war-making capability and resources with the forces on the 
front lines of the field of battle. A decisive victory by a single army could not bring about 
the defeat of the enemy any longer. These massive forces were systematically organized into 
separate corps and divisions who were tasked by command organizational structures to grind 
on in sequential campaigns and battles to exhaust the resources of the enemy. This model 
emphasized a rigid hierarchal chain of command and conformity for the mass-produced 
equipment and trained troops engaged in battle. And this model still remains with us today, 
in part surviving both world wars and as the organizing force behind our victory in the Cold 
War,58 which may be viewed as an economic and military containment war of attrition. 
Overlapping this paradigm, mechanization (enabled by the powerful internal 
combustion engine), radio communication, and aircraft design provided the technological 
boost for the emergence of maneuver warfare. The revolution in maneuver warfare was 
assisted by technology, but not necessarily driven by it. The French had developed the tank 
to a high degree in the inter-war period, but they spread them out and appended them to an 
existing defense-oriented organizational structure.59 The organizational leap to maneuver 
was brought about by Hitler's belief in Blitzkrieg and its proponents. After viewing a 
demonstration of tank maneuver warfare in February 1935, he is reported to have stated, 
57
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"That's what I need. . . That's what I want to have."60 This went against the German Army 
leadership, who preferred to superimpose the technology on their current offensive doctrine 
rather than to experiment and innovate doctrinally to exploit its potential. 
German blitzkrieg doctrine also made the disruption of enemy communications and 
control a priority at both the tactical and strategic levels.61 In lightning coordinated attacks 
with aircraft and tanks they not only accepted confusion and disorder and operated 
successfully within it, but through decentralization and their own communications 
advantages, they generated confusion and disorder.62 Soon the allies reacted to this doctrine 
and made their own innovative operational and tactical reorganizations to counter the new 
offensive style of the Germans. Combined arms maneuver techniques, used on both sides 
in mechanized battle, led to the return of attrition warfare, but this time "on wheels."63 
Besides the new equilibrium that came into effect, another criticism of the German 
doctrine was that a loose tie to high policy and the opportunism of blitzkrieg combined to 
eliminate any overarching doctrinal coherence. The strategic result was that there was a loss 
of operational purpose beyond the institutional goals of the military.64 Many tactical 
successes and victories in battle resulted in no net higher end goal or purpose. 
A similar lesson was relearned by U.S. Forces in Vietnam, where our 
counterinsurgency battle victories did not have the strategic focus to win in the "softer, 
60
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subtler" aspects of the war that the enemy was winning.65 This connection to high policy and 
to the nature of the conflict needs to be remembered, as it apparently was in DESERT 
STORM, when exploring the emerging paradigm of control warfare. The advocates of 
maneuver warfare also seem divided between the traditional idea of annihilation as the goal 
and the more progressive approach by some writers that disruption of the enemy and rapid 
victory with minimum cost is the goal.66 
Progressive business writers and speakers also suggest that with the fading of 
industrialism's governing concepts and the emergence of information age principles, the 
transformation of some societies will be as profound as the shift from an agrarian to 
industrial model.67 Of course, it is also pointed out that the result will not be the complete 
elimination of industrial structures and institutions but the large-scale shift in the way they 
organize; moving from mass machine oriented, paced, sequential, continuous, long-run 
production to de-massified network oriented, near-simultaneous, continuous, short-run 
production.68 These societal paradigm shifts and the debate over the nature of the evolution 
of maneuver warfare form the foundation for the study of the military technical revolution 
(MTR) which is virtually synonymous with the RMA. The interest in this subject is 
booming, but for the purposes of this thesis, we will limit our focus to the proposed control 
65
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warfare paradigm as expressed by Arquilla, examine its component parts, suggest some 
principles and guidelines that may emerge, and in a strategy to tasks manner, investigate the 
operational implications for PCOs and the innovative use of weapons (both lethal and non- 
lethal) and other tools at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels. 
2. Emerging Control Warfare Paradigm 
We will now apply the systems analysis principles used in the control warfare 
paradigm to more clearly understand the role of information dominance and its link to the 
"enemy" modeled as a system.69 The implications of this approach are that decisive victory 
may be obtained in knowledge-based military conflict by the use of "smart" quasi-network 
oriented forces who maneuver to disarm or paralyze the enemy as they continue to know his 
and their own disposition while simultaneously keeping the enemy blinded. The enemy can 
be concentrated, but still ignorant of what is going on. The more likely outcome is that he 
will become dispersed. 
The first subsection will explore some of the concepts and themes that comprise the 
unified development of information dominance. The second subsection explores some 
current competing ideas for modeling the enemy as a system. In the third subsection, flowing 
from the models examined in the second subsection, we will propose a physical and morale 
model for the necessarily more complex political-military "enemy" that may be encountered 
in a PCO. In the fourth subsection, we will examine detailed modeling for this systems 
approach aimed at degrading strategic infrastructure and military forces. This discussion will 
be used as the basis for the development of some operational principles of control warfare 
and the underlying tenets that this paradigm suggests as possible modifications to the more 
traditional doctrine used in warfighting.70 Finally, a shorthand reference will be developed 
69
 Arquilla, 1994, p. 25. In his earlier work with Ronfeldt, he referred to this paradigm as 
cyberwar (Arquilla and Ronfeldt, 1992, p. 162, (note 7)). The two terms may be used interchangeably. 
70
 Basis of Joint Pub 1, FM 100-5, and AFM 1-1 for list of principles of war as developed by 
J.F.C. Fuller's work in 1920, 
35 
to allow the reader to keep a focus on these changes in the underpinnings of such warfare at 
the tactical, operational, and strategic levels. 
a. Information Dominance 
As Arquilla and Ronfeldt state, the simplest and most accurate definition for 
information dominance consists of "knowing everything about an adversary while keeping 
the adversary from knowing much about oneself."71 The revolutionary aspect to this concept, 
which seems so straightforward that it could have been mentioned by Sun Tzu, is tied to the 
assumption that the following elements are present: 1) the greatly increased size of the 
modern battlefield (deep battlespace), 2) the greatly increased speed of command, control, 
communication, computer, and intelligence systems (C4I) to coordinate simultaneous, 
complex maneuvers (increased decision speed), and 3) organizational changes to a flatter, 
more network-oriented mobile force (greater connectivity) that is able to concentrate 
precisely at unexpected vital points in the battlespace. All this will combine synergistically 
to move "information dominance" from a supporting to a central role in determining the 
outcome of hostile engagements. As Arquilla states, historically, without these factors, and 
with conditions of uncertainty and chance, the Clausewitzian "friction" and "fog of war," 
superior firepower, and tactical innovation contributed to a mixed role for information in 
warfare: 
... while knowing more has often provided the necessary conditions for achieving startling 
victories, information dominance alone has rarely generated sufficient conditions for winning. 
... The solution to the problem awaited a new paradigm, one that would seek, rather than to 
exhaust or annihilate, to paralyze.72 
This concept of information dominance does not mean that only technical 
experts within the decentralized organization will be in receipt of information, but that 
commanders at all levels will share a unified "big picture" that is constantly updated with 
real-time sensor inputs. Arquilla calls this "'topsight,' a central understanding of the big 
picture that enhances the management of complexity." Deep operations by SOF provide 
71
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some of the tenacles that reach around the enemy and provide the ground truth that feeds this 
"topsight" even as the SOF elements pursue their mission objectives.73 
With this concept of information dominance in mind, the tools for gathering 
the information for a PCO would necessarily include the following elements. It may be best 
to discuss them in three time phases as their need occurs before and after the start of 
hostilities. The first time phase is the period months or even years in advance of a potential 
contingency in a particular region (far term). The second time phase is the period right 
before our involvement in hostilities becomes imminent (near term). And, the third time 
phase describes the period after hostilities have commenced (engaged). To create an 
environment of information dominance, all this information needs to be available in an 
integrated and timely manner to the unified commander and the dispersed leadership 
conducting the operation. 
First, the necessity to acquire early (far term) the fine-grained information 
needed on the physical and moral disposition of enemy forces and the interconnectivity of 
the adversary leadership suggests two issues. Ongoing peacetime research and 
documentation by analysts and area specialists should be combined with the early injection 
of HUMINT collection efforts in-theater during the beginning planning phase before a 
contingency operation is launched. This combination of virtual presence, as supported by 
the ongoing research of expert analysts, needs the actual presence of these HUMINT sources 
in-theater to generate in full a current real-time tapestry of events, personalities, and inter- 
relationships that will facilitate accurate assessments. 
Second, as hostilities become more probable (near term), the collation of the 
above information with open source information servers and sensor-derived information 
(Imagery Intelligence (MINT) and Signals Intelligence (SIGINT)) during this period would 
also be necessary for early prioritizing of potential targets. Third, when engaged with the 
73
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onset of hostilities, real-time reports, battle damage assessments, and debriefings from the 
field would be correlated with the information still available from the previously cited 
sources, and from near real-time reporting from national technical means, battle area sensors 
placed on the ground, in water, or in the air (low altitude UAVs, tier 11+ or tier JR long dwell 
high altitude UAVs, and manned tactical reconnaissance assets). 
The intelligence cycle for processing this data - the collection, processing, 
production, and dissemination - would have to be greatly time-compressed to provide for the 
continuity of information dominance and situational awareness over the battle. This would 
dictate that the intelligence process be integrated horizontally across the "cycle" to parallel 
process the potentially overwhelming amount of data that would be flowing and that the 
intelligence-operations connection be tightened so that the intelligence officers were 
intimately familiar with the planner's needs and the operational commander's intent and the 
disposition and capabilities of their own forces as well as the enemies. This situation 
presents no small challenge; and the deficiencies noted in the DESERT STORM74 air war 
and the underlying emphasis of some discussions on the subject of information warfare and 
C2W acknowledge this situation and the associated need to integrate joint intelligence 
systems, databases, and training75 to provide the necessary connectivity, as well as, the 
processing power to deal with this daunting task. 
b. The Enemy as System 
To relate the concept of information dominance effectively and efficiently to 
action against the vital points or "centers of gravity" of an enemy, a systems approach will 
be utilized. Systems modeling proposals will be reviewed and investigated for their 
The inability of BDA processing to keep up with the single day planning cycle of the Air 
Tasking Order (ATO) once the Air War started is well described in Major Larry Grundhauser, Major Susan 
Mashiko, Major Hugh Hortsman, and Major Rick Anderson, "The Future of BDA," Concepts in Airpower 
for the Campaign Planner (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air Command and Staff College, 1993), pp. 89-92. 
" Margaret Roth, "Information Overload," Air Force Times, January 24, 1994, p. 24. Martin C. 
Libicki and James A. Hazlett, "Do We Need an Information Corps?," Joint Forces Quarterly, Autumn 
1993, pp. 88-97. 
38 
applicability to the adversary in a PCO. For a baseline, the "Five Ring Theory," the systems- 
oriented approach used by Col John A. Warden UJ in planning the air campaign against Iraq, 
will be used.76 As a general strategic model, it will be examined for its applicability to PCO 
actors. Modifications to his approach will be reviewed and suggested for the structurally 
different possibilities in less hierarchal, more network oriented adversarial organizations. 
Warden's thesis is based on the following argument. Advances in 
technological hardware used for fighting have widened the distinction between the physical 
and the morale elements of combat power. His hierarchal prioritization of enemy "centers 
of gravity" into five concentric rings can be looked at from the top-down in the planning of 
a campaign to meet the desired ends by compelling the enemy command element (leadership) 
to cease fighting. This systems approach allows one to precisely target key physical nodes 
in a deep battle situation to make it physically impossible for the enemy to continue to fight 
even if he has rationally resisted earlier measured destruction of his subordinate centers of 
gravity. This results in the "strategic paralysis" of the enemy by the simultaneous and 
sequential attack on rank-ordered essentials within the enemy system.77 
Warden's model seems well suited for application in a conventional major 
regional conflict where the state structure is hierarchical and well defined. The strategic 
attack against Iraq serves as the defining example. The rank-ordered rings radiate out from 
the central leadership, to the organic essentials, to the infrastructure, to the population, to the 
fighting mechanism of the system (see Fig. 1). The rigid hierarchal leadership in Iraq offered 
a well defined target structure, indirectly if not directly, for attack. The open expanse of 
desert offered little cover and concealment for the dispersed structures or targets that would 
lead to the crippling of the combat power of the system. Although there were redundancies 
and cross-wiring in the outer rings of the system (backup communication capabilities, hidden 
76
 Col John A. Warden III, The Air Campaign: Planning for Combat (Washington, D.C.: 
Pergamon-Brassey's, 1989). 
77
 Col John A. Warden III, "The Enemy as a System," Concepts in Airpowerfor the Campaign 
Planner, pp. 7-8. 
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mobile scud launchers, and stockpiled logistics support materiel) continued air attack 
reduced the fighting mechanism capabilities to a minimum. But, in a contingency scenario 
where the organization of the enemy may be less well ordered and defined, a more network 
oriented model may serve to better map the connectivity between the vital nodes of power. 
One suggested alternative to the Warden System is offered in an article also 
describing strategic paralysis.78 The argument of Major Barlow's thesis is that the "national 
elements of value" (NEVs) that should be targeted differ from the centers of gravity that have 
been defined by Clausewitz, Douhet, Billy Mitchell, Liddell Hart, and Warden because they 
are interdependent and can compensate for each other.79 He also argues that NEVs are more 
vulnerable when they are highly developed, such as in a country higher up on the industrial 
ladder. He quotes Major Alexander P. de Seversky from 50 years ago, when he observed that 
"total warfare from the air against an undeveloped country or region is well-nigh futile; it is 
one of the curious features of the most modem weapon that it is especially effective against 
the most modern types of civilization."80 His notions of replenishment and substitution and 
the dynamic interplay of the NEVs recognizes that a tight operations and intelligence loop 
must be maintained because of the transient nature of the ranking of the NEVs in conflict. 
Constant reevaluation is necessary to evaluate not only the degree of vulnerability to attack, 
but also the kind of vulnerability. To avoid wasted effort, the attacker must understand how 
the enemy values his assets. This requires fine-grained intelligence that is continually 
processed and updated. The seven NEVs he uses for his discussion are as follows: 1) 
leadership, 2) industry, 3) armed forces, 4) population, 5) transportation, 6) communications, 
and 7) alliances.   These are similar to the five rings of a Warden system, however the 
78 Major Jason B. Barlow, "Strategic Paralysis: An Air Power Strategy for the Present," Air Power 
Journal, Winter 1993, p. 4-15. 
79
 Ibid., p. 10. 
80 Maj Alexander P. de Seversky, Victory through Air Power (New York: Simon and Schuster, 
1942), p. 101-102. 
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Connectivity, interdependence, and dynamic nature of their value is more network oriented 
than allowed for by the hierarchal Warden system. 
Although every country has the same NEVs, their relative importance changes 
- depending on the circumstances. Individual leaders important enough to be NEVs are 
concluded to be rare today. However, he notes the following: "the destruction of one target 
set could be enough to collapse an enemy government, depending on the importance of the 
NEV and the speed and the thoroughness of its destruction, as well as the dependence, 
resiliency, and speed of compensation of the other NEVs in relation to it." Of crucial 
importance in this statement is the concept of the speed or tempo and the breadth of the 
attack. He describes the four elements critical to strategic paralysis that determine the 
strength or the weakness of this strategy: 1) aerospace control, 2) technology, 3) vulnerable 
infrastructure, and 4) vital targets. Barlow reviews the effect of a failure in either technology 
or aerospace control as they limit strategic paralysis and cause a conversion to other war 
forms, namely annihilation (maneuver) and attrition, respectively. Although he avoids a 
direct discussion of the effectiveness of this strategy on rogue state or non-state actors in 
contingency operations or MOOTW environments where infrastructure and vital targets are 
not so clearly physically defined. 
c. A Merged Systems Approach 
Further examination of Barlow's NEV system demands consideration of the 
broader aspects of the political and military dimensions of PCOs. If we use the earlier 
definition of PCOs developed in Chapter II, the three phases of the PCO create a dynamic 
situation where the military, political, economic, and informational levers of power are 
orchestrated and balanced so that at any one time one or all may be in play. As the operation 
transforms from a strictly militarily oriented forced entry to a mid-term policing, peace, and 
presence operation, to a longer term FID and civil affairs assistance operation, it is easy to 
see that the NEVs should also be modeled in a morale spectrum. As Dr. Larry Cable points 
out in his presentation on Peace Operations, the U.S. really has a long experience with 
"special wars." From our revolution to the Indian Wars and the Phillipine Insurgency to the 
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short Marine excursion into Lebanon in 1958 and the Airborne and Marine deployment to 
the Dominican Republic in 1965, interesting success stories can be gleaned where we 
understood the political/military nature of these conflicts and acted correctly.81 
As the twelve year British experience in the "Malayan Emergency" illustrated, 
in these "special wars" all elements of national power need to function in an exemplary 
commitment to the unified end goal in an integrated manner.82 In the counterinsurgency 
operation that the British and the Malayans mounted, military operations, special operations, 
policing, civil affairs assistance, economic aid, and informational campaigns were used in 
interconnected ways to win the "hearts and minds" of the people. This phrase, coined by the 
British High Commissioner and Director of Operations, General Sir Gerald Templer, may 
have had more far reaching meaning than the superficial context that the "hearts-and-minds" 
analysts later attempted to apply in building their models. 
Accordingly, they worked within the broader context of the Cold War 
paradigm and considerations of modernization as they developed their prescriptions for 
externally applied programs for security, good government, and progress in third world 
countries without closely examining the particular uniqueness of the constraints facing the 
particular supported regime.83 Likewise, the cost-benefit approach as defined by Leites and 
Briefing by Dr. Larry Cable, University of North Carolina - Wilmington, 2 Feb 1995, for the 
SO/LIC Curriculum Speaker Series at NPS, Monterey, CA. 
82 Bruce Hoffman, British Air Power in Peripheral Conflict, 1919-1976 (Santa Monica, CA: 
RAND, R-3749-AF, October 1989), pp. 37-57. This work primarily emphasizes the aerial aspects of this 
integrated struggle. For a detailed review of the Briggs plan and General Templer's execution of it, see 
Edgar O'Ballance, MALAYA: The Communist Insurgent War, 1948-1960 (Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 
1966), p. 76-176. The dogged persistence and genuine desire of the British to understand in fine detail the 
context and content underlying the serious predicament of their colony and their sustained desire to save it 
from the Chinese Communists is probably an example beyond the scope of present acceptance of cost for 
the U.S. But it serves as a seminal example of what economy of force measures properly integrated 
together with fine-grained intelligence and a coordinated leadership structure can accomplish. It is beyond 
the scope of this thesis to argue the relative merits of competing counterinsurgency theories. 
on 
' Sir Robert Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency: Experiences from Malaya and 
Vietnam (London: Chatto and Windus, 1966), pp. 35-36. For another point of view see, Samuel Popkin, 
77ie Rational Peasant: The Political Economy of Rural Society in South Vietnam (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1979). 
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Wolf*4, may have been limited by similar constraints as it tried to define the complex inter- 
relationship of the government (authority) to the society, and the similar linkages of the 
counter-state (rebellion) to society. 
Similarly, D. Michael Shafer's criticism of both these approaches focuses on 
their misperception of the underlying circumstances and bureaucratic constraints in the 
specific case studies he examines.85 He argues for a rigorous analytic examination of the 
specific conditions governing each potential counterinsurgency engagement. By questioning 
the basic tenets that the existing prescriptions are based on in each particular case, he seems 
close to the mark in his criticism of the existing work on counterinsurgency, but his gloomy 
non-answer to the question seems limited by his case selection. If he had selected Malaya 
as one of his cases (instead of excepting it86), he might have carried his conclusion further 
and stated that it was the fine-grained understanding of the different dimensions of the 
emergency in Malaya that the British used as the source of their strategy for solving the 
problem. For the British, it may be that countering the psychological aspect of the guerrillas' 
strategy fell out of their plan to defeat the enemy in detail. This interplay and synergy of all 
the integrated tools that the British assembled was of a higher priority than either the physical 
or psychological targeting aspects alone when measuring the effect on their enemy's NEVs 
(infrastructure and armed forces). 
Winning the hearts and minds was therefore a symptom of a successful multi- 
dimensional integrated campaign based on an early control warfare paradigm approach. By 
using an inflow of fine-grained information, gathered from HUMINT and their own actual 
networked presence across the countryside, and by constantly questioning their prescriptions 
and policies in Malaya, the British evolved a campaign based on a process-oriented approach, 
84
 Nathan Leites and Charles Wolf, Jr., Rebellion and Authority: An Analytic Essay on Insurgent 
Conflict (Chicago: Markham, 1970), p. 42. 
85
 D. Michael Shafer, Deadly Paradigms: The Failure of U.S. Counterinsurgency Policy 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988), pp. 104-132. 
86
 Ibid., p. 15. 
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linking strategies to tasks in adaptive and innovative ways to accomplish clearly stated 
mission objectives as efficiently and effectively as possible. Additionally, they had the 
tenacity to stay the course for over twelve years, demonstrating the perseverance and 
legitimacy also necessary to win.87 
As such, the post-Cold War era provides us with the unique opportunity to 
examine and research many specific regions without the constraint of having to shoehorn 
them into an ideological struggle between us and the Soviet Union. The information age 
tools becoming available for our use and good old fashioned field work may help us 
understand the unique aspects of distinct regions, states, sub-state actors, transnational 
organizations, and peoples. 
Although future PCOs in which we become involved may contain 
insurgencies, civil wars, ethnic conflicts, or religious struggles within their larger context, 
they will probably be different from the bipolar ideological differences assumed as prevalent 
during low intensity conflict in the Cold War era. It is important to remember that the 
physical and morale forces in battle will still both be a factor on the outcome if the strategic 
organization does not map out neatly as a hierarchical organization.88 In contrast to Warden's 
view,89 the fine-grained understanding of these morale factors, may be possible through 
information dominance as described above.  As such, the possibility exists that strategic 
It is not surprising that these two concepts are listed as principles of MOOTW in Joint Pub 3-07 
(draft), II-7. 
88 Warden, 1993, p. 7, Col Warden insightfully quotes Clausewitz, "physical is to the morale as 
three is to one" he as reevaluates the seemly coequal aspects of both in battle. He then states, that our 
increased capability to destroy the physical side of the enemy through deep battle, precision strikes, allows 
one to disable a strategic entity, from a industrial state to a guerrilla organization by only concentrating on 
the physical factor. I agree that this works well for modelling a hierarchically based industrial state, but I 
disagree that it effectively targets more network oriented foes in a MOOTW environment where restrictive 
ROEs are necessary and where the grain size of the entity goes down to the level of the individual as 
explained in Chapter II. 
89 Warden, 1993, p. 7., He states, "Conversely, the morale side-the human side-is beyond the 
realm of the predictable in a particular situation because humans are so different one from another. Our war 
efforts, therefore, should be directed primarily at the physical side." In low-intensity conflict, this luxury is 
just not always available. 
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paralysis would be ineffective when targeting these more holistic, network structures, that 
are based on a shared belief or value system, whether based on culture, ethnicity, religion, 
or nationality in the moral dimension. The possibility also exists that in fractionated or 
unstable states, our attack, if not carefully planned, may serve to only split the state along 
these cleavages, create more unwanted chaos, and not address the problem or defeat the 
enemy. 
Also, by viewing network oriented morale factors along with the physical 
dimensions of a conflict, we may also see the necessity for our military leadership and forces 
to understand the tenets of the statesman's craft of deterrence, compellence, and crisis 
management. These statesman's tools offer strategic leverage when applied to the tactics and 
strategies used at the tactical and operational levels to persuade and negotiate with the enemy 
as a semi-autonomous sub-state actor and affect his motivations, even as conflict seems 
imminent or is ongoing. These sub-state actors may be more susceptible to the craft of the 
statesman, in a mixed pol-mil environment, when applied by military leadership.90 In fact, 
under a control warfare paradigm, the coercive measures of NLW seem a perfect 
accompaniment to allow a military commander who has already established forceful 
credibility to negotiate more effectively than a non-engaged civil authority. Observe the 
comparison of the of the models for the Warden five ring system, Barlow's NEV model, and 
the new Molecular model that this argument suggests in Figure 3.1. The dynamic response 
to conflict that the Molecular model illustrates, will be discussed in the next subsection. 
90
 Alexander L. George, David K. Hall, and William R. Simons, The Limits of Coercive 
Diplomacy (First Ed., Boston, MA: Little, Brown, 1971, Second Ed., Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993). 
The authors note that the relative motivation of the two sides in a conflict exerts critical leverage on 
outcomes, since the central task of a coercive strategy is "to create in the opponent the expectation of 
unacceptable costs of sufficient magnitude to erode his motivation to continue what he is doing" (pp. 26- 
27). In planning strategy against an unconventional foe, it's imperative to consider the nature and strength 
of the adversary's motivation. Understanding the reasons for cohesion in combat, and then targeting these 
morale factors would seem to dovetail with the arguement suggested by Col. Wm. Darryl Henderson in 
Cohesion: The Human Element in Combat (Washington. D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1985), 
pp. 2-8, that small-unit cohesion will have a significant impact on determining who wins and why. 
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d. A Molecular Model for PCOs 
As suggested by the Molecular model in Figure 3 .1, The physical and morale 
elements of a strategic system may exhibit both a hierarchical and network oriented nature. 
As Barlow illustrated with his NEVs, the physical elements of a system may be interlinked. 
As we discussed earlier, the motivations of a population (or leadership) may extend down 
to the village, clan, family, or individual level.91 This permeation is especially prevalent 
where religious, ethnic, or other sociopolitical factors have a fundamental effect on the nature 
of the conflict and the moral drive and behavior of the participants feeds on their beliefs. 
Early recognition of the intricacies of this situation in a PCO becomes 
imperative. The patience, durability, and costs in blood and treasure it may take to counter 
this fine-grained networked adversary may not warrant risking U.S. national assets in an 
intervention. But likewise, a detailed appreciation of this situation under a control warfare 
paradigm may reveal the hierarchical and network based levers, that must be addressed with 
the proper type of forces and OGA and/or NGO operations to influence the leadership, 
population, or social infrastructure in a meaningful way. However, we believe that the 
interesting sociological, psychological, and anthropological arguments on the specifics of 
these issues are beyond the scope of this present investigation. We seek the more modest 
goal of offering a better starting point for modeling military, political, informational, and 
economic actions against an enemy by considering the morale and physical hierarchies and 
networks. 
Therefore, the Molecular Model is proposed only as a conceptual tool to 
illustrate the richness of the alternatives possible as a result of an attack when a large, 
91
 If these network-based morale elements are deeply imbedded in a population's ethos, then as 
similar to fractal geometries suggested in Chaos Theory, they would exist in the same relationship whether 
viewed at the strategic, operational, or tactical levels. In T. Tagarev and D. Nicholls, Identification of 
Chaotic Behavior in War (to be published in the 1994 Annual Conference of the Society for Chaos Theory 
in Psychology and the Life Sciences), p. 144, they use the Koch snowflake example, illustrating that its 
perimeter looks the same whether viewed with the naked eye or with a powerful microscope. Alan 
Beyerchen, "Clausewitz, Nonlinearity, and the Unpredictability of War," International Security (Vol 17, 
No. 3, Winter 1992-93), 59-90, reframes On War in defense of Clausewitz and this "new" reality. 
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complex, and non-linear strategic system is engaged. See Figure 3.2 for illustration of 
possible notional results in the following generic cases: 1) an attack on an essential physical 
element like the electrical power grid of a developing nation, 2) an attack on hierarchal 
leadership of fundamentalist country with internal cleavages between political and religious 
factions, and 3) an indirect attack on the network-based differences in a strategic system that 
divide a population. 
1) Strategic attack on Electrical Power Grid 
2) Point Attack 
on Leadership 
RESULT = undesircd (other hierarchical systems 
compensate, networks 
strengthen) 
RESULT = undesircd (state fractures, leadership 
vacuum causes split, in danger of further 
disintegration, with one network gaming 
leverage in the remaining left strategic system) 
RESULT = desired 
(networks merge into 
unified system, but 
only after a sustained 
operation 
coordinated with other 
agencies and resources) 
Figure 3.2 - Possible Modal Responses of Molecular System 
In the first case, the one possible notional result was that the other hierarchical 
systems compensated. For example, if the society was mainly agrarian, sales of fuel for 
heating and powering portable generators for essential use could partially offset the loss of 
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the power grid. On the other hand, the locally networked resources, gathering of wood, coal, 
and other fuels, and a reversion to a more primitive lifestyle would bring the networked 
elements of power to the fore. The undesired result would be that the system, although 
damaged, would exhibit a resilience not expected if we do not take into account the 
interrelated and substitutional hierarchical nature of the other elements and the dispersed 
toughness of the network oriented aspects of the physical and morale elements. 
In the second case, the point attack on the hierarchic leadership may lead to 
the fracturing of the system because of morale and physical cleavages in the elements of the 
state. In Figure 3.2 the dotted arrow is used to suggest the indirect attack on the networks 
of the system that would be driven by the direct attack on leadership. This seems to have 
been one of the U.S. concerns in the Gulf War for a post-war Iraq. As such, the strategic 
attack on enemy leadership must take into account the hierarchic and network-based factors 
that will affect the outcome of such action. 
In the third case, a network-based indirect offensive effort by a coordinated 
use of military, political, economic, and informational elements of power to help unify a 
fragile nascent strategic system is suggested as a success. The qualifying requirement is that 
this must be conducted under a control warfare paradigm where information dominance leads 
to a process control methodology where continual adaptation and review of effectiveness are 
used to control the non-linear nature of change in these complex systems. 
The primary constraint is that even with the extremely efficient use of our 
own elements of power, the MOOTW situations suggested in Joint Pub 3-07 (draft) would 
still demand patience and durability and may take considerable time to resolve successfully. 
The Principles of MOOTW suggested: Objective, Unity of Effort, Security, Restraint, 
Perseverance, and Legitimacy (especially the last three principles), would demand strong 
long-term backing of the U.S. public and the international community in addition to the 
engaged systems. The likelihood of this is questionable. This engagement strategy would 
demand close monitoring of the costs versus U.S. interests and objectives going in so that 
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the end game or desired result is judged of sufficient interest for the expenditure of blood, 
treasure, and time that may be necessary to attain the goal. 
B. REVOLUTION IN THE PRINCIPLES OF WAR? 
The preceding discussion of the emerging control warfare paradigm suggests that the 
strategic implications will be far-reaching. Such revolutionary changes in the character of 
warfare "have profound consequences for global and regional military balances."92 The 
advantages, opportunities, costs, and risks that this type warfare suggests are brought into 
clearer focus by examining the specific general guidelines that it may overlay over existing 
principles of war.93 The following section briefly details the specific impact on the way the 
principles of war and the tenets associated with the successful conduct of operations are 
influenced by a force that operates in "special wars" with information dominance as the 
centerpiece of its strategy. 
Information dominance, itself thus takes on the dual nature of a combat element and 
a "new" principle of war. The following examination is not meant as a revisionist look at the 
time-tested doctrine of the U.S., and no principles of war that exist are to be neglected. It 
does attempt to synthesize some unifying concepts for viewing the synergy of the principles 
in an environment where the technological and organizational changes in a properly lead 
force allow it to operate with a magnitude greater knowledge in an enlarged battlespace with 
agility and high decision speed. At the same time, it does not dismiss the fact that fog and 
friction still exist, only that their influence is a magnitude less than for forces operating 
outside this paradigm. 
92
 Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., "The Coming Revolution in the Nature of Conflict: An American 
Perspective," in The US Air Force Roundtable on the Revolution in Military Affairs (report prepared by 
SAIC, January 1994), p. 2. 
93
 For this discussion the principles of war as outlined in Joint Pub 1, Joint Pub 3-0, Army FM 
100-5 (June 93), AFM 1-1 (March 1992), and Army FM 100-20/ AFP 3-20 - Objective, Offensive, Mass, 
Economy of Force, Maneuver, Unity of Command, Security, Surprise, and Simplicity are used. 
Additionally the Joint "concepts" derived from the principles in Joint Pub 1 (November 1991) and the 
supplemented principles of MOOTW from Joint Pub 3-07(D) and the special operations application of the 
principles will be incorporated in the discussion. 
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1. Guidelines for Viewing Principles and Tenets 
The first major implication  is that control  warfare demands  an expanded 
understanding of the objective. The more complex and complicated purpose of conflict in 
PCO environments goes beyond the singular destruction of the enemy's armed forces. In 
these operations, our forces will be bounded and constrained at the strategic, operational, and 
tactical levels by political sensibilities and limited policy objectives, domestic and 
international concerns for loss of life, media coverage, and situations with mixed combatants 
and civilians. The result is that our primary purpose will usually be to paralyze the enemy's 
forces and attack his other elements of power, both physical and morale, to destroy his will 
to fight. Clearly defining decisive and attainable objectives will be a more complicated task. 
The knowledge tools of control warfare will be necessary for the fine-grained determination 
of whether our strategic aims are successfully met at all levels of engagement. As such, new 
measures of effectiveness and definitions of mission success need to be addressed within the 
context of unity cf effort» where other tools and actors are supported by or supporting the 
military effort.  In Chapter V, we address this task when analyzing case study missions 
conducted in the three phases of a PCO, "special war." 
The smart military organizations that carry out these objectives need to be intimately 
familiar with the commander's concept as well as his intent. Unity of command and unity of 
effort understanding needs to exist all the way down to the individual maneuver units. A task 
force oriented, flat organizational structure that is well lead and that has planned and trained 
together, rehearsed their roles, and has an intimate understanding of the concept of the 
operation is required. Its cohesiveness, nurtured in the deliberate planning stage and 
employed forcefully in opening engagement operations, will provide the framework for 
change as this same force flexibly responds to the rapid changes in subsequent operational 
engagements. With real-time connectivity to the operational leadership for "by exception" 
94
 See Joint Pub 3-0 (November 1991), pp. 21-22. and Joint pub 3-07(1» (July 1994), p. H-l - H-5. 
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guidance and "topsight," unit commanders need to be able to make judgements and operate 
semi-autonomously when required to aggressively seize the initiative when opportunities are 
presented. 
The second major implication involves the use of smaller, more mobile forces in 
these control warfare based employments. The concept of concentration95 gains leverage 
over the principles of mass, maneuver, and economy offeree as singular elements. In these 
more agile operations, mass and quantity become relative issues. The quality of the force 
becomes more important than the quantity as the timing and synchronization evolve at a 
higher operational tempo to fight an enemy effectively dispersed by the supporting measures 
of a control warfare based campaign. The adaptive and constantly evolving innovative use 
of forces in space and time melds together maneuver and economy of force operations as we 
strive to concentrate forces and firepower against key NEVs rapidly and in unexpected ways. 
This is not to say that quantity itself can be completely neglected. The security of our 
plans, the surprise and shock of our method of attack, the rehearsed tasks and specialized 
skills, and the local predominance of firepower for a specific period of time combine as the 
concept of relative superiority96 supports the concept of concentration.     Strategic, 
operational, and tactical agility also factor into any ability to realize the advantages of this 
expanded concept of concentration. 
Once the above principles are put into action against an enemy and the initiative has 
been established, our higher decision clock-speed and knowledge abilities allow us to step 
back and examine how we want the individual campaigns within the operation to sequence. 
For an example of what knowledge or information dominance offer, an analogy to what we 
have described, "is rather like a chess game, where you see the entire board but your 
opponent sees only his own pieces: you can win even if he is allowed to start with additional 
95
 Joint Pub 3-0, p. 22., and Joint Pub 3-05, p. 1-6. 
96
 CDR William H. McRaven, The Theory of Special Operations (Monterey, CA: Naval 
Postgraduate School Thesis, 1993), p. 11. CDR McRaven used this principle to view advantages and nsks 
of small-unit discrete special operations missions. It may also be a useful tool to describe the tune- 
dependent element bounding the time-window for concentration within missions in a PCO. 
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powerful pieces."97 In addition to this first perspective on a game of chess, by undertaking 
an institutional approach to Boyd Tbeory98 beyond its use as a model for tactical 
engagements and broadening it to encompass the operational and strategic levels, it is also 
like a chess game in which you get two moves to your slower adversary's one: 
bv the time the slower side acts, the faster side is doing something different from what 
te observed, and his action is inappropriate. With each cycle the slower party s action is 
inappropriate by a larger time margin. Even though he desperately strives to do something 
that will work, each action is less useful than its predecessor; he falls farther and farther 
behind. Ultimately, he ceases to be effective." 
This leads to his paralysis and defeat. The implications for this scenario are that information 
dominance allows you to dictate the pace for a sustained operation. 
Engaging selectively where and when you determine it is advantageous, gives you an 
opportunity to take advantage of a concept that we will refer to as tempo control. Instead of 
being overwhelmed by the great breadth and depth of the battlespace and the extremely rapid 
tempo of decision cycles, the strength of a control warfare practitioner will be to seek larger 
spheres to define his deep battle stand-off strike capabilities and ever shorter notice, higher 
speed fusion and processing of information to more clearly and precisely define the shared 
real-time situational awareness of his enemy's disposition. Aerospace control, command of 
the seas, and land warfare dominance, in concert with information dominance, will provide 
the adaptability and flexibility for stepping back and dictating the tempo of a battle, 
campaign, or operation. Once tempo control is established, the fight can be fought on an 
adaptive and coordinated schedule as is deemed properly advantageous to the execution of 
operations supporting your end objective - and there is little the enemy can do about it. 
97
 Arquilla and Ronfeldt, 1993, p. 142. 
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 John Bovd Fleet Marine Force Manual Number 1 (March 1989), Lind, Maneuver Warfare 
ÄSJ Everything your adversaries do would always be a half-count behind what is 
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Incorporated in this concept is the principle of the offensive and the preservation of freedom 
of action. The locked in initiative that tempo control offers, keeps you on the offensive even 
when you choose not to immediately act against an enemy that presents no potential threat. 
For persisting operations in static positions, tempo control relies on the your force's ability 
to observe, orient, decide, and act to secure point and area defenses, while maintaining the 
enemy at standoff ranges, until assistance and/or a counter-attack can be mounted by the use 
of rapid concentration of appropriate firepower from a quick reaction force. In the latter 
phases of PCOs, this reaction capability may include a mix of lethal and non-lethal options 
commensurate with the environment of the operation. 
The last major implication that control warfare offers is the broadened concept of 
environmental degradation. Under the umbrella of information dominance, environmental 
degradation is defined as the ability to degrade the enemy's physical (time and space), 
morale, and informational dimensions such that he is overwhelmed by the chaos around him 
and can not effectively mount a fight to defend himself.  In the physical dimension, his 
forces, logistics, materiel, and weapons, and equipment need to be adversely affected to tip 
the playing field to your advantage. Natural and man-made features and conditions and our 
ability to operate more effectively in them, constitute the first level of this degradation. As 
such, the terrain, weather, and night may be used to our advantage. With night, adverse- 
weather mobility and fighting capabilities, we may effectively engage the enemy in an 
environment in which he is not well trained to operate. The fine-grained information we 
need to make these determinations must come from information dominance. The man-made 
resources we may employ include non-lethal measures to disable his forces and equipment 
with low collateral damage or economic backlash, interdict his lines of supply, and provide 
for the security of our troops and weapons systems. Our effective use of standoff fires or 
barriers, stealth, camouflage, hardened facilities, and armor protection also are dependent on 
a thorough knowledge of his capabilities and how to degrade them most effectively. 
In the information realm, we need to be able to sever his capability to command and 
control his forces or to communicate his intent.   Or we may use deception to inject 
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misinformation or disinformation into his systems to cause confusion or dispersion of his 
combat assets. Electronic warfare and measures like computer viruses or clandestine 
monitoring or entry into information systems and massaging of sensor data may aid this 
effort. 
These measures also have a morale impact on the enemy. A direct example would 
be PSYOPS campaigns that have a direct deleterious effect on the morale and informational 
dimensions of the enemy's capability.  Finally, surprise and shock are important factors 
reducing his capability to respond effectively. All of these dimensions need to be considered 
in an integrated, if not synchronous attack on the ability of the enemy to effectively engage 
us. All of these environmental degradation measures need to be orchestrated to gain and 
maintain the initiative. Once this is accomplished, these measures also aid tempo control and 
concentration efforts and support the expanded objective of the JFC. The coordination of 
this effort will have to be determined by the operational commander. It is obvious that some 
of these measures may be subject to counter-measures and may offer a wasting effect if used 
more than once. Therefore, it is imperative that they be employed in an environment of 
continuous innovation so that the enemy does not know what to expect next. 
2. A Perceptual Shorthand for Knowing the Enemy and Yourself 
As Basil Liddell Hart once wrote, "The only real objective is the enemy."100 Judging 
his capabilities and intent has always presented a difficult task. Knowing his capabilities has 
concerned commanders, staffs, intelligence officers, and agencies almost to the exclusion of 
dealing with the more nebulous subject of intent. "But knowledge of enemy intentions can 
be equally or even more important, to the extent that it sheds light on enemy plans and allows 
us to take timely and effective action to blunt them."101 
The shorthand reference that we will use to model probable courses of action for the 
enemy and for ourself will be based on the generic categorizing of options that define his/our 
100 
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capabilities for engagement in the given battlespace using his/our decision cycle as viewed 
under the paradigm of control warfare. We refer to these generic categories at the tactical, 
operational, and strategic levels as the capability to shoot, move, communicate, know, and 
react.102 Their relationship is modeled in Figure 3.3. This cognitive map links knowledge 
as the centerpiece to a continual inflow of information from other resources and from the 
parallel assessment and feedback from the engagement of the other capabilities. This 
represents a generalized depiction of how a force adaptively cycles through the means to 
engage in battle at all levels of conflict under the control warfare paradigm. An in depth 
explanation of how the capabilities are manifest at the different levels follows. 
Information/Intelligence/Data 
Figure 3.3 - Shorthand Cognitive Map 
102
 Practitioners of maneuver warfare will recognize shoot, move, and communicate as the 
warfare. 
56 
In the beginning of the thesis we discussed the adaptive range of options that SOF 
has at its disposal for mobility and communications, and the necessity to develop adaptive 
options for intermediate measures between the use of deadly force and the use of no force 
for SOF. The theoretical discussion of control warfare brings us full circle back to the reason 
for exploring non-lethal options for PCO environments where restrictive ROEs demand the 
ability to employ "or shoot" non-lethal options as part of the continuum of response 
capabilities. At the tactical level, the four capabilities ringing knowledge can be thought of 
as representing the following: 1) shoot - the actual weapons used to fight the battle, whether 
provided by supporting fires or the combatant himself, 2) move - the air, land, and water 
vehicles and dismounted movement capabilities of the individual soldier, 3) communicate - 
the connectivity at the local battle area and also upwards and downwards to the operational 
command and strategic information resources, and 4) react - the local capability to run the 
OODA loop and adapt to a changed situation. At the operational level, the four capabilities 
represent the theater level operational assets and capabilities the JFC can utilize to fight his 
tactical task forces in a networked and coordinated manner. 
At the strategic level, the four capabilities are manifest in the military and non- 
military options the NCA has available to use as coercive measures that range from 
diplomatic negotiations, to economic sanctions or supports, to international informational 
campaigns, to non-lethal and lethal use uses of force. "Shooting" at this level implies the 
execution of strategies more than the physical use of a weapon, although different authors 
have recently suggested the viability of employment of non-lethal means as an incremental 
step between diplomacy or economic sanctions and the actual employment of lethal force in 
MOOTW scenarios.103 Movement involves the force projection capabilities of the Air Force, 
Army, Navy, Marines, and USSOCOM and the sealift or strategic airlift necessary to put 
them in place in a theater. It could also involve the dispatch of diplomatic agents or 
emissaries.  Communication involves the global information capabilities of military and 
103
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commercial satellites, and direct exchanges between the NCA and the JFC and regional and 
international leaders involved in the conflict. Reaction is based on rapid upchannel reporting 
and the "real-time" international media. At the strategic level, the NCA needs to be "plugged 
into" what is going on in theater to enable the warfighting CINC or JFC to respond 
appropriately without unduly interfering in his method. Their decision time on strategic 
matters should not become the limiting factor to the prosecution of operational and tactical 
tasks. 
One limit on this decision loop is the processing or verification time needed to 
confirm the validity of out of channel reports that may be instantaneously reported in the 
media. This brief summary of various manifestations of the specifics associated with these 
general capabilities at all levels is only suggested to stimulate thought on the layered and 
interleaved possibilities. This perceptual device should be useful to keep in mind as the case 
studies are discussed and analyzed. 
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IV. CASE STUDIES 
A. BACKGROUND AND INTRODUCTION 
To preface the case studies, we will quickly review the actions leading up to the 
execution of Operation JUST CAUSE in Panama in 1989, with a thumbnail sketch of the 
forces arrayed for the initial military operations of the coup de main. This provides the 
framework for the study of subsequent follow-on missions, the details of which will be used 
to explore how NLWs might be employed. Of particular interest in determining the niche 
for NLWs will be the way the forces operated with respect to the concept of control warfare, 
the external constraints, and the nature of the particular phase of the overall operation. The 
case studies include some emerging missions and situations that may be faced in future 
PCOs. 
The first case study reviews follow-on operations to "win the west." It reveals a 
strictly measured use of force in an operation to coerce the surrender of the fractionated 
remains of the Panamanian Defense Force (PDF). The title of this study could well be 
"Military Diplomacy."104 The second case study reviews the loss of control in the aftermath 
of the invasion in the urban areas of Panama City that led to civil unrest and widespread 
looting. It is questionable whether dealing with this situation was a SOF or GPF 
responsibility, but it will explore the causes of this loss of initiative that adversely impacted 
one of the primary goals of the operation - restoring a stable democratic government of 
Panama. The possible use of NLWs to support security needs and the actions of these forces 
will be explored. 
B. JUST CAUSE 
The American attack on Panama in the early hours of December 20,1989 was the end 
result of a failure in deterrence, compellence, and crisis management. Diplomatic 
discussions and economic sanctions, and at least two attempts to allow General Manuel 
104
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Noriega to abdicate power without "fear of facing criminal prosecution either in Panama or 
the United States,"105 failed. Numerous contingencies were developed in the late 1980s 
featuring, if necessary, military intervention as a last resort. The foreign relations problems 
for the U.S. escalated with the continued recalcitrance of General Manuel Noriega, as he 
progressively trampled democracy in Panama, glorified in his blatant involvement with the 
drug cartels, crushed coup attempts, and ended up proclaiming himself "maximum leader of 
the struggle for national liberation" on the 15th of December 1989.106 Although the number 
of violations of the 1977 Panama Canal Treaty by the Panama Defense Force (PDF) reached 
the thousands,107 the outright attacks on U.S. soldiers and dependents brought the situation 
to a head. The Death of First Lieutenant Robert Paz (USMC) and the subsequent harassment 
and detainment of witnesses to the PDF shooting, Navy Lt. Adam J. Curtis and his wife, 
Bonnie, on 16 Dec 1989 was the match that finally lit the fuse to the operation. The need for 
intervention became imperative. As discussed, this thesis considers two mini-case studies 
for examining the possible role for NLWs, but first, some background on the military 
operations in the coup de main that kicked the door open and its objectives and constraints 
will help to frame these case studies. 
1. What was JUST CAUSE? 
The unique nature of the attack, considered by most as a coup de mainm, also has 
elements of a forced entry coup d' etaf/preemptive direct action/fait accompli/psychological 
operation/civic action/stability operation/nation building effort - in short, it was a special 
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Operation writ large.109 The national objective in Panama was long-standing, brief, and 
broad: Remove Noriega and restore democracy. These two national objectives translated 
into four military objectives: Protect U.S. citizens; defend the canal; restore democracy; and 
capture Noriega. Based on these objectives, the joint planning guidance from the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff followed: Use maximum surprise; unify the command structure; minimize 
collateral damage; use the minimum force necessary; plan no evacuation of noncombatants; 
and plan for postcombat operations to restore democracy in Panama. The guidance was 
converted into a mission for General Thurman, the commander in chief (CINC) of the 
Southern command. 
In the concept of the operation to accomplish the mission, the generally stated goals 
of the attack, were threefold. Phase 1: Combat operations at the onset designed to neutralize 
and fix in place the PDF, capture Noriega, install a new government, and protect and defend 
U.S. citizens and key facilities. Phase 2: Stability operations to ensure law and order and 
begin the transition to support a newly installed government. Phase 3: Nation-building that 
supports the Endara government to include restructuring and training the new government. 
This last phase would eventually be turned over to the Department of State and other 
interagency organizations as the U.S. government would assist with the economic and 
political rebuilding of Panama. These phases were intended to and in fact did overlap, with 
no clear breaks between them.110 
To accomplish this goal, the commander of joint task force south (JTFSO), Lt. Gen. 
Carl W. Stiner said: 
there were certain key things that we had to do. We knew we had to knock out the [PDF 
central headquarters in Panama City] Comandancia, to neutralize the command and control. 
We knew we had to take down the police and most of the institutions of government because 
they, too, were run by the PDF. We knew that we had to take on those PDF units that could 
influence this action. If we did that - and we did it all simultaneously to completely paralyze 
109
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them and neutralize them - anything left would be sitting out there with no guidance, no 
connectivity, no instruction. We could then go after them separately.111 
Gen Stiner realized that the Blue Spoon plan, which was to become Operation JUST 
CAUSE, needed to deliver a simultaneous and crushing blow to the PDF and Noriega. The 
required defensive maneuvers could be minimized if complemented with offensive action 
to eliminate the threat from the PDF units to the 15,000 potential American hostages in the 
Panama City area. The defensive mission would otherwise be a nightmare. Better to 
neutralize the Panamanians to prevent them from striking. 
2. Who Conducted JUST CAUSE? 
The force that accomplished this action was ostensibly under the control of Gen. 
Maxwell R. Thurman as Commander in Chief (CINC) SOUTHCOM, with a clean line of 
command and control up and down from his location on Quarry Heights.112 Lt. Gen Carl W. 
Stiner, commanding the XVUJ Airborne Corps, was his hand-picked commander of joint 
task force south (JTFSO), acting as the single point of responsibility for developing, training, 
and executing the contingency exercise code named Blue Spoon.113 With Stiner acting as 
Thurman's "war fighter," as Blue Spoon matured from Operations Plan (OPLAN) 90-1 to 
OPLAN 90-2 and then was renamed Operation JUST CAUSE, he commanded all the GPF 
and SOF forces in theater. 
The GPF elements included nearly the entire 7th Infantry Division (Light), one 
parachute brigade of the 82d Airborne Division, a mechanized battalion from the 5th Mech 
Division, a battalion-sized task force of Marines, and the in-place 193d Light Infantry 
Division.   Air support came from the 830th Air Division, the 24th Composite Wing at 
in Donnelly, p. 59. 
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Howard, and the organic Army helicopter lift and attack capabilities from the above units. 
Additional combat support and combat service support units, such as the 41st Area Support 
Group and 1109th Signal Brigade provided key general support to the entire operation. 
The SOF elements included the three battalions of the 75th Ranger Regiment, task 
forces of SEALS and special boat forces from the Naval Special Warfare Group 2, and SF 
from the Army's 7th Special Forces Group, and special mission unit personnel. Air support 
for SOF came from the Army's Task Force 160th Aviation, and the Air Force's 1st Special 
Operations Wing from Hurlburt Field, EL. All these forces, as well as PSYOPs and Civil 
Affairs belonged to USSOCOM. But one organization was necessary that could act as the 
centerpiece for coordinating all these SOF units in the execution of this operation. Stiner's 
subordinate commander for coordinating all the SOF elements was Maj. Gen. Wayne A. 
Downing,114 as the commander of his joint special operations task force (JSOTF). 
Effectively, the de facto operational command for the first five days was turned over to Gen 
Downing,115 as the supported commander, commanding the JSOTF as well as coordinating 
with the supporting conventional forces assigned to the other task forces116 - thus, this 
arrangement, although sometimes fluid and complex,117 resulted in unity of command with 
the JSOTF running the Schwerpunkt efforts for the war. 
The initial battles and successes on D-day for seizing the immediate objectives of 
JUST CAUSE mentioned above are well covered elsewhere in the cited open literature on 
the operation and will not be re-evaluated here.118 The unique situation that developed after 
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the main objectives were secured on D-day of JUST CAUSE illustrated that JTFSO and the 
JSOTF involved in accomplishing the operation would have to rapidly adapt and innovate 
when confronted with the new reality they had imposed on the remnants of the PDF and 
dignity battalion forces in the Panama City/Colon areas and the 5th Military zone PDF 
garrisons out west. Proper fulfillment of its new role as a state actor while mopping up the 
outlying districts also demanded compliance to the highly restrictive ROE imposed to 
minimize damage and injuries, and promote a smooth transition for the democratic 
government of Panama. With this introduction, the exploration of the essential tenets 
making up the emergent control warfare character of the JSOTF forces will be now be 
presented. 
3. Control Warfare in JUST CAUSE 
The rising influence of technology on battle has lead to a proliferation of new 
concepts of information warfare and "knowledge" war. In fact, a JCS document, "Command 
and Control Warfare,"119 grapples with this subject from a top down perspective. 
Researchers at National Defense University are developing a paradigm for this subject.120 
However, both these references seem to be putting the cart before the horse - that is putting 
technology first as the driving factor for knowledge warfare. 
119 CJCS MOP 30 (Issued - 17 July 1990, 1st revision - 8 March 1993). 
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These case studies will proceed from the assumption that "man is the center"121 of this 
revolution. The organizational transformation, currently aided by technology, that is 
allowing mobile forces to emerge like those assigned to USSOCOM with the highest 
readiness of any peacetime joint military reaction force in United States history is driven by 
mission. The JSOTF in Panama adheres well to the rudiments of Arquilla's and Ronfeldt's 
concept of control warfare as developed in Chapter IE. 
The JSOTF excelled because the melding of its component parts creates a synergistic 
effect on the capability of the organization as a whole. The JSOTF was a mobile force that 
was well prepared for contingencies. When employed it provides room for maneuver, 
concentrates firepower rapidly in unexpected places, and can rapidly reform and regroup to 
react to a fluid situation with a range and variety of responses. 
The JSOTF had a horizontally constructed, quasi-network based task force structure 
that had the best command, control, and information systems that were currently available 
to carry the commander's intent to its dispersed units. Similarly, with many rehearsals and 
detailed training the decentralized tactical leadership clearly understood the commander's 
underlying concept. This system also allowed battlefield commanders and individual task 
force aircraft, by remaining constantly apprised of the overall tactical situation beyond their 
objective, to make intelligent decisions and react relatively autonomously to support the 
JSOTF commander's intent. Likewise, the JSOTF commander is also supplied with "real 
time" information to allow him to maintain "topsight" for strategic purposes.122 When 
necessary, he went forward to put his own eyes on the target to aid operational decision 
making. The corollary to this is that with the grasp of these information tools, the JSOTF 
knew where and what the enemy was doing even while denying him from knowing its exact 
disposition - tipping the environment of uncertainty in its favor. 
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For shorthand reference, these abilities will be referred to as the capability to shoot, 
move, communicate, know, and react. A critical component of this conceptual framework 
is the ability to dynamically cycle through this process rapidly in accordance with Boyd's 
OODA loop123 - to operate at a higher decision and action "clock" speed than the adversary. 
A simple analogy of this effect to Mohammed Ali's (Cassius Clay's) refrain: "Float like a 
butterfly, sting like a bee," relays the idea of operating at a higher tempo than the adversary 
over a continuous span of time until he is exhausted and finally boxed in and defeated. 
To establish not only the advantage of speed that assists in the pivotal moment of a 
particular engagement (McRaven's concept of relative superiority), but to combine it with 
knowledge, allows one to sort options for environmental degradation, dictate the tempo 
control, manage concentration efforts, and continually refresh the entire joint force with the 
intent and concept of the expanded definition of the objective of an enlarged sustained 
operation. This captures the essence of the advantage offered by fast thinking, knowledge 
warfare applied at the merged tactical, operational, and strategic levels - in short, control 
warfare. 
Using this capability the force must still undertake individual operations in 
compliance with the principles of special operations as related in CDR McRaven's thesis,124 
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but analyzed in context, by observing the indicators that define the above developed variables 
in a broader vision. Additionally, this discussion would be remiss not to discuss the key 
advantages offered by the subject of selection and leadership as put forward by retired 
Colonel Rod Paschall.125 Besides having excellent leadership at the top of the JSOTF, it is 
hard to measure the added value of innovative and resourceful, well disciplined operators 
leading and executing these challenging missions. For most of the emerging missions in 
these complex integrated operations, there will be no "cookbook" answer or doctrinal 
solution. The forces executing these mission have to understand the principles and tenets of 
control warfare and make their own real-time decisions on what applies and what the best 
course of action will be given the constraints of the environment they face. 
C. MILITARY DIPLOMACY IN THE WEST 
1. Establishing the Framework For the Western Situation 
A brief outline will be presented to establish the setting for the western situation. 
Then, for the case study itself, an in depth reconstruction of events using primary and 
secondary references, will be analyzed with respect to both the tenets of crisis management, 
compellence, and deterrence; and control warfare. The commanding environment that tempo 
control allows, makes room for the employment of an expanded form of "military 
diplomacy." The ad hoc innovative organization of the forces conducting this "Military 
Diplomacy" will be explored not only to see how effectively they handled crisis management 
tasks with economy of force and concentration, but, more importantly, for this thesis, to later 
analyze the niche for NLWs that these missions may have offered. 
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2. Winning The West 
David, capital of Chiriqui province, was the Panamanian version of the "Wild West." 
It was also on the list of PDF strongholds that U.S. forces would have to seize if they were 
to forestall a protracted guerrilla war. It was home base for Lt. Col. Luis del Cid, a member 
of Noriega's SEM, the war council that he packed with cronies. Commanding the 5th 
Military District, he was effectively the "boss" of PDF military operations in Panama's 
western frontier. Like Noriega, he was also under U.S. indictment for drug trafficking.126 
Military District 5 represented the last hope of resistance for Noriega. The Mountains 
of Chiriqui held a strong and well armed PDF and dignity battalion contingent. Del Cid had 
acted decisively after the American invasion. Stating that he would fight until the end: he 
mined the Malek airfield in David, blew a hole in the runway, and retreated with his 
headquarters staff to the fortified mountain village of San Andres.127 To top off the situation, 
del Cid was also sitting on one of the largest weapons depots in Panama. 
The immediate reaction of JTFSO and the JSOTF was to do nothing with the outlying 
forces who were effectively cut off and dismembered by the D-day attacks. This policy was 
a result of priorities. Until the situation was in order in the central area of Panama (and with 
our advantage of tempo control), outlying forces would be ignored as long as our intelligence 
sources indicated they were staying put. In relation to crisis management theory, the JSOTF 
inadvertently created a cooling off period for allowing the remnants of the PDF and Digbats 
to reconsider their position. 
In stark contrast to the confused situation that existed between the U.S. and Panama 
before JUST CAUSE, immediately after the start of hostilities, the overwhelming nature and 
intensity of the military capabilities unleashed on the PDF displayed - in no uncertain terms - 
the overwhelming U.S. presence and the intent and willingness to use force when and 
wherever necessary. This acted as a framing event for firmly establishing a new status quo. 
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In effect, we created an opportunity for elements like del Cid's to adopt a version of 
Alexander George's defensive crisis management strategy referred to as "The Strategy of 
Buying Time to Explore a Negotiated Settlement."128 This inadvertent bit of genius, allowed 
these elements time to fully absorb their apparent untenable situation. While simultaneously, 
they were receiving radio reports ala "Radio Nacional" courtesy of U.S. psychological 
operators onboard Volant Solo, an EC-130, informing them of the devastation of the 
comandancia. Similarly, television feeds of Armed Forces Network and CNN were 
provided. This time period, really only a day and a half, gave them a chance to cool down 
and, in combination with the next measures to be undertaken, time to think about a face 
saving way to develop a mutually acceptable negotiated settlement. 
a. Ma Bell Diplomacy 
By Thursday, the twenty-first, Del Cid was having second thoughts about 
fighting from the jungle with his motley crew of renegades.129 He contacted some Catholic 
priests in his area and through them arranged to talk to Gen. Marc Cisneros, the Spanish- 
speaking commander of US ARSO, the Army Force component in SOUTHCOM, who was 
acting as Gen. Stiner's deputy. At the same time, Cisneros had been busy on the phone to all 
the other military zone headquarters working on establishing his "Ma Bell Diplomacy- 
campaign. 
Enlisting the help of a captured PDF soldier, Captain Amadis Jimenez,130 
Cisneros spread the word that the PDF leadership had no choice but to surrender peacefully. 
He knew it wasn't true, but it was a persuasive approach. "The combat plan was to attack," 
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Cisneros says, "to go in there and fire into the garrisons, and then give them an ultimatum 
to surrender." Sensing the PDF was not eager to fight, he told his battalion commanders, 
"See if you can call them first."131 
Cisneros knew that the PDF would need a way to save face. Presenting 
surrender as a favor to their country was a way to preserve their pride. He also was aware 
that many in the PDF, having seen their livelihood destroyed, wanted to secure positions in 
the new government. The "rotten" carrot and the stick approach worked. The choice was 
prefaced by Jimenez getting on the phone with his former PDF colleagues and establishing 
a rapport, then Cisneros would put it bluntly, saying to the PDF commanders that they stood 
a good chance of being included in the new government. The alternative was bloodshed, 
destruction, and sure defeat. 
Although there were elements of a bluff to this strategy, the unique forces 
assembled possessed the capability to inflict great damage on their positions and they knew 
it. With our framing attacks on D-day, we had demonstrated firepower, environmental 
degradation and concentration that they could not hope to counter. Manipulating the shared 
risk of a protracted guerrilla war made for a pretty distasteful game of "Schelling" chess for 
the PDF, their share of the "disaster" being much greater than ours if the game of 
brinkmanship ended with an accidental war.132 Also, we had attained information dominance 
over the fractionated remains of these PDF forces. And we had the luxury of tempo control 
to dictate action. This may help explain, the success of "Ma Bell Diplomacy" when using 
a big stick that you have already proven willing to swing while only offering a pretty wilted 
carrot. 
Back to the specific dilemma facing del Cid, during several telephone 
conversations, Cisneros outlined his demands: del Cid had to muster not only the PDF, but 
also the disarmed provincial Dignity Battalion for surrender. And he had to display a large, 
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white flag from the PDF's David cuartel As a tangible symbol of American Power, Cisneros 
coordinated a AC-130 Spectre gunship to overfly the David headquarters as they were 
speaking. The signal could not have been clearer: surrender or die. Del Cid surrendered. 
The crisis situation was settling back a notch into a compellence mode. The U.S. had to 
conclude the agreement by going to David. 
b. Setup For Accepting the Surrender 
Maj. Gilberte (Gil) Perez was the Spanish-speaking commander of A Co., 1st 
Batt., 7th Special Forces Group. He was steeped in the history of Panama.133 He received 
the warning order on 22 December to start policing up the outlying western districts. He was 
highly successful at pacifying the cuartels in the west using his own brand of mini "Ma Bell 
Diplomacy" as a two-phased concept. 
In phase one, he would land at an airport in the city near the cuartel in play, 
with a AC-130 Spectre gunship on call and a quick reaction force (QRF) of either Lt. Col. 
Joe Hunt's 3rd Batt, 75th Rangers or elements of Col.Burney's 2d Brig, 7th LID standing by 
in helicopters. Once he and his team were in place, he would call the commander of the local 
cuartel and ask him to meet him at the local airfield. When he appeared, Perez would then 
tell him that he had an infantry or Ranger battalion standing by and that he wanted the 
commander to surrender his Cuartel. 
There were three terms to the surrender: First, the surrender would be 
unconditional; second, all weapons would be placed in the cuartels guard room; and third, 
all of the PDF in the cuartel would assemble on the cuartels parade ground. Then Major 
Perez would "invite" the commander to fly with him over the parade ground to ensure that 
all of the terms had been met. If Perez detected any hesitancy or reluctance by the 
commander to comply, he would have the AC-130 register a few rounds of 105mm into an 
open area of the cuartel. This threat and any actual usage were a decidedly non-lethal 
application for a precise and lethal weapon like this. (The risk would be the effect of a stray 
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or short round.) Perez felt that it was essential to use all available means to gain a peaceful 
surrender with minimum casualties on either side. 
In phase two, Perez and some of his men would move into the cuartel to 
search the area and to process the PDF soldiers. At the same time, a backup 7th ID or 
Ranger Company would move into the town to establish law and order. The company's 
mission would be to prevent looting and reprisals that the citizens might be inclined to take 
against the surrendering PDF, whose past transgressions might have warranted considerable 
desire for revenge and retribution. Finally a small Spanish-speaking contingent would be left 
behind to assist with the local community. 
His work was extremely successful at three smaller cuartel's in Santiago, 
Chitre, and Las Tablas with only minor incidents and no injuries. This did not escape the 
notice of the JSOTF as it planned for the bloodless coup de grace to eliminate del Cid's force 
at David.134 It was modeled on his operation, but on a grander scale. 
c. The Raid(?) on David 
Because del Cid was waffling and acting recalcitrant after his initial 
agreement to surrender, the planners for the mission felt that there was a real possibility that 
he might not surrender. Therefore, the composition of the forces for accepting the surrender 
of del Cid were beefed up as follows: A first task force was loaded on three helicopters, an 
MH-53J Pave Low and two MH-60G, Pave Hawks. The Hawks were to transport a 
surrender team party comprised of PDF liaison, Special Forces personnel, key decision 
makers, and a commo cell with secure radios and a satcom set. The 53 carried a 25 man 
Ranger package to provide an aerial, roving, blocking party in case of a hostile approach on 
the surrender party. A second task force with the muscle to support the first and to seize the 
airfield and secure it for immediate follow on landing by C-130s with additional personnel 
was inbound two hours behind the first. This timing was used to compensate for the delay 
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expected for negotiations with del Cid at the schoolhouse and extra trip to the cuartel for the 
first task force before it would arrive back at the airfield. This second task force was 
comprised of approximately eight heavy-lift SOF helicopters, a mixture of MH-53s and MH- 
47s, carrying 250 Rangers (Lt Col Joe Hunt's 3/75) plus two AH-64 Apache gunships, four 
AH-6 Little birds and an AC-130 for topcover. The interesting part of this second package 
is that the AH-64s and the AH-6s did not have the range (approx. 300 nm) or the aerial 
refueling capability to fly to David non-stop. So what happened was that the FARP MH-47 
Chinooks had to leapfrog out ahead of the package and setup FARPs to refuel those aircraft. 
It was quite a gaggle. 
The first package had a schoolhouse with a telephone as its initial objective. 
It was about 20 nm southeast of David near the river. The idea was to call del Cid and make 
the demands for surrender known to him and then have him drive out to the schoolhouse in 
a single car (maximum of five people in car) so that the overhead MH-53 could interdict any 
trailers by a chokepoint on the bridge if they followed del Cid. The mission went smooth up 
to the point where the surrender team was deplaned at the site. Del Cid drove out, but would 
not get on the helicopter as planned for the ride to the cuartel. In retrospect, the one 
condition he was initially allowed was a promise to not be made a POW. He probably felt 
that there was a good chance that we might just grab him and fly back to Howard AFB. 
Instead of flying to the cuartel as planned, he took two members of the 
surrender team with him in his car and drove back to the cuartel. Now, things were getting 
riskier as the two MH-60s took off for the cuartel to meet him. No longer was the PDF 
commander onboard to insure a deterrent to an ambush on approach into the cuartel. 
However, no aggressive action was taken by the PDF while the 60s landed. 
Del Cid's next demand was that he surrender only to a General officer. 
Cisneros was called and one was put on one of the C-130s waiting to takeoff from Howard. 
At about H - 30 minutes from when the seizure package was to arrive, the surrender package 
flew over to the airfield to meet the C-130 with the general that was inbound. At this time 
the helicopter crews noticed the crater in the runway at David. This would preclude the 
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arrival of the C-130s until filled in. Additionally the anti-aircraft artillery (AAA), ZPU-4s, 
that were supposed to be unloaded and depressed were loaded and pointing skyward, aircraft 
that were supposed to be tied down were not, and the weapons that were supposed to be piled 
on the airfield were not in place. 
Unbelievably, things were fairly calm at the airfield, even with all the 
irregularities. The Rangers were off loaded from the MH-53J and the local fire company was 
enroute to the airfield to fill in and patch the hole in the runway. Things got exciting when 
the MH-53J crew remembered that all these deviations in the plan put them at ground zero 
for the rapidly approaching airfield seizure package. At that point, about H - 5 minutes, they 
got out a call on the Satcom warning the second task force that there were friendlies on the 
field. 
The seizure force landed and secured the perimeter without incident. Shortly 
after, the runway was patched and the C-130 carrying the general arrived. At H + 1 hour del 
Cid Departed as other C-130s were landing to deplane the reserve forces for searching the 
city for arms caches and for providing law and order in David. As del Cid was enroute to 
Howard he was flex cuffed. Landing at Howard he was introduced to two DEA agents with 
extradition paperwork for his drug indictment in the U.S. They read him his rights and 
boarded a jet for Miami with him after a little photo session on the ramp. He was never a 
POW,135 although later he may have wished that he had the rights and privileges of a POW, 
instead of a convicted felon. 
3. Final Analysis 
First, as already mentioned, it appears that by allowing time for the fragmented forces 
to consider their situation, clearer heads were allowed to prevail. The "Ma Bell Diplomacy" 
and "Mini Ma Bell Diplomacy" campaigns worked because of the tempo control that the U.S. 
forces possessed and the almost indiscriminate ability to appear anytime and anyplace in 
Panama and concentrate without the dispersed forces of the enemy knowing our exact 
135 Telephone Interviews, Capt Doug Moore, 10 Mar 1994, and Maj Jay Cook, 16 Mar 1994. 
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disposition because we had absolute air superiority and could operate at night (environmental 
degradation). With our ability to concentrate unexpectedly and by using our expanded 
understanding of the objective, we could shoot, move, communicate, know, and react at all 
levels of combat to pursue our ends. The framing events that changed the status quo at the 
onset of the invasion and after the success of the initial overwhelming battles had a shocking 
psychological impact on the psyche of the PDF. As such, the morale elements that would 
reinforce any type of guerrilla resistance effort were lacking.136 
This was a big stick, and in the words of George, the U.S. used it as blackmail at 
times, "It consists essentially of demanding the adversary give up something on pain of 
suffering serious punishment or damage if he refuses to do so."137 Unlike in relations at the 
state actor level, use of this offensive crisis management strategy proved extremely 
successful when dealing with sub-state actors that had bought into the belief that you were 
nasty enough to annihilate them if they did not comply. 
Additionally, in the explanation for the concept of the Mini Ma Bell Diplomacy, 
coercive diplomacy is displayed. If the PDF commanders did not comply, the directed shots 
from the AC-130 Spectre into the open area of the cuartel would qualify as an "... exemplary 
use of quite limited force to persuade him to back down."138 Having someone register 
105mm howitzer rounds in your backyard can surely get your attention without necessarily 
hurting anyone. Although this use of lethal firepower in non-lethal demonstrations was not 
without risk, a stray or short round could have caused many casualties. "Gunship 
Diplomacy" of this sort actually was used quite extensively, and in all probability greatly 
reduced casualties on both sides.   Seeing that gunship orbiting at 6000 ft AGL had an 
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amazing calmative effect on potential combatants.139 Similarly, the use of armed helicopters 
in a like roles produced similar effects. One of the biggest risks inherent in conducting bold 
operations like this was the lack of security for these small teams as they daringly flew into 
enemy garrisons in the daylight. This suggests that enhanced self-defense measures utilizing 
NLWs may be necessary so that this act may be committed with a safety net, if our 
understanding of enemy intent is not as accurate and fine-grained as we suspect. Some NLW 
types may help support both the demonstration needs of these type "Military Diplomacy" 
missions, as well as the security needs of the forces tasked to execute them. We will analyze 
these NLWs in the matrices in Chapter V. 
D. POLICING PANAMA CITY 
1. Establishing the Framework for Urban Operations After D-day 
Operation JUST CAUSE was a campaign that consisted of two ambitious operations. 
The goals of the first were to protect American citizens and installations, to secure other key 
sites within Panama, to capture and deliver Noriega into competent legal hands, and most 
importantly, to shatter the PDF. The second operation, which was to begin almost 
simultaneously with the first, was to replace Noriega's rule with the democratically elected 
government of Guillermo Endara and to rebuild the PDF as a police force. As General Stiner 
later told redeploying troops, who had just jumped into Sicily Drop Zone at Fort Bragg, "The 
mission in Panama was a difficult one. We were literally to decapitate a government and 
then shake hands with the same people who we fought the night before and say, We want 
to help you now.'"140 
The first of these operations went remarkably well. The assault on dozens of targets 
simultaneously, in the middle of the night, and with overwhelming force, left Noriega and 
his supporters little hope of response. Stiner's insight that the PDF was a highly centralized 
organization, capable of only modest action without direction from Noriega or his chief 
139 Telephone interview, Clay McCutheon, AFSOC historian, 7 Mar 94, Hurlburt Field, FL. 
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lieutenants, proved to be true, and was vital to the success of the assaults on D-day. Stiner's 
analysis of the role of the PDF in Panamanian society meshed neatly with the intention to use 
swift, overpowering force to accomplish the Bush administration's goals in Panama. 
However, when the sun came up on the morning of the twentieth of December, the frictions 
of war and some oversights in the planning stage of the integrated operations to collapse the 
power of the PDF and the Dignity Battalions (Digbats) were already starting to cause 
problems in the urban areas of Panama City and Colon. 
This mini-case study examines incidents in Panama City in the week following the 
invasion. Using the paradigm of control warfare and a careful review of the literature on 
JUST CAUSE, we will examine possible causes, besides a lack of military presence and law 
enforcement, that contributed to the wide extent of the looting, sniping, and drive by 
shootings. Specific incidents to be reviewed include the looting of the shopping districts, the 
snipers effectiveness in pinning down U.S. forces, the attack on the U.S. Embassy, and the 
incidents at the Marriott. This approach is combined with interview data and personal 
observations to create a slightly revisionist view of this situation so that the lessons learned 
may be applied to the analysis in Chapter V of what specific NLWs and non-lethal tools may 
have aided the conduct of operations in these urban areas. This type analysis will hopefully 
shed light on key moral and physical elements to concentrate on in future operations in 
similar environments. 
2. Dealing With Urban Unrest 
The conventional view for what went wrong with the campaign in the city focuses 
on the frictions of war and the late deployment of the 82d Airborne and the 7th LJD. Due 
to a freak ice storm at Pope AFB, in North Carolina and stubborn fog at Travis AFB, in 
California, both units arrived too late to fulfill their missions as originally conceived.141 
According to LTC Jerry Murguia, who was the chief of Thurman's Current Operations A 
team, the OPLAN depended on the 2nd Brigade of the 7th LJD, who has been rigorously 
141 McConnell, p. 228. Flanagan, pp. 61, 197-198. 
77 
trained in MOUT, to spread out through the wide metropolitan area to establish roadblocks 
and secure key government facilities and infrastructure, such as power plants and water 
works.142 In fact, by the time the 5/21st of the 2nd Brigade arrived, 1515 hours on D-day, 
they assisted with the securing of Tocumen and then were reassigned by Gen Stiner on the 
twenty-first to a western AO.143 In any case there was not an early presence in Panama City 
in the early morning before daylight on D-day to "nip in the bud" the ensuing Digbat and 
dispersed PDF sniping, drive by shootings, hostage taking, and other attacks. 
Murguia noted that the will to fight and the cohesiveness of the PDF had been 
effectively crushed after H-hour. But he also realized that the opportunity to quickly deploy 
the overwhelming force needed to completely subdue the PDF and the Digbats and to pacify 
the city had been missed. Others point out that the priority of the other military targets and 
the necessity to wrap up the PDF had precedence over the civil unrest problems in the city. 
Regardless, it seems that the looting that stripped clean the downtown commercial districts 
reflected the biggest failure of the operation. 
The strategic objective of securing a democratic government was adversely effected 
by the losses due the comprehensive looting of the whole area. Loss estimates from $500M 
to $1.0B144 and the rebuilding time for this infrastructure both impacted the ability of the new 
government to get off to a robust start. Also the international informational aspects of this 
highly visible problem gave this otherwise exemplary operation a black eye through the 
reporting of the media. Scenes of unchecked looting and the perceived anarchy of sniper 
attacks - as broadcast around the world by CNN - were distorting the truly remarkable 
success that had been achieved at H-hour. Were the facts that the 7th LID or other U.S. 
forces were not swarming over the city or that the collapse of policing efforts with the quick 
demise of the PDF the only causes for this quick devolution into a free for all, or was there 
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some other catalyst. The following discussion examines through the lens of control warfare 
some of the possible contributing factors that were overlooked in a more conventional 
analysis. 
a. The Roots of the Urban Jacquerie 
Besides the lack of presence operations by the U.S. in Panama City early on 
after H-hour, some other key catalysts appear responsible for accelerating the lawlessness 
and looting in the some of the richest shopping districts in Latin America. At 0104 hours 
on 20 December, Captain Ivan Castillo, Noriega's personal bodyguard, was awakened from 
a doze outside of the aging La Siesta Hotel which had been transformed into the Centro 
Recreativo Militär, or called the Ceremi guest house by Noriega. Inside was Gen Noriega 
with Gloria, a girlfriend. What woke him was the nearby sounds of several loud explosions 
and the rattling sounds of automatic weapons to the west at the Tocumen-Torrijos airport 
complex. He looked up to see the terrible sight of hundreds of Rangers streaming from 
transports. This was the invasion that Noriega had refused to believe would ever happen. 
Castillo quickly took control of the situation. 
He hustled Noriega and the girl into a white Hyundai and they made their 
escape. He quickly realized that Noriega had no rational plan whatsoever. Instead Noriega 
was incoherently stammering about some forgotten Santeria charms and drunkenly mumbled, 
"What are we going to do?"145 After fleeing from one house to another and repeated phone 
calls to and among his small circle of close supporters, the situation looked bleak. Noriega 
talked on the phone with Capt. Asuncion Gaitan, who commanded his personal escort and 
served as Panamanian liaison with the various Cuban military and intelligence programs.146 
Gaitan persuaded Noriega to make a defiant speech into the phone, which he recorded at the 
other end. This speech was to prove an effective psychological weapon for the dictator who 
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was in reality on the run for his life and only really searching for a place to hide. Highlights 
of the translated transcript follow: 
We're in trench warfare now... and we will maintain the resistance,... We must resist and 
advance ... We ask the world for help, with men, dignity, and strength ... Our slogan is to 
win or die, not one step backward.147 
With his initial escape and with the phone system in operation, his mini- 
victory started a chain of events, when combined with the lack of presence of U.S. troops 
downtown and the collapse of the National police because they were part of the PDF. With 
Noriega on the loose, and because Noriega's power structure was based on greed, the U.S. 
quickly put up a bounty of one million dollars for help in his capture.148 The hope was that 
a PDF trooper or member of the opposition would finger him. This tactic plus the active 
search measures ongoing to track him down greatly restricted his ability to maneuver. 
b. Looting in Panama City and Colon 
However, the taped message Noriega made was soon being transmitted on 
Radio Nacional, which had been taken over by the PDF. This message had a very 
inflammatory effect on the morale of the remnants of the PDF and the Digbats in the urban 
areas. Early in the morning of the twentieth, elements of PDF and Digbats were soon leading 
efforts to break into stores, removing the money from cash registers, and piling the most 
valuable goods on trucks. Then, they would stand guard while looters picked clean what 
remained on the shelves. By mid-afternoon the streets were jammed around Avenida Central 
and Via Espafia with looters in a frenzy of lawlessness. The looting continued unabated for 
thirty hours.149 The Digbats that struck out on their own as snipers also persisted far longer 
than expected. This also may have been one more consequence of the mixed information 
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that the radio message and the continued transmissions of Radio Nacional fostered.150 Even 
with the decisive D-day victories, this loss of information dominance caused an unclear sense 
among the remnants of the PDF, the Digbats, the poor population in the urban areas, and the 
media that the war was really over and that there was any semblance of order being imposed 
by the U.S. forces. 
The rules of engagement for dealing with the looters restricted the American 
forces from firing on them if they were unarmed. The complication to this situation was the 
fact that mixed in with the looters were the armed Digbat members. With the statement on 
Radio Nacional that they would kill any yankee on sight, there was considerable risk of 
sniping or skirmishes for any small patrol that waded into any of these looting situations. As 
the looting escalated in the Colon duty-free port, the Americans were authorized to fire 
warning shots, then to fire near the looters, and finally, to shoot to wound. Without a riot 
control ability in Panama City or Colon, these measures came up short of stopping the 
looting until it had run its course. However, in Colon, one anecdotal example of a way the 
looting supported by armed Digbat was curtailed follows: 
... the effective strength -- and definitely the morale - of these "troops" was cut by the Navy 
SEAL sniper team set up on the roof of a port building at the south end of the bottleneck. 
The SEALs had a spotting scope, as well as an M-24 7.62mm sniper rifle. They also had one 
of the new .50-caliber long-range sniper weapons, which was in effect a single-shot version 
of the devastating .50-caliber machine gun. This weapon was precise out to a thousand 
yards. The SEALs spotted a group of civilians armed with assault rifles and festooned with 
ammunition pouches and rocket grenades. Technically, these "armed civilians" fell under 
the shoot-to-wound category. But it was impossible to merely wound with a .50-caliber 
sniper rifle. When three of the four Digbats were struck squarely in the torso and killed, 
falling one after the other like shooting gallery targets, the scale and tempo of the looting 
quickly dropped.151 
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c. Sniping and Counter Sniping Operations 
The sniping in Panama City by the Digbats slowed the ability of U.S. forces 
to fan out from their positions to patrol and to recover control of the city after it had been 
lost. On the night of the twenty-second, Pvt. James Allen Tabor, a .50-caliber machine 
gunner with the 4th Batt., 325th Parachute Infantry Regiment, became a fatal victim of a 
sniper. As his patrol started out the gate of Paitilla towards the main part of Panama City, 
it came under immediate sniper fire.152 Similar incidents impacted the ability of other patrols 
to move out and provide presence in most of Panama City. 
Some concerned citizens built barricades in the streets around their 
neighborhoods and provided for their own security by manning them with shotguns and 
hunting rifles. After a couple of days, the situation gradually returned to some sort of 
normalcy as U.S. soldiers spread out through the city and patrolled the streets. Eventually, 
over 1100 Military Police were assigned to Col. Larry Brede, the commanding officer of Fort 
Bragg's 16th Military Police Brigade. The MPs from the various units under Col. Brede's 
command performed many more duties than just trying to control traffic and prevent looting. 
They enforced basic laws and operated "detainee" camps for looters, former prisoners, and 
PDF members.153 
The effectiveness of the snipers was reduced by some different types of 
counter-sniper operations. In Colon, the anecdotal example referenced above towards 
looting was one example. In Panama City, the use of small armored task forces like Major 
Donivan's "Panzer Gruppe"154 were able to move special forces troops to trouble spots around 
the city. On the twentieth, helicopters gunships were also tasked to engage snipers in 
highrises in the Chorrillo area to assist the troops fighting for control of the Comandancia. 
Additionally, in the next couple of days, later calls for support from some engaged units were 
answered by special operations helicopters that provided counter-sniper fire. 
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d. The U.S. Embassy Under Attack 
The following anecdote relays the vulnerability of the U.S. Embassy shortly 
after the invasion, before it was reinforced with special forces soldiers. A few hours after 
the fighting began, a squad of uniformed PDF soldiers in full battle gear roared down 
Avenida Balboa in a pickup truck and a Land Cruiser and stopped under the palm trees near 
the Embassy. Using the concrete barrier of the seawall as a shield, they proceeded to blast 
the Embassy chancery with rocket-propelled grenades.- The RPGs smashed through the 
chancery's outer wall and exploded near the ambassador's office on the third floor. Inside, 
the Marine guards returned the fire as best they could with M-16s and shotguns. But the 
Embassy guard was badly outgunned.  Had the PDF elected to exploit their fire-power 
advantage they could have blasted their way into the Embassy and slaughtered the guards 
and foreign service personnel or taken them hostage. Instead, the PDF soldiers knocked out 
a few more windows with their AK-47s and drove off into the night.156 
This incident outlines the necessity for some way to repel attackers in an 
emergency. Point defenses for embassies can be easily overwhelmed by a military-type 
attack The constraint on the embassy is that it is not an armed fortress. The use of pre- 
positioned non-lethal defenses, to provide limited stand off or a temporary "moat" around the 
facility until help arrives seems like a reasonable contingency defense idea. 
e. Incidents At The Marriott Caesar Park Hotel 
Another target for disjointed PDF vengeance was the Marriott Hotel beside 
the modem Atlapa Convention Center in a middle-class neighborhood in the San Francisco 
district on the bayfront 2 miles east of Paitilla Point. The Marriott was a status symbol for 
the prosperous rabiblanco community, a gathering place for gringos, and the headquarters 
for American news media, so it was not a surprise that it was raided twice by Digbat gunmen. 
Shortly after H-hour the first incursion by Digbats resulted in the hostage taking of some 
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media personnel and/or their wives.157 However, they were released within a few hours and 
allowed to return to the hotel. 
Around 0900 a second wave of Digbat gunmen burst into the Marriott lobby 
and seized CBS producer Jon Meyersohn, ABC producer Robert Campos, and an American 
resident manager for the Marriott, Daniel Sarria. Two were released that afternoon. 
Meyersohn together with a GTE Corporation executive, Doug Mullen, were among the last 
Americans to be released by the Digbats three days later.158 Around 2300 on the 20th, B 
Co/2d Batt /504 Inf. (Airborne) finally reached the hotel after a grueling 2Vi mile road march 
marked by numerous sniper attacks and a shootout with Digbats in a truck. They blasted 
their way into the unlocked hotel and proceeded to round up all the "hostages" that had been 
reported to their headquarters. The last confusing incident at the Marriott involved the 
arrival of the relief convoy to transport the hotel guests to Panama Viejo. 
At 1000 on the 21 December, the evacuation force, led by Capt. Greg Sawyer 
and consisting of four .50-caliber mounted HMMWVs, one Sheridan tank, two cargo trucks 
from 1st brigade, and two large civilian "Marriott" airport catering trucks, arrived on the 
scene. According to several sources, it appeared that the evacuation force and the 2/504 
soldiers were involved in a friendly fire incident with each other as the convoy approached 
the hotel.159 Other reports by the U.S. government officially denied this, but there was a law 
suit filed against the U.S. government by the family of a Spanish photographer, Juan 
Rodriguez.160 The guests were transferred safely out of the area. Although some returned 
within twenty-four hours to continue their coverage of the war. 
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3. The Aftermath 
By late in the day on the twentieth, the offices of Radio Nacional, that had been taken 
over by the PDF, were finally assaulted by a heliborne force. The highrise offices in Punta 
Paitilla were swept of PDF and the transmitter destroyed.161 The question remains why was 
this was overlooked for almost twenty-four hours when the Channel 2 television station was 
surgically removed from the air shortly before H-hour in anticipation of the informational 
aspects of the war.162 Similarly, Noriega's communication ability by the use of the telephone 
system seems like something that needs to be accounted for in any future coup de main as 
part of a PCO. In the "softer" battle for information dominance over the morale aspects of 
the minds of the public and the will of the dispersed enemy, being on the air and clearly 
explaining the situation may preclude strong resistance or lawlessness. 
Physical security of some key U.S. facilities besides the bases also needs to be 
addressed. Most notably would be the vulnerability of the Embassy to attack, but also, the 
security of main tourist hotels and the risk of a mass hostage situation they represent needs 
to be taken into account. Some of the criticisms by knowledgeable people on the ground in 
Panama City, include the problem of the neglect of planning for public safety in the plan for 
defeat. They feel that anarchy in major urban areas will undercut policy in "special wars" 
and the story will be lost in the confusion.163 Also, pointed out is the effect that these 
incidents have on the portrayal of the operation to domestic audiences and for domestic 
politics. This type of civil disorder is one of the first indicators of failure. Thus, the policy 
process is immediately effected by this perception and national strategic input down channel 
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causes mission creep at the operational and tactical levels. This may actually lead to failure 
as the goals of a mission are re-prioritized on the fly without consideration to the NEVs that 
were originally targeted. 
Overall, the U.S. was lucky that there were only three U.S. civilian casualties, with 
the potential for loss that was reviewed in this case study. It is understood that in a city of 
1.2 million, U.S. troops engaged in a shooting war simply could not protect every U.S. 
citizen. Similarly, shielding all the businesses and stores from looting also presented a 
daunting task. However, as this brief study indicates some low cost measures coupled with 
a better management of information, could have been incorporated into the plan to do a better 
job than was accomplished.  Gen. Thurman explained the prioritization in the following 
quote: 
Not to downplay anyone's loss. .. [, but] we had to make a choice given the manpower we 
had. We made a choice to protect high value targets: the utilities, the television facilities, 
power, water pumping, food warehouses, and telecommunications, not the local 7-Eleven.164 
Not to disagree with General that we did a fine job in Panama, but it appears as though we 
missed a couple of the key items on his list. Based on this case study, telecommunications 
and food warehouses stick out as two glaring examples. 
Additionally, an appreciation of the extremely high value of every American life in 
these type "special wars" should have led to some pre-positioned support at the Embassy and 
at the major hotels like the Marriott and the Holiday Inn in Panama City. A priori 
clandestine insertion of squad-sized special forces elements in mufti with a minimum of 
heavy weapons or non-lethal weapons to hold back the "bad guys" may be the most prudent 
course in future situations that approximate the scale of JUST CAUSE. As a close associate 
of Endara's, Anel Beliz stated, "The U.S. was very, very lucky, they didn't get protection to 
their people."165 Indeed, the failure of U.S. troops to protect civilians outside of military 
garrisons at H-hour tarnished the triumph of the invasion. It just so happened that the scale 
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of the urban looting and civilian casualties among Panamanians in the neigborhoods 
surrounding the Commandancia were so much higher than the American losses that the 
question of minimum force and collateral damage to the indigenous population and the 
Panamanian infrastructure became a much greater issues in this case. The question of the 
number of Panamanian civilians killed caused much controvery and led to many follow on 
investigations, not least of which was a congressional investigation.166 It should be expected 
that any future foe will take better advantage of any opening for causing pain and suffering 
to Americans than was the case in Panama. 
E. COMPARATIVE LOOK AT MINI-CASE STUDIES 
In the next chapter, we will run through a detailed review analyzing both the 
emerging glimpses of control warfare and the potential application of NLWs that seem to 
apply to the mini-case studies. However, a quick look back at the two mini-case studies 
reveals some easily observable general trends that will become even more apparent if first 
capsulized here. In the first case study that examined operations in the west of Panama, 
Chiriqui province, it appeared that the closer we came to waging control warfare, the more 
use could be made for non-lethal techniques if not for specific non-lethal weapons. The 
exemplary and restrained use of such highly lethal weapons such as the AC-130 Gunships 
and helicopter borne special operations forces in non-lethal compellence roles suggests the 
expanded role for specifically designed non-lethal weapons and tools. That is if they are 
designed to replace or augment lethal tools in these missions while still maintaining, if not 
highlighting, the threat of use for our sharpened stiletto. In this environment, Dr. Deutch's 
short quote in the beginning of this thesis - pairing NLWs with the development of PGMs - 
takes on deeper meaning. 
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Where we strayed from control warfare tenets in the mini-cases in the second study 
was by not addressing and planning for contingencies in the urban areas of Panama City and 
Colon. As a result, we had to go lethal to regain a foothold and credible coercion. By not 
being "ahead of the curve" in the realm of information dominance, and losing the initiative 
of our overwhelming forceful entry, we slipped into an environment of "graduated 
compellence" where we had to engage a physically and mentally toughened opponent who 
had recovered his wits. Additionally, the fires that devastated the El Chorillo barrio next to 
the Commandancia (regardless of who caused them) toughened the opponent. As is often 
the case in insurgencies, "the dead dictate policy."167 With fewer dead or displaced, the less 
the support and reasons for revenge. With this simply stated, but hard to realize advantage 
for both control warfare and NLWs, we will now review and further analyze the case studies. 
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V. ANALYSIS 
A. THE CHALLENGE 
Judging the utility of NLWs in the constrained and changing environment of a PCO 
is much more difficult than judging that of lethal weapons. In actual operations - at least for 
lethal weapons - the planners, commanders, and troops have amassed an excellent 
appreciation for the effectiveness of particular weapon systems. For research and 
development studies, testing, training, and operational data on previous usage of lethal 
weapons have allowed the development of combat simulation models to predict the outcomes 
of fire support missions and individual soldier performance in studies of future scenarios. 
For these studies, combat potentials are weighed against the amassed and detailed 
analytical database drawn from past performance of a weapon to measure its ability and 
degree to incapacitate in the projected scenario. Additionally, the easy viewing of their 
physical effects allow a more intuitive understanding. Previous usage of lethal weapons have 
produced known, measurable, physical effects on the enemy in reaching the goal or desired 
end state objective of an operation. But, figures of merit like "loss exchange ratios" used by 
the Army to evaluate conventional combat simulations, do not fit with the policy direction 
for these emerging PCO, "special wars" or the use of NLWs in which the desire is to avoid 
casualties.168 NLW use in this environment, with their physical and morale effects, are 
difficult to judge, as they not only impact the physical capability of the enemy, but also the 
morale force or will to fight. 
Carried over from our earlier discussion of control warfare, it appears that the 
concepts that support it and the system it models also address these "softer" more subtle 
dimensions in warfare. In the following overall analysis of each case study it will be 
interesting first to evaluate separately the applicability of the control warfare paradigm to 
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the mission areas and then second to subsequently address the projected suitability of NLWs 
to operational tasks within these mission areas. For this second analysis, MOEs will need 
to be addressed that conform to the constrained tasks that need to be accomplished. 
If our conceptual discussion of a new control warfare paradigm does indeed reflect 
a revolution in warfare, then perhaps the existing measures of effectiveness (MOEs) are not 
adequate for measuring goals in the new emerging model for operations. Therefore, MOEs 
will be developed around the defining dimensions of the perceptual shorthand for knowing 
the potential capabilities and intent of the enemy and our own forces. This perceptual 
shorthand was discussed in the end of Chapter HI. In the conclusion, a comparison of these 
two parallel analyses will help answer the hypothesis of this thesis as well as lay the 
conceptual groundwork for further qualitative and quantitative questions and issues. 
Reviewing the theoretical discussion in Chapter HI, the new paralyzing requirements 
of control warfare seem to dovetail with the policy constraints of minimum collateral 
damage, minimum force, and quick decisive defeat. But, modeling intent or the "softer" 
psychological dimensions of the morale character or will of the enemy seems significantly 
more difficult than measuring the degree of physical destruction of enemy personnel or 
materiel. Given the challenge of measurability of effects, military and political suitability, 
and the newness of these tools, coupled with the external constraints: the legal and ethical, 
sociopolitical, informational, environmental, and economic considerations on their use, we 
now will delineate the methodology for our case study analysis. 
B. CASE STUDY ANALYSIS 
To establish the background on the methodology that we will be using in the case 
studies to analyze missions with respect to control warfare and NLWs, it may first be useful 
to consider the linking of strategies to tasks. The "Strategies to Tasks"169 concept, that we 
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armed forces in the conduct of military missions and sub-missions. This method seems 
particularly appropriate for evaluating missions within PCOs like JUST CAUSE where the 
number and complexity of missions and their constraints combine to make it difficult to 
ensure that the means are appropriate to the ends. Given limited policy objectives and then 
trying to match the appropriate power or utility of a particular military tool(s) to support each 
operational task has proven to be very challenging. To sort out and list all the "generic" 
operational tasks also could be tedious. Luckily, there have been some comprehensive 
compilations of operational tasks that could be applicable in one or more mission areas.170 
For this analysis, we will only be concerned with examining specific tasks that we evaluate 
as principally applicable to the completion of missions within the case studies. 
In the two case studies, we will look at the national and military objectives governing 
each significant mission within the context of each phase of the operation. References back 
to the framing discussion of Operation JUST CAUSE in Chapter IV will be essential. We 
will reference or define the operational mission and the corresponding strategy to accomplish 
the objective. We will then examine the operational tasks that these strategies dictate. For 
the first analysis, the concepts developed earlier in Chapter JJI that characterize control 
warfare will be used to review and judge the operational strategy driving these selected tasks 
for their appropriateness within the conduct of the overall operation. These concepts include 
the following: information dominance, objective (expanded), concentration, tempo control, 
and environmental degradation. 
In the conclusion, we will look back to compare the results of this analysis, where the 
strategies driving the operational tasks are evaluated using the perceptual lens of control 
warfare, with the results of the following matrices analysis on the applicability of NLWs to 
the operational tasks. To answer the primary question posed in this thesis, we are more 
concerned with comparing the net assessment of the relative projected applicability of NLWs 
between the first case study and the second and not specifically concerned with comparing 
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NLWs. As mentioned earlier, this will provide the basis for the evaluation of the hypothesis 
of this thesis. However, the second part of our analysis that addresses an MOE evaluation 
of NLWs may be also useful for setting the stage for later more detailed operations research 
type analysis, examinations, and trade off studies for prioritizing future acquisition, testing, 
and operational use of NLWs in an environment of severely constrained resources. 
Specifically, for the second analysis, as the operational tasks define the courses of 
action that we would take to defeat courses of action the enemy may take, the "enemy 
system" part of the familiar METT-T171 acronym is expanded upon by using the following 
perceptual device. The tasks are evaluated by criteria developed for examining our system 
and its interaction with the enemy system by categorizing the MOEs under the generic 
capability headings of shoot, move, communicate, know, and react (concepts discussed at the 
end of Chapter IH.). The specific MOEs will be discussed in the next subsection and within 
the context of the individual case studies. For evaluation, the advantages and characteristics 
of the NLWs that "deploy" positively into each MOE will be qualitatively reviewed based 
on the limited quantitative references from a table developed by ARDEC (Appendix B) and 
from the summarized effects listed for each type of NLW in Appendix A. These different 
types of NLWs will be cross-listed within the target or general task categories defined in 
Chapter n. Only then will they be "deployed" into the MOEs in the weighted comparison 
type matrices in Appendix C which are described below.172 
This technique will allow us to judge their applicability to the particular operational 
tasks associated with a mission. In the lower half of these matrices, the relative merit of the 
particular "deployed" NLWs will be filtered by the combined effects of the external 
constraints listed above to weight their net utility. These external constraints, especially the 
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legal issues, will first be examined in detail to establish the supporting references and audit 
trail for their relative correlation to specific NLWs. Even though costs are extremely 
important in prioritizing development of NLWs, it appears as though the costs of these 
systems are not high and the relative differences in cost are not significant to exclude any 
NLWs from this initial evaluation effort. In later, more detailed quantitative analyses or 
trade off studies, costs will definitely need to be factored into the equation against 
effectiveness as we continue to operate in an environment of fiscal constraints. 
The format for these matrices will be in accordance with that used in Quality 
Function Deployment (QFD) matrices as used in Total Quality ManagementVLeadership 
173 (TQM/L) team applications for development of a product, service, process, or strategy. 
The acquisition and evaluation of new defense systems, by both DoD and NATO are starting 
to be viewed by the use of such tools.174 This weighted matrices evaluation format was 
chosen because it offers an accepted standard for weighted heuristic analysis of multi- 
attribute decision problems that are nearly impossible to evaluate algorithmically because of 
the limited data for all the variables.175 Even though this effort represents the views of only 
one person, the technique is designed for use by a cross-functional team that fully 
understands the end users requirements and also includes the customer or end user on the 
team. This multifunctional approach encourages synergism to identify and resolve strategy 
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to task (and technology) issues up front. By adopting this type of decision aiding approach 
and combining its use with traditional trade-off studies using assessment criteria with much 
more detailed data, other researchers using a team approach should be able to see the 
advantages of this particular proposed framework as a baseline from which to proceed. 
The MOEs used follow from the five capabilities developed at the end of Chapter HI. 
They address the different dimensions used to examine in the modeling of the probable 
courses of action for the enemy and ourself. These capabilities - to shoot, move, 
communicate, know, and react - reflect both the intent and physical capability of the enemy 
to act. Using them as a guide will help us understand the complex direct and indirect 
relationships of NLWs to the operational tasks and goals of a mission. 
The main benefit of this heuristic QFD approach is that the indirect effect of one 
measure mapping onto another may be taken into account. Even though we divide out the 
MOEs into five dimensions, we realize that this type of synergistic warfare (as described and 
modeled in the earlier theoretical discussion) has to be thought of holistically and the five 
dimensions are interlinked according to the shorthand cognitive map in Figure 3.3. With 
there being no way to make the MOE dimensions completely mutually exclusive, cases with 
interactive effects will be reflected at a commensurate level on the other affected measures. 
For example, measures for disabling communication that may lead to an indirect impact on 
one of the other measures, like inability to react for a designated period of time, may show 
up with a mental addition of the combined direct effect for that dependent measure being 
rounded up by the reflected indirect effect of the first. 
Team members evaluating NLWs using this model would have to be briefed on the 
fuzzy edges for these measures that may overlap slightly in some cases and take this into 
account before determining what level of deployment ranking (9, 3, 1, or none) to assign to 
the other measures as a result of the determined effect on it of the main measure for a 
particular operational task. The intent is to break out measures for NLWs in as many 
independent dimensions as possible to get some understanding for how to view their effects, 
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but this qualitative technique has its limitations. But for now, let us examine the capability 
measures individually to establish the MOEs for each. 
The first capability is the ability of each side to shoot, providing supporting fires or 
individually engaging weapons to destroy or incapacitate the other side. In ARDEC's 
Alternate Armament Evaluation Methodology (AAEM)176 analysis of NLWs for four 
scenarios, the following MOEs were used. The first MOE involved the total number of 
casualties for U.S. troops that were taken as a percentage of the total force engaged. This 
needed to be less that 10% of the total U.S. personnel involved for the MOE to be satisfied 
in "High Confidence" contingency operations. The second MOE developed was a measure 
of the probability of success for the operation. This needed to be greater than 90% for the 
mission to be considered a success. 
For our analysis, we feel that these values place too loose of a constraint on the 
number casualties and the probability of success.177 For contingency operations like the 
PCOs we discuss, it seems that friendly casualties are required to be at or near zero (less than 
2%) and that enemy casualties need to be minimized (less than 10%). Likewise, the 
probability of success needs to be almost assured (greater than 98%). Although we will not 
try to evaluate this last aggregate MOE, we feel that it would need to take into account the 
net effect of the quantitative MOEs and the subjective effects of weapons on the will of the 
enemy to shoot, move, communicate, know, or react. This morale factor has indirect effects 
that couple with the direct effects measured by the quantitative MOEs. Where we feel this 
rationale is valid, and supporting arguments confirm these indirect effects, we will add the 
subjective effect to the quantitative measure. 
Therefore we will classify MOEs under the category of shoot as follows: Friendly 
casualties - near zero (<2%), enemy casualties - minimized (<10%), enemy deterred from 
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engaging (<10% of enemy inclined to fire) - which is the result of weapons disabled, fire 
suppressed, or costs of resistance visually displayed. Enemy fire detected and traced to 
source (<1 meter circular error probable for location of source). Friendly fires precise with 
minimum collateral damage or non-lethal for surrounding non-combatants (<2% of non- 
combatants in immediate area as casualties). 
The second capability is the ability of each side to move to engage or retreat and to 
reposition into attack or defensive formations. At the tactical level, this involves land, air 
and water vehicles or the dismounted movement capabilities of soldiers. The MOE to 
evaluate this could be represented by a percentage of vehicles disabled (>95%) and the 
percentage of enemy soldiers frozen in place (>90%). 
The third capability is the ability of the enemy forces to communicate between and 
among their separated elements. A NLW that could disable most of this capability would 
leave them in a dispersed and ineffective state. The MOE may require that almost all 
electronic communication be monitored or disrupted (>95%). This capability is a good 
example of where the indirect effects of NLWs may correlate with the direct effects. Some 
of the anti-personnel weapons that disable or impede the communicators may make the use 
of communication gear impossible - even without damaging it directly. 
The fourth capability is the ability to monitor the above capabilities and make 
decisions for follow-on actions. This capability is referred to as the capability to know. A 
weapon that addresses this capability would not allow the enemy to know their own or our 
disposition. They would be effectively blinded or disoriented as to the nature of an ongoing 
engagement (<5% of their information systems functional or their inability to operate them 
impaired). 
The fifth capability is the ability of the enemy to react, thus adapting to the changed 
situation resulting from moves, actions, or engagement by our forces. As this concept relates 
to speed of action and the ability to run through the OODA loop, it reflects the ability to 
support high tempo operations. The time factor that this reaction capability represents is best 
measured as the time delay or the duration for the effects of NLWs. Because these temporary 
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or disabling effects can be a result of personnel, materiel, informational, (task) or security 
(functional) type ROEs for weapons acting to impede the ability of the enemy to shoot, 
move, communicate, or know, as well as specifically to react, we use the MOEs associated 
with this capability to measure the net time component of the effect at the tactical maneuver 
group or operational level. 
The other dimension of this time component is the time delay for the weapon to take 
effect. Although most have almost instant effect, some of the chemical, acoustic, or 
microwave weapons may take a short while for the effects to take hold. Thus, in a potential 
shooting exchange where instant effect is preferred, this could be important in determining 
the suitability of one type over the other. Because the data on potential NLWs is sketchy at 
best, we will assume all effects are instantaneous for this analysis. 
The ability to paralyze, stun, shock, or surprise the enemy is a cumulative effect of 
physical and morale factors. Lethal weapons, NLWs, and non-lethal tools all play into these 
effects on reaction time. We recognize this cumulative effect. But, because we are primarily 
concerned with NLWs in this evaluation, we will try to specifically decouple effects of 
individual NLWs or tools for their application to the MOEs. The last problem is that in 
different operations the time scale for the reaction delay requirement varies. For example, 
in a hostage rescue situation, the paralyzing effect must be instantaneous and widespread, but 
only need last for a period of seconds. In an urban operation the requirement may be to 
disable the enemy for a period of 15 to 30 minutes until the objectives can be secured, while 
at a strategic level, the attack on an enemies information system may need to last for days or 
weeks to be considered effective. Therefore, within the context of a particular operational 
task supporting a mission, the MOE will be judged by comparison its ability to meet a time 
delay of 95% of the target time specified. 
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C. REVIEW OF MILITARY DIPLOMACY IN THE WEST 
The strategic objectives for JUST CAUSE, to capture Noriega and to restore 
democracy for the government of Panama, drove military objectives that outlined U.S. 
operations in western Panama after the invasion. As noted in the case study, western Panama 
presented the last stronghold and chance for Noriega to remain powerful and support 
protracted conflict in Panama. The first military objective was the quick, decisive surrender 
of the forces out west to remove this potential supporting infrastructure: the military 
garrisons, Dignity Battalions, and the key leadership support of the Military Zone Five 
commander, Lt. Col. del Cid. However, during the initial phase of JUST CAUSE this ranked 
behind securing the main invasion targets in the central area of Panama and securing the 
facilities in the Canal Zone. There was going to be a delay after H-hour before this objective 
could be addressed. The second objective was the smooth transition of these areas back to 
democratic Panamanian civil rule. This constrained the first goal by requiring minimum 
force and minimum collateral damage to support the quick changeover to a military 
assistance mode out west. 
The strategy developed was illustrated at the operational level as the "Ma Bell 
Diplomacy" of Gen. Cisneros. At the tactical level it was centered around the "Mini-Ma 
Bell" task forces. At both levels this strategy was assisted by "Gunship" diplomacy. The 
operational tasks that faced this force included the following: maneuver to operate in the 
enemy's rear area, coordinate a simultaneous show of force with the AC-130 Gunship, 
accomplish a facilities seizure (the cuartels), and quickly secure the immediate outlying area 
around the facility to quell violence. It will now be instructive to review how well the 
concepts of control warfare applied to the strategy associated with these operational tasks. 
1. Military Diplomacy and Control Warfare 
The five main concepts supporting control warfare, developed in Chapter III, will 
be sequentially reviewed in the following order: information dominance, objective, 
concentration, tempo control, and environmental degradation. Information dominance was 
achieved out west by first providing the PDF forces and Panamanian people with news and 
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information of the scale of the attack and the PDF defeat in the decisive D-day battles. 
PSYOPs personnel assisted the Voice of America (VOA) staff and also operated television 
and radio broadcast facilities on Volant Solo, a specially modified EC-130, to make sure that 
they were aware of the new situation for the government of Panama. They also conducted 
leaflet drops of "safe passage cards" signed by General Cisneros, to induce PDF and Digbats 
to surrender and support the new regime.178 The PDF forces out west who had braced for our 
expected attack, realized that they really had no way of knowing where we would mass or 
how we would attack. They were forced into a siege mentality. The unsavory prospect of 
persisting operations against an imminent attack by a perceived dominant U.S. force had a 
debilitating effect on their morale. 
At the same time, Gen. Cisneros's "Ma Bell Diplomacy" was starting to have an effect 
on the cohesion of the PDF forces. Though he was not able to make direct phone calls to 
the cuartels because of the disconnects between the civilian phone system in Panama and his 
military offices, he was able to call through the international operator in Miami, who then 
called the PDF installations long-distance. In consultation with Capt. Jimenez, he reviewed 
the list of PDF commanders to decide who commanded the most loyalty. The PDF major 
in charge of Darien province (in the east) received the first call and he obliged by calling his 
colleagues to persuade them to surrender.179 But, in fact, all the way out west in Chiriqui, on 
the twenty-first of December, Major Ivan Gaytan, del Cid's right-hand man, initiated the 
phone linkup with Gen Cisneros by calling his brother, Moises, a Catholic priest to work out 
a deal.180 This subtle detail, the second thoughts of del Cid and his top officers, illustrates 
the effect of information dominance on their actions even before Cisneros's "Ma Bell 
Diplomacy" could be brought into play. 
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At the tactical level out west, Major Gil Perez's mini "Ma Bell Diplomacy" served 
as the coup de grace for the capitulation of the cuartels in Santiago, Chitre, and Las Tablas. 
At each, with an AC-130 simultaneously circling over his head, as soon as the PDF 
commander responded positively to the phone conversation with Major Perez from the 
nearby airport the surrender of the cuartel was virtually assured. The other aspects of 
information dominance include the sensors on the Gunship and their ability to look down on 
the cuartel and expose and confirm the disposition of forces in and around it. 
Communicating this information to Perez's task force immediately after the terms and 
instructions for surrender were given, gave Perez the information edge as he approached their 
facilities. Also, as the operation commenced, the helicopter overflight of the cuartel by 
Major Perez and the PDF commander confirmed the preparations for the capitulation and 
provided the immediate "ground truth" view that the soldiers were assembled on the parade 
ground as instructed.181 
The operations out west supported the enhanced concept of the objective in control 
warfare. The broadened understanding of the commander's intent and concept was necessary 
to understand the subtleties of designing a strategy that would destroy the will of the enemy 
without forcing him to be frightened into trying to fight back out of shock or desperation. 
The small size, excellent training, and cultural and indigenous understanding of the lead task 
force that went into David reflected this understanding of the objective and the importance 
of the strategic policy linkage to the tactical task they needed to accomplish. The packaged 
mix of PDF liaison, (Panama based) 3/7 SFG soldiers, key decision makers, and 
communications personnel on the two MH-60Gs in the surrender team reflected the precise 
tuning of the force to accomplish the operational task. 
Lt. Col. Joe Hunt, the commander of the 3/75 Rangers, also made sure he clarified 
to del Cid the compellent environment this small force was being used in when he said to 
him on the phone that there was a sizable combat force in the air, and "Should there be any 
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problem with this linkup between the special forces element and del Cid, then we would take 
necessary action." In the earlier operations on the other cuartels, Major Perez's A Co. 1/7 
SFG soldiers displayed their strict fire discipline by not firing a round. The only shots fired 
were at the one cuartel in Santiago. A couple of ineffective shots at the landing helicopters 
were unleashed by a scared PDF soldier before the cuartel leadership could subdue him - 
ceasing the fire.182 The understanding of the political importance of securing these cuartels 
with minimum force to support both our national objectives and to support the operational 
objective for the democratic transition of Panama was a critical aspect of these missions out 
west. 
The concept of concentration for these operations is displayed by the ability to appear 
over the objective rapidly and to seize the cuartels before there could be a chance for second 
thoughts by the surrendering forces. We operated with a firepower advantage as a threat of 
force which allowed the synchronized maneuver of these small, but high quality, forces to 
gain relative superiority over the PDF at a time and place of our choosing. The enemy had 
already been effectively dispersed by our framing attack on the key infrastructure of the PDF. 
These concentrated operations were all that remained as necessary actions to efficiently end 
PDF control in the outlying districts. 
We were able to maintain tempo control by initiating the timing of these operations 
to work in conjunction with the preparatory work of information dominance. We dictated 
the timing after having determined the demoralizing effect in the short interregnum since D- 
day that had softened the will of these forces to resist. For the David operation, we had the 
ability to move our task forces into position in a controlled, cascading, sequential fashion that 
was beyond the ability of the enemy's reaction capability. With the AC-130 overhead and 
the threat of a large reinforcing task force available to air assault their position, the PDF were 
put into a dilemma where any thought of resisting the entry task force and the tempo of our 
operations would result in unacceptable costs. 
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We were able to take advantage of environmental degradation by having the "high 
ground" with the sensors on the AC-130 providing a detailed view of the enemies disposition 
while he knew little of ours. Our standoff firepower also tilted the playing field in our favor. 
And finally, total air superiority allowed us to be air mobile with room to maneuver at our 
leisure to accomplish the air assault in a controlled fashion. 
2. MOE Evaluation of Tasks Out West 
To review, the four main operational tasks that were part of the campaign out west 
to disarm the PDF at minimum cost were as follows: maneuver to operate in the enemy's 
rear area, coordinate a simultaneous show of force with the AC-130 Gunship, accomplish 
a facilities seizure (the cuartels), and quickly secure the immediate outlying area around the 
facility to quell violence. They will be examined using the MOEs derived under each of the 
five capability dimensions developed in our shorthand (designed for examining the enemy 
and friendly forces in a control warfare campaign). A series of QFD matrices in Appendix 
Y will be used to visualize this analysis. These matrices will apply to the specific type of 
mission examined and as such will collectively review the operational tasks that were part 
of it in an aggregate fashion. For reasons of software matrix size support limits and 
presentability, the individual matrices will be vertically split by functional category for 
NLWs, using the established categories: personnel, materiel, information, and security. 
This will allow us to judge NLW applicability to the sum total of the operational 
tasks associated with a mission and develop a raw score based on the perceived military 
utility of the weapons. In each cell of the matrix, the normal QFD weighting of 9, 3, and 1 
will apply to the degree that the "how" (the NLW) seems to support a specific "what" criteria 
(the MOE). In the lower half of the matrix, the relative merit of the particular "deployed" 
NLWs will be filtered by summing the weighted and combined effects of the external 
constraints listed earlier and in the following constraint analysis and taking them into account 
as a percentage reduction to determine the NLWs net utility. 
These external constraints, especially the legal issues, will first be examined in detail 
later in this chapter to establish the supporting references for their relative correlation to 
102 
specific NLWs. The scale used to determine their net impact on the decision to use a 
particular weapon will be ranked from 0-10. This is done so that the constraint may be 
easily translated into a percentage decrease in the desirability of specific NLW as these 
external constraints become internalized into the decision problem for use of NLWs. Also, 
as these constraints are considered as mutually exclusive and additive for simplicity in this 
evaluation, they will each be given a weighting factor such that they all add up to one 
hundred percent (i.e. .3, .2, .5) if all considered together and then ranked at full effect in their 
impact on the desirability of a particular NLW. 
A similar procedure will be used to evaluate the MOEs for the second case study, 
which is described below. After all matrices are completed, a table in Appendix Y will list 
and compare the scores for NLWs for the operational tasks in each evaluated mission. The 
next section details the analysis of the missions in the second case study. 
D. A REVIEW OF POLICING PANAMA CITY 
Urban Operations are difficult, operating forces in these environments subjects 
troops, vehicles, and aircraft to well entrenched and concealed opponents. Military 
Operations in Urban Terrain (MOUT) have historically been avoided as a part of doctrine 
and when undertaken have been bloody and brutish, but in the constrained circumstances 
involved in PCOs, operating with minimum costs and prevailing in urban environments must 
be planned for, trained for, and expected. When the frictions of war complicate plans for 
operating in this type of environment, quick flexible actions must be taken or the opportunity 
for success will be lost. This analysis for the congregate missions and operational tasks in 
the second case study will be handled very similarly to the analysis of the first case study. 
The strategic objectives for JUST CAUSE (listed earlier) drove the military 
objectives that defined follow on U.S. operations in Panama City and Colon in the wake of 
the initial simultaneous attacks. Protection of Americans, defense of the Canal, restoration 
of democracy, and the capture of Noriega were all included in the military objectives that 
were being pursued in the urban areas. In more specific terms, General Thurman's broad 
operational tasks, inherent in his mission, were these: Protect 30,000 U.S. Citizens; defend 
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142 key facilities along the Panama Canal; neutralize the PDF, who were spread out in some 
13 key objective areas; neutralize the nonuniformed, armed Dignity Battalion forces, almost 
unidentifiable, as they mingled with other Panamanians on the streets, in vehicles of all sorts, 
and in various buildings; and find and capture the elusive Noriega - who moved on a random 
schedule and slept in a different house every night. General Thurman's basic strategy was 
simply stated but complex in execution: "Simultaneously attack the Panamanian combat 
forces in the Panama City/Colon area and force their collapse."183 That strategy supported 
the execution of a myriad of other specific operational tasks that were included as part of the 
three main mission area efforts to restore order before stability could be regained in Panama 
City/Colon: stop the unprecedented looting, stop the sniping and drive by shootings, and 
provide protection for key facilities that were not included under the umbrella of the H-hours 
attacks. 
In the next subsection we will review how well the concepts of control warfare apply 
to the three main mission areas listed above. Following that discussion, we will list the main 
operational tasks that could be cross-listed as part of this follow on urban campaign. The 
eight main operational tasks that were contained within the missions in the urban areas 
include the following tasks: denial operations to stop looting, countersniper operations, 
weapons detection, policing of restricted zones, pursuit operations, isolation of insurgents 
and enemy leadership from support, accomplish a facilities seizure (the Marriott), and 
quickly secure the immediate outlying area around the facility to quell violence. Then an 
MOE evaluation using the QFD matrices as already described for the first case study will 
again be completed to assess how NLWs might project into these operational tasks. The 
main point to remember for this evaluation is that the QFD matrices will reflect values for 
conducting the tasks within the real missions conducted, given the constraint that the de facto 
environment that existed frames any projection of NLWs. We cannot assume that the NLWs 
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could have been used with different initial conditions that would have preempted the 
operational tasks from having to be conducted in reaction to the existing threat. 
1. Follow Up Operations and Control Warfare 
The five main concepts supporting control warfare, developed in Chapter HI, will 
again be sequentially applied to this case study in the same manner as the first case study. 
The problems with establishing information dominance, outlined in the context of the second 
case study review in Chapter IV, will be the first concept more deeply examined with regard 
to each of the mission areas. But first, to be fair, the frictions of war that delayed the arrival 
of the 82nd Airborne and the 7th LID, were only part of the problem with getting these forces 
established and deployed to carry out their initially planned for objectives against the PDF 
and Digbats in the Panama City area.184 The parachute drop of the heavy equipment and 
armored vehicles for the 82nd at Torrijos/Tocumen left most of the vehicles in the swamp 
on the eastern perimeter of the field.185 Likewise, the 2/7 LID piled up on the ramp at 
Tocumen on the 21nd of December to find that they were reassigned to support operations 
out west and the 1/7, which started arriving the next day, received the mission of clearing and 
securing a major portion of Panama City.186 This series of events shows how the window of 
opportunity was further opened for the establishment of resistance operations in the urban 
areas for both the PDF and Digbats as information dominance of the situation deteriorated.. 
The unexpected severity of the looting problem in Panama City and Colon added 
another dimension to the problem of information dominance as the urban jackerie enveloped 
the cities. Stopping a looting problem once the perception of legitimate control of the 
situation was perceived to have vanished was a far greater problem than deploying a 
presence and law enforcement force beforehand. The addition of the Radio Nacional 
broadcasts further exacerbated the situation and the perception that we were not in control 
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of the situation with the (a branch of the PDF) police presence effectively cleared out of the 
way by the start of the attack. 
The sniper problems that pinned our forces down also were supported by an inability 
of information dominance tools to help predetermine, pinpoint, and effectively retaliate for 
these enemy operations. When lethal counter sniper tools were finally brought into use 
against them, involving both teams and special operations aircraft, the word must have 
spread quickly among the Digbats and remnants of the PDF. Very quickly, the sniper activity 
evaporated, as the cost/benefits advantages it enjoyed as a relatively risk-free venture also 
evaporated. Information dominance was also lacking when addressing the defense of the 
Embassy and the tourist hotels. We did not have any way of predicting or stopping the sieges 
and hostage-taking actions that resulted after the invasion. Without information dominance, 
the defense of static positions cannot be proactive and NLWs and lethal weapons must 
primarily be used in a defensive "self security" mode. After control at a facility has been lost, 
as in the case at the Marriott, the employment of lethal task forces to retake the facility 
presents much more risk than not losing control in the first place. Although a hostage rescue 
force may take advantage of the use of NLWs, the enemy forces are already dug in and 
expecting some kind of retaliatory action. 
It seems reasonable to say that the forces that finally received the tasking to operate 
in the urban areas were dealing with an ad hoc situation that they had not specifically planned 
and rehearsed for beforehand. For example, the MOUT operations that the 1/7 under the 
command of Lt. Col. William J. Leszcynski were ultimately tasked to conduct were certainly 
contained within their repertoire of responsibilities. However, to exploit the idea of an 
expanded objective, these forces should have been afforded the chance to review in detail the 
personalities and locations of key players and facilities within their area of operations (AO) 
before deployment, so that they could quickly spread out and assume their mission when 
deployed. The interagency coordination (or lack thereof) that left the eight man contingent 
of Marines at the U.S. Embassy to fend for themselves certainly does not exemplify the 
uniform application of the objective to all pertinent locations. Finally, the communication 
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between the arriving evacuation force and the 82nd Airborne troops inside the Marriott hotel 
appears to have been lacking. This is an indication that the forces were not in sync regarding 
the objective of the operation. 
Offensive concentration of forces in the urban areas was impeded by the vast size1 
and our lack of good knowledge of where to concentrate effectively against the enemy 
without concentrating inappropriately thus aiding the enemy's efforts to target our forces. 
Therefore, information dominance of the situation could have provided help with proper 
concentration of forces. Also, the ability to move about in armor, as in the case of the 
"Panzer Gruppe" discussed briefly in Chapter IV, was useful as long as there were no enemy 
weapons deployed that could defeat this type of protection. However, defensive 
concentration at key sites that the enemy might view as targets of opportunity should have 
been much easier. With the risk of 20/20 hindsight, it seems that early placement of squad 
sized units could have helped avoid problems at both the Embassy and the hotels. The earlier 
suggestion of special forces insertion at these sites before the initial attacks could have also 
been used as a substitutable option. In all fairness, it is worth noting that the ability to 
concentrate against relatively static, dispersed regular forces, as in the first case study, is a 
vastly simpler problem than operations in urban environments that are out of control, require 
almost zero collateral damage and noncombatant casualties, and offer limited room for 
maneuver. This type of case seems like a demanding test for forces trying to operate with 
respect to the principles of control warfare. As pointed out in this analysis, without a fully 
developed understanding of control warfare, it was extremely demanding trying to react to 
the small gaps in the plan and operation. 
Once forced to operate in a reactive mode to PDF and Digbat attacks, tempo control 
was also a principle that was hard to regain. The overall loss of control of large elements of 
the civilian populous coupled with the military situation to create an anarchic environment 
where anyone moving about was at risk. Regaining the initiative and tempo control required 
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the deployment of large numbers of soldiers to sweep through the neighborhoods affected 
by the looting. Sadly, the risk involved once the looting started made it necessary to wait 
until the affected areas were picked clean and the looters had burnt themselves out. 
Gradually control of the situation was regained, but not without great monetary losses that 
were going to burden the new government that we were trying to support as one of the main 
strategic goals of the operation. 
Once the sun came up after the night of the initial attacks of the invasion, 
environmental degradation was a challenge in the urban areas. We had lost some of the 
physical advantages for masking or concealing our operations. We also lost the 
informational edge by not completely coordinating our PS YOPS campaign to cover all the 
existing media for communicating by the enemy and replacing it with our own. 
Although the surgical attack that temporarily removed TV Channel 2 from the air 
before H-hour was masterful, TV Channel 4 was not secured until after the invasion.188 But, 
the critical miss was not shutting down Radio Nacional, which broadcast the hastily prepared 
message that Noriega had recorded, as well as other slogans and rousing speeches to agitate 
the remnants of the PDF, the Digbats, and people looking to settle scores or do some free 
shopping in the free-for-all that ensued. If the phone system had been shutdown or 
monitored, we could have stopped Noriega's escape planning or used it as an intelligence 
tool. 
The public affairs aspects of changing the image of a war environment is in 
opposition to the quiet, workmanlike role the military uses for operating or patrolling. The 
ideas of showing presence like that a police force would use for patrolling or that an 
advertising firm might use to awe a crowd may be worth considering on a non-interference 
basis with the military missions underway. The morale effect of operations on the populous 
188
 McConnell, pp. 113-4; Flanagan, pp. 80-81; and Buckley, p. 175. 
108 
seems obvious to anyone who marched into neighborhoods in full combat gear189 or has ever 
flown low-level in combat helicopters past cheering crowds of people. However, in the 
aftermath of the invasion, the poorer residents immediate example of how to act was based 
on the guidance of the Digbat irregulars who were systematically leading the ransacking of 
food warehouses, stores, and auto dealerships. Also, the PDF and Digbats had the local 
knowledge of the streets, alleyways, and structures that aided their sniping efforts. The 
driveby shooting attempts, although useful for terrorizing the populous, met with little 
success when encountering well armed and trained U.S. forces. So it seems that the 
remnants of Noreiga's forces had some aspects of environmental degradation on their side 
in the opening stages of the urban battles. For us to tip the scales back in our favor required 
hard work and traditional soldiering augmented by a nascent presence role for light infantry. 
2. MOE Evaluation of Tasks in the Urban Areas 
To review, the eight main operational tasks that were contained within the missions 
in the urban areas were as follows: denial operations to stop the looting, countersniper 
operations, weapons detection, policing of restricted zones, pursuit operations, isolation of 
insurgents and enemy leadership from support, accomplish a facilities seizure (the Marriott), 
and quickly secure the immediate outlying area around the facility to quell violence. They 
will be examined in aggregate using the MOEs derived under each of the five capability 
dimensions developed in our shorthand (designed for examining the enemy and friendly 
forces in a control warfare campaign). A series of QFD matrices in Appendix Y will be used 
to visualize this analysis. 
These matrices will apply to the aggregate of all missions examined as part of the 
overall urban operations and as such will collectively review the operational tasks that were 
part of it in an aggregate fashion. As mentioned earlier, for reasons of software matrix size 
support limits and presentability, the individual matrices will be vertically split by functional 
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category for NLWs, using the established categories: personnel, materiel, information, and 
security. 
The methodology is the same as for the first case. It will allow us to judge NLW 
applicability to the sum total of the operational tasks associated with the missions and 
develop a raw score based on the perceived military utility of the weapons in a similar 
manner as was done with the operational tasks in the first case study. In each cell of the 
matrix, the normal QFD weighting of 9, 3, and 1 will apply to the degree that the "how" (the 
NLW) seems to support a specific "what" criteria (the MOE). In the lower half of the matrix, 
the relative merit of the particular "deployed" NLWs will be filtered by summing the 
weighted and combined effects of the external constraints as they become internalized into 
the decision problem for use of NLWs. Also, as these constraints are considered as mutually 
exclusive and additive for simplicity in this evaluation, they will each be given a weighting 
factor as in the first case. 
E. GENERAL CONSTRAINT ANALYSIS 
One of the first constraints on the use of NLWs would be the actual proof that they 
are not lethal and that they produce no undesirable side effects. But, this proof may only be 
substantiated through actual in field use. Because of the paucity of data on the effects of 
NLWs, a prescription on their possible detrimental effects is best considered in context with 
a comprehensive review of existing external constraints to weapons in general and to already 
recognized potential problems with specific technologies. Therefore, besides the necessary 
constraints of political and military utility; the legal and ethical, as well as the social, 
informational, environmental, and economic constraints on the use of a particular non-lethal 
weapon must be addressed. Under this heading, we will review the external constraints 
discussed above in the following order: the legal and ethical, sociopolitical, informational, 
environmental, and economic considerations. The legal and ethical considerations will be 
addressed first, as they are the most controversial constraints on NLWs being argued today. 
Because we are addressing their use in PCO or MOOTW missions, across a wide 
spectrum of conflict, the issue of military law of war becomes enmeshed with international 
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law and local statutes that may complicate the use of NLWs. Different social or cultural 
norms, local populace perceptions, and the international media perceptions may effect the 
suitability of NLWs. The issue of environmental and economic effects, obviously a selling 
point for non-lethals, may also be a detriment. For these reasons, the weighting of these 
different constraints may not be mutually exclusive as assumed for this analysis. This is a 
recognized limitation. Also, the relative weighting between the different constraints could 
vary based on the environment or functional category of use for NLWs. For this work, these 
limits will be accepted in the attempt to baseline the decision problem. Areas or type 
missions where we feel differences would arise will be discussed in the conclusion. 
After a review of the literature, the projected types of NLWs, listed in Appendix A, 
will be weighed against the constraints in Table 1 at the end of the section. The relative 
weights of all the types of constraints examined in the conclusion of this section will be used 
to help rank order the suitability of NLWs in the mission-based Quality Functional 
Deployment (QFD) matrix. In these matrices, in addition to parallelized comparisons of 
categories of weapons into the MOE criteria, the constraints are applied to (or in TQM lingo, 
"deployed into") the different types of non-lethal weapons to filter their merit. 
1. Legal and Ethical Constraint Analysis 
As stated above, the legal and ethical considerations will be addressed first, as they 
are the most controversial constraints on NLWs being argued today. We will start with a 
review of the legal framework for the usage of weapons in general within the law of war. 
Then, because the methodology for determining if specific type weapons are even "legal" is 
governed by international law, a review of both the basis of the law and the treaties that may 
be applicable to NLWs will be completed. Next, because the MOOTW environments in 
these PCOs produce situations similar to conventional and unconventional wartime conflict, 
peace operations, internal unrest, and political violence; some recent (since the 1960s) 
anecdotal examples from conflict situations and internal policy responses to political 
violence and civil unrest will be used to provide background for this constraint as well as the 
other constraint categories.   These recent historical examples of NLW usage will help 
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develop the defining characteristics for each type of constraint. Arguments in the current 
literature on NLWs will be examined to see what weapons have raised the most contentious 
issues regarding these constraints. After a review of the literature and reference to open 
sources on the possible effects of certain types of these weapons, the projected types of 
NLWs (listed in the Appendix) will be weighed against the legal and ethical constraints, as 
well as the other constraints in Table 1. 
This review of the Law of War and NLWs will highlight the major historical legal 
actions that have been applied to the conduct of war. While most cultures saw the need to 
restrain the horrors of war, and in the Middle Ages there were laws as to where and when 
fighting was allowed, it was not until the nineteenth century that international laws were 
codified. In general, the law of war in its modern form has its roots in the Saint Petersburg 
(Russia) Declaration of 1868, as it was the first international treaty imposing restrictions on 
the conduct of war.190 The main emphasis of this Russian Government Declaration was the 
prohibition of explosive projectiles under 400 grams. There was a humanitarian tone to this 
declaration: 
Considering the progress of civilization should have the effect of alleviating as much as 
possible the calamities of war... the only legitimate object which states should endeavor to 
accomplish during war is to weaken the military forces of the enemy. . . it is sufficient to 
disable the greatest possible men, and ... this object would be exceeded by the employment 
of arms which uselessly aggravate the sufferings of disabled men or render their death 
inevitable. . . [The use of such weapons] would therefore, be contrary to the laws of 
humanity.191 
In regard to future weapons the Declaration stated the following: "The contracting or 
Acceding Parties reserve to themselves to come hereafter to an understanding whenever a 
precise proposition shall be drawn up in view of future improvements which science may 
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effect in the armament of troops in order to maintain the principles which they have 
established."192 In essence, this declaration stated that the legality of a future weapon needed 
to be judged by balancing the military necessity or utility of a future weapon against the 
necessary suffering it could incur. 
Also, during the U.S. Civil War, President Lincoln issued the unilateral Instructions 
for the Government of Armies of the United States, commonly known as the Lieber Code.193 
The Lieber Code set out rules for the Union Army for the conduct of warfare and the 
protective treatment of categories of persons including civilians and prisoners of war. The 
Lieber code was a unilateral code, imposed by one army to be binding only upon itself. 
It was followed by a number of multilateral treaties covering the conduct of warfare 
between nations. In 1899, The first Hague Peace Conference outlawed the use of so-called 
dum-dum bullets. They were considered to be excessively injurious. The first and the 
second conference in 1907, also codified a prohibition on the use of poison and poisoned 
weapons. Under the Hague Regulations the employment of arms, materiel, or projectiles 
designed to cause unnecessary suffering is prohibited. 
The next major step in expanding the law of war was the 1925 Geneva Protocol for 
the Prohibition of the use of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or other Gases and of Bacteriological 
Methods of Warfare.194 The prohibitions in this treaty were not absolute. Reservations 
expressed at the time made it clear that a number of countries considered themselves free to 
use chemical or biological weapons in retaliation, should their adversaries use them first. 
The U. S. has reserved the right to use chemical weapons against a state if that state fails to 
respect the prohibitions of the Protocol. The Protocol is generally considered to include both 
lethal and incapacitating chemical agents. After considerable debate, in 1975 the U.S. also 
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renounced the first use of riot control agents in war except in defensive military modes to 
save lives. The use of tear gas is restricted by an Executive Order. Presidential approval is 
required in advance for any use in armed conflict of herbicides or riot control agents, even 
under defensive military conditions.195 
The Geneva Conventions of 1929 and 1949 focused on ameliorating the conditions 
of civilians, prisoners of war, and the sick and wounded. The latest amendments to the law 
of armed conflict are contained in the 1977 Protocol. It contains the Convention on the 
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, and the U.S. has not ratified it at this time.196 In 1969, 
because of the horrific nature of biological weapons, President Nixon announced that the 
U.S. would not use them under any circumstances. In 1975, the U.S. ratified the Convention 
on the prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological 
(Biological) and Toxin Weapons and Their Destruction. The criteria used for characterizing 
the use of the biological agents is whether or not it is a hostile use, not whether or not it will 
result in death. 
Some of the contentious legal issues that have persisted even after the ratification of 
Protocols follow. The U.S. has historically argued the dichotomy of allowing the use of riot 
control gases by a nation's police force against its own citizens while prohibiting their use 
against enemy combatants in battle. Also, the U.S. has argued that herbicides involve the 
same chemicals and had the same effects of materials used by countries to control their own 
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Vegetation. It argued that the use of herbicides and defoliants may be more humane in some 
cases than the use of conventional weapons.197 
Subsequent cumulative reviews of the protocols and other international actions have 
resulted in the establishment of the following general format for questioning the legality of 
a particular weapon. These will be reviewed and then applied to the three most controversial 
potential non-lethal weapons: laser, chemical, and biological based NLWs. 
1. First, can this weapon legally be used? The protocols are then reviewed and then 
the next question may be asked. 
2. If the weapon is legal, is the proposed use of it legal? Three things are considered 
in a review of the laws of armed conflict: military necessity, humanity, and the rule 
of proportionality. The rule of proportionality requires the balancing of necessity 
with humanity. 
3. Principles governing weapons - they must not cause unnecessary suffering, 
produce indiscriminate effects, or violate restraints imposed by Custom or Treaty. 
Weapons may only be used against military objectives. The complication to this 
is that some objects are considered dual use. They meet the needs of the civilian 
population but also effectively contribute to the enemy's military action. These 
objects may be attacked if there is a military advantage to be gained by their attack. 
The U.S. follows the Department of Defense Instruction 5500.15 which requires that 
a weapon or munitions undergo a legal review during its development and prior to 
acquisition and fielding to ensure that the weapon or munitions in question complies with 
the international law obligations of the U.S. The only other country with similar internal 
regulations is the former Federal Republic of Germany. Additionally, a duty for all countries 
to evaluate new weapon developments and tactics was established in international 
humanitarian law in 1977.198 
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Obviously, not all nations have followed these legal Protocols. Additionally, the 
restrictions are not always proactive, for example, the gas protocols were issued in response 
to the Germans' use of chemical weapons in World War I. In effect, the specific new classes 
of recently proposed NLWs may have to be used before their effects may be judged as either 
warranting additional protocols banning them or considering their use as contained within 
existing restrictions. Some of the concerns with proliferation of the more virulent versions 
of possible NLWs deal with the historical examples like the Italians use of chemicals against 
the Ethiopians, the Japanese use against the Chinese, the Soviets use against the Afghans, 
and the internal Iraqi use against the Kurdish minorities. This last example in this list falls 
outside of the purview of international statutes, but it was an horrific recent example of the 
type of regional conflict in fractionated states that may be fought with brutal measures where 
maiming and lethal weapons are judged for efficiency only and where the leadership may not 
care about the censure of the international community. 
a. Lasers as NLWs 
Probably the most contentious arguments concerning the legality of a potential 
technology that also seems likely to offer great potential as a NLW have involved the use of 
low-power lasers as dazzling or blinding devices on the battlefield. The starting point for the 
assessment of laser weapons in the international context must begin by a consideration of the 
biological effect of these weapons on human beings as compared to the military interests 
involved. Using the three step format listed above, we can see that the first question has 
already been answered differently by various sources. 
The U.S. has reviewed the use of laser weapons in accordance with DoD 
instruction 5500.15 and issued a memorandum of law that states that the use of a laser as an 
antipersonnel weapon is lawful. The fundamental issue in the review is whether the use of 
a laser to blind an enemy soldier would cause unnecessary suffering and therefore be 
unlawful. The memorandum notes that it would be legally inconsistent if a determination 
was made that "a soldier legally could be blinded ancillary to the lawful use of a laser range- 
finder or target acquisition lasers against material targets, but could not be attacked 
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individually."199 The logic of the argument makes sense in the context of conventional war 
and the widespread usage of legal measures that could cause similar blinding from ancillary 
effects, not only from laser use, but from blast or fragmentation. The "proportionality of 
means test" listed as the third part of question two, seems to bring into question the humanity 
of the use of lasers as blinding measures in MOOTW or PCOs unless they were used in 
situations involving direct conflict with other conventional means or if U.S. personnel were 
subject to grave threat to life and limb. 
If the situation does not meet these conditions, we feel that the use of lasers 
as NLWs needs to be precisely controlled so that the measured dosage of light energy merely 
dazzles the receiving individual, without causing permanent damage. Using laser weapons 
as convenient tools to blind adversaries in MOOTW environments, even if judged legal, 
would certainly raise ethical issues and questions of economic liability for the care of 
individuals who would live out the rest of their life maimed. Indeed, it would be hard to still 
consider lasers as NLWs according to our original definition, if they do permanent, 
debilitating harm to people. Certainly, the U.S. could not afford the informational problem 
that the "CNN effect" would instantly shove in the face of the policymakers who had directed 
the use of such weapons. 
Some scholars, in particular experts from Switzerland and Sweden, argue that 
intentionally using a laser to permanently blind a combatant is a disproportionate injury to 
the gained military advantage. It is their contention that intentional irreversible blinding by 
a laser constitutes "unnecessary suffering."200 Others, however, recognize that the blinding 
of an occupant of an aircraft, tank, or other fighting equipment incidental to the functional 
kill or physical destruction of that high value military weapon, does not contravene the 
existing principles of humanitarian law if the laser offers military advantages not matched 
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by other weapons.      One concern that we have as a result of this line of reasoning is the 
double standard on the battlefield regarding what is fair to use against who. For example, 
consider the following two questions. If I am flying a helicopter in a contingency operation, 
should I be subject to being blinded by a laser weapon wielded by an insurgent which 
subsequently causes my aircraft to crash? Should I accept this without recourse to the use 
of similar self-defensive weaponry against my dismounted attacker? We think this approach 
reveals the brinkmanship problem contained in such reasoning. It also reveals the necessity 
for a civilized power like the U.S. to adhere to the rule of law while a less scrupulous foe can 
take advantage of the poor man's excuse for doing whatever it takes to win. 
During the 1979 session of the UN Conference on Certain Conventional 
Weapons a resolution was adopted relating the old dum-dum prohibition to the need for 
caution regarding modern weapons. Under the Certain Conventional Weapons Convention, 
international discussions are now under way that may lead to the development of specific 
new protocols covering electromagnetic weapons.  A report is expected next year.  One 
author suggests that "The current surge of interest in electromagnetic and similar 
technologies makes the adoption of a protocol explicitly outlawing the use of these 
dehumanizing weapons an urgent matter." This same author doubts the ability to tune these 
weapons precisely enough to control the severity of the effects.202 Martin van Creveld, puts 
this debate in historical perspective when discussing the history of the law of war and 
weapons development: 
One very important reason for disliking a weapon was of course because it was new. A new 
weapon might or might not be effective, but whenever one was introduced it always 
threatened to upset the traditional ideas as to how war should be waged and, indeed, what it 
was all about. This explains why weapons classified as "unfair" often make their appearance 
201 Ibid., p. 210. View of C. Greenwood of Cambridge University (and it seems the author) as 
expressed in a presentation before the 1989ICRC round table of experts. He also stated that the use of 
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during periods of rapid technological progress; good examples are provided by the Greek 
catapult (invented in Sicily around 400 B.C.) and, of course, early firearms.203 
The imbroglio surrounding laser weapons, may be similar to the early feelings about 
firearms, in that the widespread availability and effectiveness of these weapons represent a 
weapons revolution driven by a burgeoning technological age of innovation that will not 
soon pass. To offer a glimpse of what is right around the corner, we offer the following 
example to close this discussion: 
The U.S. Army is planning to field a highly classified, M-16 rifle-mounted laser weapon with 
its infantry (three per platoon) and scouts in the fall of 1995. Called the AN/PLQ-5 Laser 
Countermeasure System, it will provide the individual soldier a non-lethal weapon that can 
detect and disrupt optical and electro-optical targeting systems on armored vehicles at "stand- 
off ranges."204 
b. Chemicals as NLWs 
The next class of weapons we will review is represented by all the different 
types of personnel and anti-materiel chemical weapons being proposed. Of this class the 
anti-personnel chemicals have raised the biggest legal questions, as already reviewed by the 
earlier discussion on the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the Geneva Protocol. 
The CWC is expected to be voted on in 1995 (arguments developed in it stem from the 1977 
Geneva Protocol). The primary thrust of this measure concerns the total banning and 
destruction of all chemical weapons. In this document, these weapons are defined as "any 
chemical which through its chemical action on life processes can cause death, temporary 
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incapacitation or permanent harm to humans or animals."205 The definition would include 
substances such as caustics and other chemicals not usually classified as poisons. 
This seems incongruous in the current climate of increased U.S. involvement 
in frequent peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance operations where our national interests 
are marginal and at the same time where there is a greater public sensitivity to military and 
civilian casualties. There has been an outcry for less lethal measures at the same time the 
CWC calls for more restrictions on possible chemical non-lethal options. Couple this with 
the historical U.S. legal disagreement with the dichotomy that exists between domestic use 
in policing and the international use in policeman-like "peacekeeping operations" and the 
deeper contentiousness of the CWC debate blooms. First, we will review the recent use of 
widely available commercial cayenne pepper sprays (a disabling usage) in a peacekeeping 
environment and second we will discuss the subject of calmative sprays. 
The U.S. used cayenne pepper spray (as a new, more effective, natural version 
of mace or CS type tear gas) in Operation Restore Hope in Somalia when lesser measures of 
nondeadly force or resistance (i.e. batons, barbed wire entanglements around vehicles, and 
avoidance of crowds) proved inadequate to stop the swarming of vehicles and looting by 
Somali men and children, when they knew our ROE restricted us from using lethal force. 
The spray was so effective that by the end of the operation merely waving any aerosol can 
in the air was said to ward off Somalis.206 However, three problems surfaced with its use: 
1. Dispensing it to troops in theater without proper training, may have lead to its 
inappropriate use on some occasions and from first hand reports it definitely lead 
to the self administering or accidental spraying of fellow soldiers by untrained 
operators. 
2. Fear of its inappropriate use led to a delay in requesting it in the first place. 
3. Some soldiers, hesitant to use deadly force already because of pending Article 32 
cases, used it instead of the more appropriate deadly force in some engagements. 
server. 
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But, in the end the spray would have to be judged as an effective means of proportionate non- 
persistent force against low-level threats.207 
It is the U.S. interpretation that the CWC does not apply in peacekeeping or 
humanitarian operations (although as noted, use does require Presidential approval). It is 
interesting to speculate on the debates when ratification of the CWC in 1995 is expected. 
The larger question for this study is how do peacekeeping (PK) and humanitarian assistance 
(HA) operations get compartmented out from other missions and operations in the PCO, 
"special wars" we may be involved in? This differentiation of ROE based on mission would 
cause properly trained troops not to be able to use the most appropriate level of force. Based 
on legal interpretations, they could be held liable if they could not justify that their particular 
task fell under the PK and HA umbrella if and when they used the spray. 
The second anti-personnel type of chemical weapon proposed is in the 
category of calmative agents. These agents are more subtle in their approach. A crowd or 
area sprayed with these agents would be relaxed or become drowsy or fall asleep. There is 
some anecdotal evidence that the Soviets used some experimental types in this category in 
Afghanistan (as well as more noxious and deadly agents). Reports indicate that the 
Mujaheddin would lie down and go to sleep until they awoke later in Soviet custody. The 
reports are discounted as such a chemical has not proven effective.208 The U.S. once 
possessed the proactive hallucinogenic drug BZ, but has since abandoned it. BZ is on the 
schedule of forbidden drugs of the Draft Chemical Convention, its use would be prohibited 
by law. The calmative class of chemicals would be "any chemical not listed in a Schedule 
which can produce rapidly in humans... disabling physical effects."209 
The last type of chemically-based anti-personnel weapons that has produced 
some debate includes some sticky foams that when dispensed impede the movement of an 
207
 Jonathan T. Dworken, "Rules of Engagement: Lessons from Restore Hope," Military Review, 
September 1994, pp. 26-34. 
208
 H. Crone, Banning Chemical Weapons, 18 (1992), cited in McGowan, (1994), p. 12. 
209
 CWC text (on internet). 
121 
individual. The interesting question here is whether the disablement is purely a mechanical 
hinderance or based on the chemical action of the foam. The same arguments could be 
lodged against sticky nets, especially the proposed "stinging" sticky nets that dissuade an 
individual from moving around much or resisting after being captured in the net because of 
the irritating chemical released by abrasion by the net. However, it seems like these 
questions seem much less controversial than the previous ones regarding CS type tearing 
agents or potential calmatives. 
A number of the proposed chemical NLWs include anti-materiel measures. 
Combustion inhibitors, inorganic super-reagents, super-sticky, anti-traction and liquid metal 
embrittlement define some of the most often cited classes. If the chemical which comprises 
the weapon is listed on the schedule of prohibited chemicals it may be possible to claim that 
they are exempt weapons. These chemicals are "not dependent on the use of the toxic 
properties of the chemicals as a method of warfare." "Toxic properties" means using 
chemical action on life processes that cause death, temporary incapacitation, or permanent 
harm to humans or animals." Questions brought up by critics of these proposed anti-materiel 
measures include misapplication to humans or animals and unplanned secondary effects on 
people. Accordingly, if used as they are designed to be used, and they have no unexpected 
secondary effects, these weapons would not be in violation of the Chemical Weapons 
Convention. 
c. Biologicals as NLWs 
The last class of NLWs examined in this study are the proposed biologicals. 
The proposals that we are concerned about deal only with anti-materiel measures like 
bacteria that eat electronic semiconductor material or that grow rapidly and gel POL supplies. 
Besides the ratification of the Convention on the Prohibition of Biologicals (BWC) in 1975, 
and Geneva Protocols banning their use, just the thought of biologicals produces emotions 
of fear and revulsion in most people. As reviewed in Chapter 11 of the Swedish International 
Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Yearbook 1994: World Armaments and Disarmaments, 
with the criteria that it is hostile use, not disabling or deadly intent that is banned, the 
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assessment is "that the development of such agents for offensive warfare purposes would be 
prohibited by the BWC."210 Major McGowan, in her Air Force directed study, similarly has 
concluded that: 
Some bacteriological agents have genuine medical uses and stockpiling for these purposes 
are not objectionable. Accordingly it would follow that the use of bioremedians [i.e. oil spill 
eating bacteria] to clean up an oil spill would be legal under these conventions and treaties, 
but the use of these same agents to destroy an enemy's fuel supply would be the use of 
biological agents with a hostile intent and therefore illegal.2" 
We must therefore also conclude that the investigation of biological NLWs would be fraught 
with legal and ethical challenges. But, with the diffusion of technology in the emerging 
information age and the advances in work on recombinant DNA and biophysics, one would 
be remiss not to expect unscrupulous international actors to experiment with "bad" bugs. It 
seems, however, that for the U.S., the marginal interests sought or goals supported through 
the use of these weapons could be better substituted for by a more palatable weapon. 
This review of the legal and ethical constraints formed by the current legal 
environment and the ethical concerns about three main classes of NLWs: lasers, chemicals, 
and biologicals forms the basis for the background that we will use to make judgements in 
the QFD matrices evaluation. Before actual use of NLWs, the specific "local" statutes also 
need to be considered in addition to the law of war, international law, and treaties when 
evaluating the use of NLWs in a particular region. The best source of this type of fine- 
grained information may only be available before deployment from the command Staff Judge 
Advocate. 
2. Sociopolitical Constraint Analysis 
The idea behind sociopolitical constraints is that there is a variance in acceptability 
and appropriateness for different types of non-lethal means based on regional, ethnic, 
religious, or other traditional cultural expectations. This hypothesis, that the use of a tool in 
one theater of operations may not correlate with its use in another, could require its own 
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stand alone detailed research study using a region by region survey . But, for the purposes 
of our discussion, we will only use three anecdotes to illustrate this idea. The bottom line 
is that we may neglect these more subtle factors at our own peril when trying to conduct 
knowledge-based control warfare. Measuring this constraint will be considered beyond the 
scope of this thesis and we will produce no numbers for weighting the QFD analysis. 
However, we will be concerned with measuring the informational aspects of the use of 
NLWs, and as such these sociopolitical factors will indirectly be accounted for in this 
measurement. 
The first anecdote that we will review concerns the use of bayonets in quelling a riot 
associated with a strike on Okinawa. The second concerns National Guardsmen trying to 
control student protesters on U.S. university campuses. The third concerns the use of NLWs 
by U.S. soldiers against the Somalis. These three anecdotes are selected to illustrate the 
sometimes surprising unacceptance, difficulty of domestic use, and the sometimes surprising 
acceptance of NLWs based on different sociopolitical settings. 
In the summer of 1969, U.S. MP's in attempting to quell a riot among striking 
Okinawans who were blocking a gate at a U.S. base used fixed bayonets on their weapons 
as a riot-control instrument. An Okinawan, Mr. Asato, was slightly wounded in the 
altercation and the event turned into an international incident. The following excerpt from 
the New York Times illustrates the complexities involved in the use of NLWs: 
To many Okinawans, the most serious aspect of the affair is not that Mr. Asato was slightly 
wounded but that the Americans, the rulers, used bayonets against Okinawans, the ruled. 
There is apparently a wide cultural gap on this score. Americans, both military and civilian, 
say that the bayonet is a recognized riot-control instrument, frequently used as such in the 
United States. 
To the Okinawans, and even more so to their fellow countrymen in Japan proper, the bayonet 
is a weapon of war, arousing painful memories most people would rather forget. In prewar 
Japan, there was a whole mystique about swords and their use, which extended to the bayonet 
used by infantrymen. There is general agreement that no postwar government could have 
used bayonets in a riot and survived.212 
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The bottom line when thinking of the sociopolitical influences on the decision to use a 
particular NLW is the answer to the question, "In this instance will this use coerce with the 
desired effects or will it provoke an undesired response?" 
During the same period of time as the preceding example, the Vietnam War generated 
protest movements at major universities in the U.S. In a few cases the National Guard was 
called in to quell the unrest. One specific example of the use of fixed bayonets against 
college students was at the University of California Berkeley campus where Guardsmen with 
fixed bayonets twice turned back marches of several thousand demonstrators who were 
protesting police use of guns on demonstrating students. However, most of the students 
refused to really take the bayonets seriously. Taunting the Guardsmen, they walked up to the 
bayonets challenging the soldiers to stab at them while they flashed peace signs at the 
soldiers. They had little fear of the bayonets because they could not image a Guardsman 
bayoneting an American student.213 Unlike the later deadly incident at Kent State in Ohio 
in 1970, there was not any fear that the Guardsmen would use less-than-lethal or lethal force. 
As pointed out by Coates in his study of non-lethal weapons, stabbing and cutting 
weapons are classical military weapons and their use in lethal military operations is quite 
well known. In some more aggressive military operations, while using the threat of lethal 
force, perhaps their use may not be misconstrued as too violent or assumed as not legitimate 
and therefore not threatening.214 These two short historical examples above were used to 
show how sociopolitical factors could narrow the applicability for a particular NLW. 
Hopefully these simple examples may reinforce the need for a regional approach to strategy 
when determining the use of NLWs. If this approach is not convincing, then please consider 
the converse example to the first two examples by examining this next more recent anecdotal 
incident. 
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To deal with the starvation problem in Somalia, the UN authorized a U.S.-led 
intervention in December 1992. The U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) established 
Joint Task Force (JTF) Somalia to perform Restore Hope. The First Marine Expeditionary 
Force (I MEF) and a task force of U.S. Army, TF 2-87 (10th Mountain Division), made up 
the bulk of JTF Somalia.215 Of the many lessons learned in this operation, rules of 
engagement (ROE) issues figured prominently. 
The situation on the ground was complex. Most Somalis carried weapons openly 
before the UN intervention. After convincing them that they were not going to be allowed 
to continue to do so, the troops still had to deal with other problems when operating in towns. 
Driven by the lack of schools, massive unemployment, and poverty, young Somali males 
formed roving gangs and turned to thievery. When stopped in towns due to traffic, the U.S. 
troops faced swarms of these young men, trying to steal anything they could. 
According to the CJTF OPLAN, the ROE in Somalia dictated that when U.S. forces 
are attacked by unarmed hostile elements, mobs, or rioters, they should use the minimum 
force necessary under the circumstances and proportionate to the threat. It did not take long 
for the Somali people to know the ROE and push it to the limit. The soldiers quickly found 
themselves robbed of just about everything (except their weapons - which they could shoot 
to protect) that was not nailed down. Before cayenne pepper spray was introduced into 
theater, they had found a solution that may not seem appropriate in other surroundings. They 
developed a means to counter these threats - means short of deadly force - which included 
carrying tent pegs, batons, and sticks to repel the Somalis.216 
This solution may sound overly brutal and one may think that it would have been 
provocative in most environments to see heavily armed soldiers beating off children with 
sticks. However, in interviews with a SEAL sniper who was involved in the operation, it 
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turns out that the Somalis considered this method of coercion acceptable.217 It seems that the 
tribal elders also used sticks to beat off and to discipline these young hoodlums. And so for 
this last anecdote, NLWs that would seem abhorrent and provocative under western 
standards were not constrained by the sociopolitical factors in Somalia. Hopefully this last 
simple example may be more convincing than the earlier anecdotes in reinforcing the need 
for a regional approach based on sociopolitical factors when determining the use of NLWs. 
3. Informational Constraint Analysis 
This constraint is the subjective measure of the "CNN Effect" on international 
information campaigns that may accompany the use of NLWs in a particular operation. 
Whereas the last constraint concerned the "local" or regional response to the use of NLWs, 
this constraint primarily reflects the international and domestic U.S. audience response to 
actions involving the use of NLWs. For this reason, to be prescriptive, a cross-functional 
team of experts that would use regional or area specialists to evaluate the last constraint 
would be replaced by public relations, information, and PSYOPs personnel to evaluate the 
subjective measure for NLWs under this constraint. As mentioned earlier, these two 
measures may not be mutually exclusive and it should be expected that there would be 
indirect effects of one upon the other. 
For this one man study, that looks back on historical case studies during Operation 
JUST CAUSE, determining a qualitative measure should not be difficult. This measure will 
be assigned based on a review of the extensive media and press coverage of the invasion. 
Again, because the QFD matrices allow an audit trail and a sensitivity analysis, in the 
conclusion we will discuss the amount of impact that varying the assigned value may have 
on the results. Any reader would be able to similarly judge weighting or "deployment" 
differences based their own evaluation values. 
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4. Environmental Constraint Analysis 
The use of some NLWs, especially those that target materiel or information systems, 
could have ecological or environmental effects that are persistent. The damaging effects of 
biological, chemical, and electromagnetic weapons come to mind as possibly creating 
collateral effects that constrain the use of such weapons. Environmental warfare has been 
practiced throughout history. Scorched earth campaigns, slaughter of livestock, poisoning 
of wells and damming of water sources, and other destruction of infrastructure have been 
used to help defeat the enemy. However, in no period of time has the ability to create 
environmental havoc equalled the potential today. With the increased demand for resources 
for industrialized societies and to support the population explosion, and our increasing 
awareness of the long term effects of existing pollution, any usage of a weapon system needs 
to address the impact it will have on the environment. The next example illustrates the most 
recent case of non-lethal warfare using environmental means. 
Two recent incidents in the Gulf War offer an extreme example of environmental 
warfare. After the air war began, Saddam Hussein's Iraqi forces first opened valves on oil 
terminals causing a massive oil spill into the sea and then later as they made their retreat at 
the end of the ground war, they detonated plastic explosives on the wellheads of most of the 
1,080 working oil wells causing hundreds of oil fires.218 This "poison pill" approach was 
described by Saddam in an interview with Peter Arnett of CNN as using oil as a weapon "of 
legitimate self-defense."219 The Kuwaitis called it an act of ecological terrorism and many 
scientists viewed it an environmental catastrophe of unprecedented scale.220 The weapons 
that we might employ should obviously not be tailored to produce these kind of effects as 
their primary purpose. However, we should anticipate having countermeasures for such 
actions. 
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To determine the environmental constraints on specific NLW categories and types 
a combined assessment of their net effect on natural and man-made infrastructure may be 
necessary. For example, a conventional electromagnetic pulse (EMP) weapon may damage 
the computerized safety systems on nuclear power facilities causing an environmental 
catastrophe. Or less dramatically, a computer virus may infect the process monitoring system 
at a chemical plant leading to the flushing of toxic chemicals into the sea. Finally, an 
acoustic infrasound weapon may weaken structures that are susceptible to later earthquake 
damage. Although these examples may be considered fantastic exaggerations, the point is 
that the natural and man-made systems that exist could be damaged and then damage the 
environment either directly or indirectly. In the QFD analysis, this linked environment will 
be considered as the various NLWs are "deployed" into the environmental constraint. 
5. Economic Constraint Analysis 
In today's international environment, world economic interdependence and instant 
communications link most parts of the world together as a system that responds to events in 
one region with immediate financial implications for us all. America cannot afford another 
Marshall Plan, in fact, our current deficit crisis is pressuring the government to scale back 
aid to our allies and there is great resistance to pouring money into rebuilding an old enemy. 
The public and congressional debate over Russian aid is the best contemporary example. 
According to reports, the current Commander in Chief tightly monitors the relationship 
between foreign policy decisions and American economic prosperity, and he asks his staff 
to evaluate the economic impact of every decision.221 As the military is one of the four main 
policy tools (combined with political, economic, and informational) that are increasingly 
interleaved together to execute foreign policy, it only makes sense that the end economic 
state be factored into military employment and targeting of weapons. 
If we have no responsibility to rebuild what we destroy or disable, then economic cost 
is not a factor. However, in most of the PCO scenarios like JUST CAUSE this would not 
221 US News and World Report, April 5, 1993, p. 41. 
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be the case. Even in the Gulf War the economic factor was a consideration in our targeting 
of Iraq's electrical system and fuel production. These targets were attacked with precision 
weapons at critical nodes, to achieve functional destruction of those systems while limiting 
the physical damage.222 Although an enemy may elect to not fix the functionally killed 
systems to defeat this policy, informational tools should be able to make that fact known to 
his populace to reduce perceptions of legitimacy for the enemy regime. 
As well as looking at the economic constraints for usage of NLWs, the positive 
aspects for some weapons may be the drastic reduction in the costs associated with the after 
effects of an operation. In the second case we examined in this thesis, the looting and 
destruction in downtown Panama City resulted in $41M in immediate emergency assistance 
and $420M pledged in FY 1990-91 to help get Panama back on its feet.223 The postconflict 
costs could have been smaller if we had quickly placed forces into Panama City to maintain 
order after the invasion. NLWs and non-lethal tools that would have increased the security 
of our forces while still allowing them to operate with minimum force while producing 
minimum collateral damage could have resulted in savings for us all. However, the 
economic constraints deployed against the various NLWs in the QFD matrices only allow 
us to weight the negative effects of the use of a NLW. This situation is similar to that for the 
environmental constraints as well as to a lesser degree the other constraints . 
6. Constraint Summary 
Following on the next page in Table 5.. 1 we will summarize the relative weight of the 
constraints in a combined interval measure of impact of "low, medium, and high." This table 
summarizes the impact of the use of NLWs against target categories and tabulates them 
versus the three phases of a PCO: forced entry, sustainment (follow on stability ops), and the 
peacekeeping/humanitarian operations phase. When later inserted in the QFD analysis in 
222
 Majors Mike Fisher, Chuck Howe, Jan Klaaren, and Sam Seager, "The End State," Concepts in 
Air Power for the Campaign Planner (Maxwell AFB, AL: ACSC, 1993), p. 152. 
223
 Fishel, John T., "The Fog Of Peace: Planning, and Executing the Restoration of Panama" 
(Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, US AWC Paper, 1992), p. 29. 
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Appendix B, these measures will be converted into a ten point scale for conversion to a 
percentage measure that reduces the raw score for the unconstrained merit of a NLW. In the 
conclusion, we will review this analysis, discuss sensitivity analysis, and make some 
recommendations based on these arguments. 
Forced Entry Sustainment PKHA 





Materiel low low low 
Information N/A N/A N/A 
Security low low medium 
C Personnel high high low 
H Materiel low low medium 
E 
M 
Information N/A N/A N/A 
Security medium medium low 
R Personnel high high high 
1 Materiel high high high 
0 Information high high high 
Security medium meduim medium 




A. GENERAL FINDINGS 
This thesis surveys the broad subject of NLWs during a period when our increasing 
interest is driven by the combined effect of technological advances; societal and warfare 
paradigm shifts; military downsizing, risk reduction, cost effectiveness, and role refinement 
issues; and increased turbulence in regional relations in the wake of the forty-year bipolar 
Cold War standoff. Using the National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement 
as a guide, we primarily referenced the Joint Publications supporting doctrine for special 
operations and MOOTW (3-05, 3-07), and then took a paradigmatic approach to develop 
principles and tenets to understand the problem of deciding how and when to use NLWs in 
"special wars" in this environment. We reviewed the definitions and theoretical framework 
that seemed most appropriate for both the broad study of NLWs and for determining the 
basis of our case study selection of "special wars" to illustrate the effects of operationalizing 
a new paradigm. 
The current nascent state of DoD policy development for NLWs, coupled with an 
environment that is forcing the piecemeal fielding of systems without developed policies, 
testing, or training (as in the Somalia pepper gas anecdote in Chapter V.), demands basic 
exploration efforts. This type of preliminary research does this by venturing into 
incompletely defined areas and using qualitative tools linking concepts or strategies to tasks 
using tenets or principles garnered from the debate on control warfare. The different 
perceptual lens this provides offers a critical re-evaluation of how we wage war. This 
integrated policy approach to the employment of NLWs employs both the concepts of 
information dominance and the other tenets associated with control warfare to offer a 
different perspective on the niche that NLWs can fill at the tactical, operational, and strategic 
levels in conflict. The two part analysis method that was used, also helps to bridge the policy 
to quantitative measurement "gap" that exists when trying to measure the effectiveness of 
these "softer" non-lethal measures in support of national objectives and the overall scheme 
of events. 
133 
The arguments raised in support of the hypothesis that the more the tenets of control 
warfare are applied to a mission or operation, the more effective will be any application of 
NLWs, and the greater the likelihood of success, seems well supported by the comparative 
analysis of the two different follow-on Operation JUST CAUSE mini-case studies. 
Specifically, the respective mission areas of Military Diplomacy in Western Panama and the 
Urban Policing operations nicely contrast the situational possibility for NLW use when tenets 
of control warfare are respectively followed or ignored. The internalization of previously 
considered "external" constraints into the decision problem seems essential when using a 
broadened morale and physical model of the enemy, like the molecular model developed in 
this thesis. This supports a systems analysis of our linked relationship to the enemy that 
exists in these minimum force and minimum casualty operations. In these PCOs, where we 
must quickly transition from an "us versus them" forced opening to an "us helping them" end 
state, we ignore this linked and more complex military and political environment at our own 
peril. Even though the employment of NLWs in this type environment entails both the 
additional training, fielding, and support problems inherent in the fielding of alternate lethal 
methods, and the added burden of developing decision tools regarding the appropriateness 
of the level of response or use of NLWs given the existing ROE in a military or "policing" 
engagement, these general findings point to the more specific findings of this research that 
demands a requisite variety of options, from extreme lethality to diplomacy, to respond 
appropriately in these highly constrained operations. After they are detailed, we will make 
some general and specific recommendations for further research and offer perspectives on 
this subject. 
B. SPECIFIC FINDINGS 
The debate over NLWs has produced some consensus as to the possible advantages 
for their use that were listed in Chapter U under the subsection discussing advantages of 
nonlethal weapons. To review, by mapping out the case studies in our paradigmatic analysis 
it was confirmed that in the PCO and MOOTW environment that we are primarily concerned 
with in this thesis, NLWs could represent an intermediate strategic means to coerce 
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cooperation or compel the end of aberrant behavior. By looking at how we used lethal 
weapons in a non-lethal threatening role in the Military Diplomacy in the West case study, 
we saw how non-lethal measures could possibly offer several other advantages over lethal 
force. They may be more legally and morally defensible. They may offer less political risk 
with more benefits. Operationally, they may offer more appropriate military effectiveness, 
flexibility, and better protection and security for our troops. In tactical situations, they may 
be force multipliers when used in conjunction with traditional means. And finally, with the 
rapid development of new technologies, they may be technically feasible, supportable, and 
affordable. 
However, before going on to a discussion of external constraints, we would be remiss 
to not relate arguments supporting positions that do not agree that all these advantages are 
necessarily good. As Eliot Cohen emphasizes, there is a clearly a danger in overselling these 
capabilities.224 At the strategic policy level, some are worried that the availability of "easy 
to use" non-lethal options may present an "attractive nuisance" and lower the threshold for 
war, encourage adventurism, and spread out our limited resources in marginal areas of 
interest.225 Others cite the blunting effect they may have on the threat of lethal deterrence. 
Quoting Clausewitz, in his writing on the psychology of defeat, when he spoke of the need 
to "kill the enemy's courage," they worry that reliance on non-lethal means could actually 
prolong conflict and increase U.S. casualties.226 Regardless of the diminishing effect these 
contrapuntal arguments may have on the military and political utility of NLWs, their 
immediate impact pales in comparison to the questions raised by some of the external 
constraints discussed on their use. As such there was no overt attempt to model the above 
224
 Eliot Cohen, "The Mystique of US Air Power," Foreign Affairs, Jan/Feb 1994, 121. Cohen 
feels that the most dangerous legacy of NLW technologies in the Gulf War was the "fantasy of near- 
bloodless use of force." 
225
 Sam Gardiner, "The Nonlethal Revolution in Warfare: Maybe Not such a Revolution," (RAND: 
unpublished monograph, 1993), p. 2. 
226
 Col John L. Barry, USAF; LTC Micheal W. Everett, USA; and Lt Col Allen G. Peck, USAF, 
(Draft - 13 May 1994), p. 24. 
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alternate prescriptive arguments in this healthy debate. But, they were mentally used in the 
QFD matrix analysis to temper judgements of possible application of NLWs to the case 
studies. Without the discovery of the "ultimate" NLW, temperance is offered against any 
arguments suggesting excess enthusiasm for NLWs as a panacea. 
Specifically, for laser weapons, anti-personnel usage brought up some contentious 
points. The U.S. point of view on the issue is clearly based on a battlefield orientation. As 
such, the memorandum of law offering the decision that personnel may be targeted for 
blinding seems to lose its argument for support if the other means of lawful use of lasers and 
the other lethal weapon systems are not engaged in battle. Therefore, it is the opinion of this 
study that the usage in the first two phases of a PCO where open combat is ongoing may be 
tolerated (with medium impact), while in the third phase where it is not, presents serious 
legal and ethical questions (high impact). The use against materiel seems to generate low 
impact on the legal and ethical discussions, if personnel are not blinded in an indiscriminate 
manner ancillary to this usage. The full ethical impact of the development of systems like 
the AN/PLQ-5 Laser Countermeasure may not be able to be judged until after 10,000 enemy 
combatants end up as blinded veterans of a conflict. To get the legal and ethical impact 
reduced to a low level in all phases suggests concentration on a dedicated approach to 
limiting the effect on personnel to a temporary dazzlement with no long term adverse effects. 
Indeed, if permanent disablement of personnel occurs as a corollary result of anti-materiel 
laser weapons usage that indirectly affects personnel, it is doubtful that such use would fit 
within the definition for NLWs offered at the beginning of the thesis. It is understood that 
controlling dosages and the susceptibility to a dosage is an arcane art, but it should not be 
neglected if these weapons are developed for reasons of military necessity. 
For chemical NLWs, the U.S. opinion which separates peacekeeping and 
humanitarian assistance operations from warfare, allows the use for crowd control and self 
protection in the last phase of a PCO. The wider development of calmatives and other more 
subtle wide-area-effects chemical NLWs may dictate a re-evaluation of legal and ethical 
impact. Because of the opinion that usage of new chemical NLWs that are designed to target 
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materiel without toxic effects on personnel does not violate the CWC, use against materiel 
in open conflict is judged to offer a low legal and ethical impact. However, during the 
"softer" HA phase of the PCO, ethical judgements based on longer term economic impacts 
and perceptions of exceeding necessary proportional force, may drive international opinion 
to go against such use. That is why the impact factor is raised to a medium level in Table 5.1. 
Because the U.S. currently maintains the right to respond in kind to enemy usage of chemical 
weapons, the legal and ethical impact in the first two phases of a PCO for non-lethal 
chemical usage is reduced to a medium level for self-protection security reasons. 
The Department of Defense and the Department of Justice should continue 
cooperative efforts to develop better non-lethal chemical weapons as the constraints on lethal 
force that both the police and the military operate under are tightened. The dilemma that is 
raised by a BWC "like" new protocol on the complete prohibition of chemical non-lethal 
means that conflicts with the increasing constraints that call for more extensive use of these 
type weapons. Solving this dilemma was beyond the scope of this thesis. 
For biological NLWs, the 1972 ratification of the BWC places extremely high 
constraints on the consideration for the usage of non-lethal biologicals. This constraint is 
effective across the spectrum of combat. However, two considerations combine to lower the 
level to a medium impact for purely self-defensive and security reasons. The first 
consideration deals with the proven inclination of foes to engage in environmental and 
ecological warfare, the latest example being Saddam Hussein's oil spill warfare in the Gulf 
War. The ability to militarize some bioemedians so that they could quickly be used as 
countermeasures to deter this type of "poison pill" blackmail needs to be explored. Also, the 
chances of a less ethical foe to use biological methods (both lethal and non-lethal) suggests 
the need for the continued investigation of "anti-biological" biologicals. Clearly, the 
vaccines available in the Gulf War were very crude and some were untested on such a wide 
group beforehand to offer much real chance of countering potential biological weapons that 
Iraq might have used. 
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All these weapons, seemingly designed to reduce the bloodshed and suffering in 
conflict while making involvement "safer" for intervening forces, still must meet the tests 
and judgmental constraints that have been established by the international community as 
international law and the law of war for existing classes of weapons and the use of lethal 
force, respectively. In this context, it has been pointed out that the argument that NLWs 
should be considered more humane than other weapons, the primary purpose of which is to 
kill, may be too simplistic. For example, international human rights agreements and national 
constitutions may often prohibit inhumane forms of punishment or torture while at the same 
time allow capital punishment. This makes it apparent that death itself is not always 
considered to be the worst form of injury or suffering.227 Consideration of these factors and 
"a fate worse than death"228 should be a prime concern for policy makers in future attempts 
to control the use or deployment of non-lethal technologies in general. 
Additionally, even if a particular weapon is termed as legal and the use of it in a 
particular setting is judged legal, the ethical dimension of its use in the current "information 
age" will be judged by the international court of "world opinion." This additional 
consideration needs to be addressed before the U.S. fields these new weapons in an 
environment where the international press, with almost instantaneous speed, will report on 
the circumstances of use and results in the mass media. Finally, as "all politics are local,"229 
we needed to consider the regional and local cultural and sociopolitical factors governing the 
227 See in particular L. Doswald-Beck (ed.), Blinding Weapons: Reports of the Meetings of 
Experts Convened by the International Committee of the Red Cross on Battlefield Laser Weapons 1989-91 
(International Committee of the Red Cross: Geneva, 1993) and Kokoski, (1994), p. 383. 
228 An extreme example of this type of NLW is described in a novel by Ralph Peters, The War in 
2020 (New York: Simon & Shuster Inc., 1991), pp. 430-433. He describes an insidious "scrambler" 
electromagnetic radio-frequency weapons system that wounds instead of kills. The weapon simply destroys 
the victim's control over voluntary muscles - while the victim remains a fully intelligent human being, even 
though he is physically and utterly incapable of controlling his basic bodily functions. The force attacked 
by such weapons could not "lighten their load" by euthanizing thinking, feeling human beings who have lost 
the use of their body in service to their country. 
22Q Remark attributed to Speaker of the House, Rep. "Tip" O'Neill in his retirement speech before 
the house. 
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use of certain types of NLWs,230 as we move from an environment of "us against them" to 
involvements better characterized as "us helping them." In cases of involvement in 
peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance operations that may be part of a wider PCO, the 
perceptions of the "locals" in regard to certain types of NLWs may cause us to consider the 
situational substitution of other means. This may suggest the necessity for a large palette of 
options and the wider development of ever better non-lethal means as we undertake the task 
of determining the "ideal" NLW for a specific situation. 
The beauty of the QFD matrices analysis technique is that it allowed the parallelized 
comparison of a palette of NLWs against MOEs that correspond to specific operational tasks. 
Further work, by utilizing cross-functional groups of experts to define the matrices and smart 
decision assistance software, may provide operational commanders with the tools to take best 
advantage of these NLWs. As a one man project, this preliminary effort pales as a 
preliminary introduction to the proper deployment of QFD techniques in finding solutions 
to operational decision problems. 
C. GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS 
What lessons can be learned from this example for application when deterrence fails 
in the post-Cold War world? As transnational actors and sub-national actors join the nation- 
state actors in this new environment, it becomes harder to use the same levers of power in 
extended immediate or extended general deterrence to deter action by these ethnic, 
nationalist or religious actors. Clearly the "rogue" nation-states that exist also can see an 
opportunity for action - using international terrorism, proliferation, and proxies to exact their 
aims. 
230
 For example, reference the earlier Somalia anecdote relaying that it was culturally acceptable 
for U.S. servicemen to wield batons against youths trying to steal from them, as the Somali elders similarly 
used long sticks to control unruly youths (note 216, Chapter V, interview with Lt Michael McGuire (USN 
SEAL). On the other hand, the other examples of the inappropriate use of NLWs (bayonets in Okinawa 
strike in 1969, and the use of fixed bayonets by Guardsmen against rioting U.S. college students in the late 
1960s and early 1970s). 
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To react militarily the U.S. will be constrained by calls for incremental and 
multilateral actions and the use of military force as a last resort. This prevailing paradigm 
may insure that by the time the military options are taken the ultimate failure may be 
unavoidable. Additionally, large lethal force actions will not b e economically or politically 
feasible with domestic policy issues crowding them out of the policy agenda. NLWs may 
provide the intermediate means by which limited intervention could be achieved early in an 
effective crisis management contingency response. 
As a result, this analysis may also suggest a way to react effectively when deterrence 
has just been observed to fail. The early compellence role for these special operations forces 
or general purpose forces equipped with NLWs, supplemented by conventional resources, 
and aided by information tools that allow a fine-grained understanding of the enemy may 
allow the problem to be "nipped in the bud." In the same way these resources provided a 
framing event in theater in Panama, consistent and successful use of control warfare based 
forces may lead to better extended general deterrence by serving as a framing example to 
other potential challengers. Also, by using a control warfare perspective ahead of the 
intervention, the knowledge tools that model the resources needed to reach the desired 
morale and physical end state in a PCO may predict that the costs outweigh the benefits. For 
the recent Somalia intervention, the question of how much effort it would actually take to 
subdue and compel the warring factions to desist and to restore democratic order may have 
resulted in an answer - more than we are willing to spend in blood and treasure. 
D. SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS 
These recommendations reflect specific research suggestions that follow up issues 
uncovered in this work but were beyond the scope of this thesis. The first specific 
recommendation is that the DoD Non-Lethal Steering Group provide direction for research 
on other recent PCO cases using similar MOEs to fully develop a database of criteria for 
possible policy development and procurement of NLWs as part of an integrated approach to 
all the measure and tools that come together when we think of RMA or paradigm shift to 
control warfare. Using a cross-functional groups of experts to develop nested an iterative 
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QFD matrices including the "house of quality" cross correlation triangle that determines how 
the different MOEs and operational tasks deploy into their counter parts and examining all 
the existing and emerging operational tasks would define the open ended universe of 
knowledge for viewing NLWs with respect to these known tasks. 
The second recommendations is that interdisciplinary work b e undertaken to merge 
the qualitative findings of policy-based QFD analysis with Operations Analysis quantitative 
multi-attribute decision problem algorithms that describe the detailed characteristics of the 
specific types of NLWs that fit within the functional categories that presently exist or that 
are projected to exist by 2020. The third recommendation addresses the increased emphasis 
on the counter-proliferation mission with the establishment of the Counter-proliferation 
Initiative, work dedicated exclusively to exploring the uses for non-lethal weapons within 
the "very special war" scenarios possible under this heading seems like a mandatory 
requirement. The fourth recommendation concerns the issue of countermeasures for NLWs. 
With one of the most highly technologically dependent societies in the world, the U.S. 
presents a lucrative target for "poorer" forces desperate to gain any advantage possible by the 
use of "nice" or "nasty" NLWs. Just as we view the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction as the poor man's nuke, the discussion of how or what would be targeted by an 
opponent deserves study, as well as the arms control implications for trying to suspend the 
deployment of some of the nastier NLWs possible. A fifth recommendation concerns a 
merged or synergistic study of how PSYOPS, Electronic Warfare, Information Warfare, 
Command and Control Warfare, extremely precise lethality operations, sensor developments 
like Hovering UAV Battlestations, small RPV's, and Tier 11+ and Tier HI long dwell UAVs 
augmenting national intelligence collection capabilities and non-lethality all fit together as 
part of a new paradigm for military and political operations as part of the emerging study of 
the RMA. Granted, this last recommendation may push the envelope on what is possible to 
accomplish, but the first four seem like tasks that are within the realm of current possibilities. 
Finally, we must seriously consider the possibility for "backward compatibility" when 
forces operating within a control warfare paradigm meet second wave maneuver warfare 
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oriented forces or first wave attrition warfare oriented force on the expanded field of battle. 
The non-lethal weapons that the control warfare forces bring to battle must effectively 
address the type of foe faced. The singular advantage of being the first to engage in robust 
and redundantly supported control warfare may create similar advantages as those realized 
by the German's Blitzkrieg development in World War EL Before the allies caught up with 
this operational maneuver warfare innovation and re-leveled the playing field in the 
constantly raised battle of brinkmanship that still defines warfare as we move into the 
twenty-first century, the German's held the figurative and literal high ground. Because there 
is no chance for "forward compatibility" for forces that cannot operate with respect to a new 
paradigm that they have yet to internalize, the force that can operate within this new 
paradigm and understands 'backward compatibility" is going to innovate, adapt, and 
decisively defeat the literally and figuratively outgunned foe. I recommend that we be first 
to get all the elements correctly coordinated and orchestrated. Woe be unto the opponent 
who meets this force. Leading, fighting, managing resources, and operating effectively with 
robust and redundant interconnections in a chaotic environment will define the control 
warfare based force. The necessity for a force that deals effectively with complexity and 
consists of high quality well trained troops that can network their operations effectively over 
a dispersed battlefield/space and coordinate and orchestrate their forces to work in concert 
with other government agencies, coalition partners, and non-government organizations while 
employing a requisite variety of weapons and tool options, including non-lethal weapons as 
an integral part of this mix, defines the vision of a twenty-first century U.S. force that will 
prevail in the "special wars" yet to come. 
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APPENDIX A - NLW TYPES 
This appendix lists the major types and technologies of NLWs that are discussed in 
the thesis. It is not intended to be all inclusive, but it should represent the majority of 
possible weapons systems that are currently being discussed in the referenced literature on 
NLWs. The format used for our classification here relies primarily on the work done by 
Major Joseph W. Cook, m (et al) in a study done at the USAFA for HQ USAF/XOXI, Non- 
Lethal Weapons and Special Operations: Technologies, Legalities, and Potential Policies. 
This format was used because it dovetails with the way the legal and academic communities 
already view lethal chemical and biological weapons for arms control discussions. 
It was easy to include electromagnetic weapons as another major type together with 
the these two. Lasers have garnered so much attention in recent discussions that we break 
out this category of electromagnetic weapons for its own separate treatment. However, some 
of the technologies or types of NLWs don't fit so neatly into one major category. They define 
their own niche and will be discussed separately. 
A. BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS AS NLWS 
Biological agents are living organisms (bacteria, viruses, fungi, protozoa, and 
rickettsiae) or the toxins derived from such organisms. These organisms of toxins can be 
targeted against animals, plants, or materiel. Recombinant DNA technology allows the 
development of designer biological weapons that attack almost anything desired. The ability 
to target a particular ethnic group is even a possibility. 
The use of deadly biological agents such as anthrax against humans is probably the 
most universally accepted prohibition in modern warfare (Ref. 1972 BWC). NLW variants 
of biological agents designed to make humans sick or reduce their ability to function have 
certainly been developed, but none could truly be classified as non-lethal. Routine 
vaccinations, as well as normally non-lethal diseases such as influenza can sometimes result 
in death. The idea of dosage or control for non-lethal biologicals for use against personnel, 
thus remains a nebulous subject.  One proposed candidate for a Bio - NLW would be a 
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clandestine agent that resulted in such a mild effect that the target population would be 
unaware of their reduced ability. Another proposal is a biological allergen that could be used 
for area denial. 
Biological agents for use against crops and plants would be very difficult to control. 
One possible anecdotal example, that some speculate about, was the use of some kind of 
fungus for infestation of the coca plants in the Upper Huallaga Valley in Peru. However, it 
appears that this problem was caused by the over-intensive farming methods and not any 
specialized agent. 
Biological agents for use against materiel are the predominant types currently under 
discussion. The burgeoning and well-accepted field of bioremediation relies on non-lethal 
bio-agents to clean up oil spills and digest toxic materials at hazardous waste sites. The 
development of "bugs" that will eat almost anything appears to be possible. The introduction 
of existing bioremediation agents in fuel or POL supplies could devastate an army's mobility. 
If our strategic oil reserve became contaminated, the economic and strategic costs could be 
enormous. Similarly, the introduction of a bug that eats silicon (the semiconductor substrate 
for all micro-electronics) could shut down critical computer, communications, and military 
guidance systems. The primary limitation to such weapons appears to be their unpredictable 
widespread effects and control rather than the capability to develop them. 
B. CHEMICAL NLWS 
As with biological weapons, chemical weapons can target animals, plants, and 
materiel. Non-lethal chemical agents that can target personnel come in numerous forms. 
The following categories list them. 
- Tear/Riot Gasses. Deaths have occurred from the use of these gasses. However, 
exceedingly liability-conscientious domestic law enforcement organizations continue to use 
them because their lethality (when used appropriately and with proper training) is very 
consistently low. The literature on their effectiveness is extensive and maintained by the 
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National Institute of Justice for the U.S. Department of Justice. The older CN type has been 
replaced by CS for area use. FOR point usage capisorum or "pepper sprays" is replacing the 
liquid form of CS, Mace. Some more exotic and rarely used riot gasses include HC (smoke 
screens) and some extremely malodorous substances. 
- Calmative Agents. These agents, sometimes called sleep agents, can be mixed with 
Dimethyl sulfoxide (DMSO) to allow them to be readily adsorbed through the skin and into 
the blood stream. Chemical agents could also be delivered by projecting onto or into the skin 
in solid or liquid form. Although tranquilizer guns seem like a poor idea because of the risk 
involved in their use, they are one means of incapacitating a subject. 
- Sticky Foam. Polymer agents that can be dispensed in a stream and will hopelessly stick 
a person to anything. 
- Super lubricants. Sometimes called liquid banana peel, they reduce traction to almost zero. 
- Markers. Designed for law enforcement, these chemicals can covertly or overtly mark 
criminals for a long period of time. They are just about impossible to wash off. 
Non-lethal chemicals that can attack plants include defoliants and crop specific destroyers. 
Non-lethal chemicals that attack materiel are promising and diverse. They include the 
following categories. 
- Combustion Alteration Technology (CAT). CAT agents change the viscosity or 
combustion characteristics of fuel to degrade engine performance. Engine failure is possible 
id the agent can be applied in sufficient quantities. 
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- Smart Metals. Alloys designed to fail or give off tell tail signs if used for "bad" purposes. 
Also, chemical tags could be ingrained into the metal to trace origin. These uses have been 
suggested for non/counter-proliferation tasks and for weapons tracing, respectively. 
- Supercaustics. Inorganic acids that target non-organic materials and cause them to fail. 
They may be stored in harmless binary forms. Problems may include inadvertent contact 
with humans. 
- Liquid Metal Embrittlement. Agents that severely weaken metal by chemically changing 
their molecular structure. They are clear, and leave an almost imperceptible residue. 
- Anti-traction Technology. These superlubricants are specially blended to attach specific 
targets like roads, rails, or runways. 
- Polymer Agents. Similar to sticky foam, but formulated to target materiel not personnel. 
Can deny the use of facilities or weapons. 
C. LASER NLWS 
Really a sub-class of electromagnetic weapons, they are discussed here separately 
because of the legal controversy over their use. Low energy lasers can be used to dazzle or 
blind personnel either temporarily or permanently. The most advanced blinding lasers 
oscillate between numerous frequencies so that countermeasures against them are virtually 
non-existent. High powered lasers can directly destroy materiel objects on the battlefield or 
create hot, high pressure plasmas in front of a target that can disable certain weapons. Laser 
range-finders and laser designators have been misused as low power laser weapons to blind 
pilots or soldiers. The Soviet-style systems, because they are so crude and need to be over- 
powered to work have been especially subject to this type use. The Iraqis are rumored to 
have blinded thousands of Iranians in the Iran/Iraq War with these systems. The Soviets 
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pointed systems like these on their warships at U.S. Naval Reconnaissance Aircraft in the 
1980s, but deny that they did so to purposely effect vision, nevertheless we signed a protocol 
with each other not to do this to each other anymore. 
One other development in laser technology is the isotropic radiator. These omnidirectional 
laser light sources are explosively driven to emit a short burst of laser light. This application 
seems to be best suited for self-protection, as anti-materiel measures that destroys the seeker 
head on a missile. 
D. ELECTROMAGNETIC NLWS 
This general type category includes many different types of NLWs that are directed at 
different target categories. The listing includes the following: 
- High Power Microwaves (HPM). Utilize an explosive or generated burst of microwave 
energy to disable materiel. Some talk of possible targeting of personnel to cause 
disorientation. 
- Conventional Electromagnetic Pulse (C-EMP) or Non-nuclear (NNEMP). Basically this 
weapon simulates the EMP effects of a small yield nuclear weapon. EMP disrupts and 
overloads semiconductor based (chip) electronic circuits and some smaller capacity discrete 
power devices. Outside of reports in Aviation Week and Space Technology, this subject 
seems designated as classified by the USG. 
- Electrofied Baton, Stun Gun, TASER. These small tactical weapons are designed to control 
personnel at close ranges by delivering a pulsed shock that incapacitates the individual. 
- High Intensity Light. Similar to low power spread Lasers, they temporarily flash blind 
individuals or sensors. The effect is much more pronounced at night. 
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- Visual Stimulus and Illusion. Basically this category includes strobe lights, large projected 
holograms, and high-tech camouflage. Strobes flickered at appropriate frequencies can cause 
nausea and incapacitation. Holograms are similar in concept to public relations displays and 
sky advertising as now being fielded by commercial promoters. 
- ELF Fields. Extremely low frequency electric or magnetic fields can be used to interfere 
with brain and body functions. 
E. ACOUSTIC WEAPONS 
These include simple amplified high intensity sound and other loud noises and some 
more sophisticated developments that may offer a more effective use of acoustic energy as 
aNLW. 
- Infrasound. This is powerful ultra low frequency sound (sub-sonic) that results in nausea 
and disorientation. Other variations on the theme include sonic bullets (really travelling 
toriodal wavefronts - donut shapes) that can pack a punch on the receiving end. 
- Sonic Detectors. Really more of a non-lethal tool, these devices are developed from the 
rescue industry and may detect human presence behind nonmetallic barriers or rubble. 
F. MECHANICAL WEAPONS 
This category includes familiar batons and nightsticks of law enforcement and some 
more advanced recently enhanced devices. 
- Bludgeoning Instruments. May include clubs, batons, night sticks, and rubber hoses. The 
misuse of these NLWs by many groups throughout history has caused more harm than good 
as an effective coercive measure. In fact, in Panama, the primary task of the 7th special 
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forces during the post-conflict rebuilding phase, when retraining the police, was to rid the 
National Police of rubber hoses used in interrogations of criminals, prisoners, or suspects. 
- Projectiles. These also have a long history and can be easily misused if the proper training 
is not provided in the use of specific devices. The listing includes shot bags, plastic or 
rubber bullets, foam rubber ball grenades and any other device that is fired explosively at 
personnel. 
- Barriers. The newest versions include explosively fired sticky/stinging nets and other 
ensnaring devices. Rapidly expanding foams and airbag restraints also fit this category. 
G. INFORMATIONAL WEAPONS 
This type include PSYOPs and other novel high tech possibilities. 
- Voice Synthesis. The ability to clone a person's voice and broadcast it. 
- Morphing. Visual images may be altered so that recorded actions may be easily fabricated 
to depict an individual speech or order that never actually existed. 
- Pyschotropic Weapons. Reported by the Russian press, this technique involves injecting 
subliminal messages into the minds of a target audience. 
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APPENDIX B - NLW EFFECTS 
This Appendix, from the U.S. Army Research Development and Evaluation Center 
(ARDEC) at Picatinny Arsenal in New Jersey, is included as the best unclassified source to 
accompany Appendix A when judging the applicability of NLWs for the QFD matrices 
analysis. All the categories listed were included in our evaluation except for the Time To 
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APPENDIX C - QFD ANALYSIS 
This appendix contains the output of the QFD/Capture software program used to 
evaluate NLWs. The data of interest for our evaluation is the sum total of the net 
assessments of NLWs for each of the four categories of NLWs for each case study. This 
single number is compared between the two case studies to determine how well NLWs 
would apply to the operational tasks within each case. This is done within the context of the 
situation faced by the U.S. forces as they approached each mission. For example, in a 
sensitivity analysis of the Urban case, if one was to assume that these NLWs did not just 
apply to the de facto situation after the invasion, but were brought in beforehand as part of 
a decision to maintain information dominance and presence, one would have to assume that 
the sum total of the net assessments would increase. This type of evaluation would be best 
left to more detailed cross-functional team studies, as it is to easy for this to only represent 
a self-fulfilled prophecy for this one-man effort. 
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Enemy communication disrupted (>95%) 
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Reaction delayed within 95% of target time 
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Case Study 2 - Follow-on Urban Campaign 
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